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Abstract
This study analyzes the 115 U.S. federal cases regarding the copyright protection of computer programs,
in order to examine how legal actors with different resources interact through their strategic
communication activities, which influence the structuring of the information environment of the copyright
system.
The framework of "authorship," "work," and "use" helps us understand the stakeholders' relationships and
struggles that are manifested in their legal arguments. The structural rules mainly concerning the concept
of authorship and work at first enabled the developers and copyright holders to make effective arguments
to extend copyright protection on their behalf. When the cases began to have more actors who are
developers but not copyright holders and the actors who are not developers but claim their rights in the
programs, the struggle between the developers and non-developers were manifested in their arguments
focusing on the concept of work and that of authorship. Through the legal actors' constant efforts to
legitimize their interests in computer programs, the construct of authorship has been mobilized yet
remained central. Artistic creativity that had been emphasized in other areas of copyright, and
"independent" creativity that had been emphasized in earlier cases of software copyright, is later
transformed to "scientific expertise, knowledge, and skills."
The findings of this study demonstrate the importance of the role of communication in structuration,
because the only way that the legal actors were able to legitimize their interests and possibly transform
the existing structural rules was through their communicative activities. The nature of the actor, i.e.,
whether she was a developing entity, was found to be a single most important factor that influences the
decisions made by the judges. However, only when the legal actor could successfully present herself as a
party that involved with developing computer programs, the judges were more likely to make a decision in
her favor. When the actor was a developer but she focused her arguments on the nature of the work
rather than her developing activity, the actor tended not to have any advantage over the other party.
Therefore, it was the legitimacy gained by communicating the nature of the actor, rather than the nature of
the actor itself, that made the difference in the ways the judges made decisions.
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ABSTRACT

Structural Continuity and Transformations of the U.S. Copyright Law
With Regard to Computer Programs:
Actors' Communicative Interactions
through the Use of Structural Rules and Resources

Jisuk Woo
Oscar H. Gandy Jr., Supervisor

This study analyzes the 115 U.S. federal cases regarding the copyright
protection of computer programs, in order to examine how legal actors with
different resources interact through their strategic communication activities,
which influence the structuring of the information environment of the
copyright system.
The framework of "authorship," "work," and "use" helps us
understand the stakeholders' relationships and struggles that are manifested
in their legal arguments. The structural rules mainly concerning the concept
of authorship and work at first enabled the developers and copyright holders
to make effective arguments to extend copyright protection on their behalf.
When the cases began to have more actors who are developers but not
copyright holders and the actors who are not developers but claim their rights
in the programs, the struggle between the developers and non-developers
were manifested in their arguments focusing on the concept of work and that
of authorship. Through the legal actors' constant efforts to legitimize their
interests in computer programs, the construct of authorship has been
mobilized yet remained central. Artistic creativity that had been emphasized
in other areas of copyright, and "independent" creativity that had been
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emphasized in earlier cases of software copyright, is later transformed to
"scientific expertise, knowledge, and skills."
The findings of this study demonstrate the importance of the role of
communication in structuration, because the only way that the legal actors
were able to legitimize their interests and possibly transform the existing
structural rules was through their communicative activities. The nature of
the actor, i.e., whether she was a developing entity, was found to be a single
most important factor that influences the decisions made by the judges.
However, only when the legal actor could successfully present herself as a
party that involved with developing computer programs, the judges were
more likely to make a decision in her favor. When the actor was a developer
but she focused her arguments on the nature of the work rather than her
developing activity, the actor tended not to have any advantage over the
other party. Therefore, it was the legitimacy gained by communicating the
nature of the actor, rather than the nature of the actor itself, that made the
difference in the ways the judges made decisions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of legal arguments and court decisions regarding the
copyright protection of computer programs in the United States. This study
aims to examine how the court decisions relate to the use of structural rules
and resources by legal actors - in this case, judges, plaintiffs and defendants and how these arguments and decisions influence future arguments and
decisions by reproducing and transforming structural rules.
Examining the copyright law in relation to computer programs has
both a theoretical significance as a communications study and a practical
implication. In a constantly changing, information-based society, copyright
law has a particular significance in that it controls the flow of information
and information technology. In addition, among the various technological
developments and changes that have been credited with having generated
great changes in human lives and relationships in society, computers have
transformed the way information is created, processed, transmitted, and
provided to individuals and institutions (Office of Technology Assessment,
1990, p. 3). Computer software has become a valuable resource for the
functioning of an information-based economy and the means to increase the
exchange of information. Questions as to what kind of rights are given to
whom with regard to computer software posit significant economic and social
implications, since the access to software plays an important role in increasing
the sharing of information, which is believed to be a fundamental basis for
scientific and social progress.
The difficulty to use existing legal regimes to protect a new technology
has been compounded by the special characteristics of computer programs.
While the computer software industry generates billions of dollars annually,
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programs that involve costly research and development can be copied illicitly
with ease and little expense. Another difficulty arising from the nature of
computer programs involves the fact that traditional distinctions among
various stages in the creation cannot be maintained: these programs are both
writings, descriptions, and processes (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986).
In addition, more and more computer programs continue to be one of the

intellectual work that is being done by teams. Finally, the development of
software programs can be characteristically incremental and cumulative, as
developers commonly adopt software design elements by consulting
examples in other programs (Samuelson, et. al., 1994). Therefore, while
computer technologies are fast-moving, the software industry is maturing,
and increased numbers and types of software users are entering, these unique
characteristics of computer software pose a remarkable challenge to the
existing regime of copyright law.
The fact that the U.s. copyright laws are enacted by the legislative
branch and interpreted by the judiciary may also have a significant
implication in the ways in which computer programs are protected and
information is disseminated. While the courts deal with particular incidents
involving two disputed parties and do not necessarily consider the broader
context of policy-making in an explicit way, the decisions concerning
copyright protection of computer software have a direct influence on the
computer software industry and users. The ways in which legal decisions are
made with regard to copyright protection of computer software have
significant policy implications because they provide rules and guidelines for
those involved with the development, the distribution, and the use of
computer software.

2

While acknowledging the social and the economic significance of the
protection of computer software, legal scholars and decision makers who
have attempted to examine the copyright law in relation to computer
programs have been puzzled. Many articles and debates about the legal
protection of computer software have focused on how existing laws can or
should apply to computer programs, i.e., what is the scope of copyright
protection, who has the ownership, who has the right to copy or to distribute,
and how much should be protected from the use of competitors or other
users (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986). Some scholars who argue for a
sui generis approach conducted normative analyses of the kind of legal

protection that would be socially desirable for computer software and how it
might best be accomplished, and suggested that a new system for protecting
the software is necessary (see Samuelson, et. al., 1994). A recent notable
contribution stems from various interdisciplinary approaches of literary and
legal critics who try to understand the underlying values and mechanisms in
copyright law (see Woodmansee and Jaszi, 1994; Sherman and Strowel, 1994).
While these studies provide some insights into the elements of
copyright law in relation to computer software, systematic studies on the
processes in which software copyright decisions are made have been scarce.
Studies that examine the mechanisms by which the copyright law with
regards to computer software has been established and transformed are
almost non-existent. The factors that influence the judges' decision-making
in the software copyright law have not been systematically identified. This
poses a serious problem in that various approaches to understand the
mechanisms by which the software copyright law is shaped remain un-tested.
This study attempts to compare the approaches and derive a framework that
will help us capture the variety and diversity of factors that shape copyright
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law, by analyzing all the decisions and arguments that were made in the U. S.
federal cases regarding the copyright protection of computer software.
This study also distinguishes itself from the other approaches to study
the copyright law of computer software, in that it conceptualizes the
communicative interactions among the legal actors reflected in case reports as
the primary focus of the mechanism, by which the copyright law is
established and transformed. The laws and practices of the copyright system,
as those of any legal system, reflect the relationships among the stakeholders
and tensions among the interests and values that copyright law tries to
protect. At the same time, the laws and practices also generate and reinforce
these relationships and tensions. In order to understand the underlying
relationships and competing interests and values, this study conceptualizes
interactions between knowledgeable legal actors - judges, plaintiffs and
defendants - and institutions as forces influencing the copyright decisions.
The interactions between actors and institutions in the legal decision making
processes are basically made through legal arguments, which become a crucial
nexus providing an understanding of the decision making process regarding
computer software. Providing a useful framework to examine the legal
arguments and decisions as communication processes of knowledgeable
actors, and examining the role of communication in the process of the
reproduction and transformation of a legal regime, is the main concern of
this study.
Examining the copyright rules and discourses regarding computer
software is particularly informative to understand interactions among the
actors and institutional rules, because the rules in this area are relatively lessgrounded but still evolving. In the U.S. Constitution, the intellectual
property clause grants to Congress the power to enact copyright legislation in
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order to promote the progress of science and useful arts. The enacted law is
constantly being re-interpreted by individual decisions made in the courts.
Given that computer software has not traditionally been protected by
copyright, and that the protection of software requires certain amount of
expertise in the area of computer technology, room for variation in the
interpretation of the enacted law when applied to the specific cases could be
especially large.
The focus of the study is on how different stakeholders with differing
resources use the rules and resources in legal arguments, which influence the
structuring of the information environment of the copyright system. How,
in the process of actors' communicative interactions, the rules and resources
themselves are reproduced and transformed is the main concern of this
study. Examining copyright decisions and arguments on computer software
would not only enhance our understanding of the role of communication in
legal decision-making processes, but also would provide a context for
evaluating these decisions.

The next chapter is an analysis of theoretical frameworks that help us
to inquire into the processes in which the copyright law is shaped. The
theoretical perspectives that are discussed include: Critical Legal Studies that
emphasize the role of actors in legal processes; instrumentalist and
structuralist theories that focus on influential factors on social reproduction
and change; and the theory of structuration formulated by Giddens that
reconciles the relationship between actors and structures. The conceptual
framework for this study is proposed in the end.
In the third chapter, the conceptual framework proposed in the second
chapter is applied to the copyright system of computer software. The critical
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concepts of the framework are defined and discussed in relation to the
copyright decision making process. In order to derive useful frames to
analyze legal arguments, this chapter examines some of the approaches
attempted to understand the copyright principles and to recognize the social,
political, and economic underpinnings that contributed to the shaping of the
copyright concept and system. The main research questions are proposed in
the end.
The fourth chapter describes the methods used in gathering data,
instrumenting variables, and analyzing the data. The final three chapters are
the result of the analyses, first one being descriptive analyses of the nature of
cases and other variables, second being analyses of the relationships between
the legal actors, issues, and court decisions, and third being analyses of the
legal actors' use of rules and resources reflected in their legal arguments. The
findings of the third analysis identify the ways in which the structural rules
are created, reproduced, and transformed.
The last chapter combines the three analyses to examine the
interactions among the actors, their use of structural rules and resources, and
decisions. The process of structuration in the copyright arguments and
decisions is illustrated. Also, the relationships, interests, and values that
have been reflected, generated, transformed, and reinforced in this process are
discussed.

6

It

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The literature review in this chapter consists of five related themes. It
starts with a discussion of different approaches to the legal decision making
process, with a special focus on the Liberal legal formalism and the Critical
Legal Studies. In order to examine how social structures and social actors may
playa role in the legal decision-making process, social theories regarding the
social structure and actors are discussed, with a particular emphasis on the
tension between the structuralist and the instrumentalist strands. Giddens's
theory of structuration which attempts to reconcile this tension is discussed
in detail, and the analytical framework of this study is proposed. The
importance of the communication aspect, in terms of legal arguments made
by knowledgeable legal actors, is emphasized here. Finally, how the scheme
of news discourse analysis drawn from the perspective of constructivism may
help examine the legal arguments is discussed.

Legal System: Decisions and Arguments

There are roughly two broad streams in the legal scholarship that
characterize the legal system and legal decision making: Liberal legal
formalism, which dominates the mainstream law and practice, and Critical
Legal Studies (CLS), which is a new current in contemporary legal theory.
The doctrine of legal formalism posits that law is a body of intelligible and
impersonal purposes, policies and principles that form a gap-less system of
rules from which legal reasoning and subsequent decisions are derived
(Unger, 1983, p. 1). These decisions are assumed to come after 'objective'
hearings where evidence is presented according to certain rules, and thus
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'truth' ultimately emerges. Combined with the doctrine of objectivism, the
Liberal legal scholarship views law as an apolitical realm for the exercises of
power relationships. The decision making process itself supposedly
guarantees that law remains above politics, mainly due to the contribution of
the attributes of the legal system including "judicial subservience to a
Constitution, statutes and precedent; the quasi-scientific, objective nature of
legal analysis; and the technical expertise of judges and lawyers" (Kairys, 1982,
p.1).

The Liberal legal scholarship, therefore, believe that legal systems,
decisions and arguments are natural, neutral, apolitical, rational and
objective. Consequently, political, social, and economic factors which might
influence the decision making processes, and the implications of the
decisions have not received much attention by Liberal legal scholars. In
particular, legal decisions involving new technology such as computer
programs are more easily argued and perceived to be "value-free," "technical"
decisions.
The assumption that legal decisions and arguments are value-free or
objective is rejected by CLS scholars who generally believe that any kind of
human reality is socially constructed. Within the perspective of the social
construction of reality, neither language nor collective procedures can be
value-neutral: individual selves are inseparable from society, and aspects of
human social life such as "rights" are always socially constructed, contingent,
and context-bound, instead of natural or universal (Streeter, 1990, p. 4). Thus,
Critical Legal Studies is critical of the belief in neutral and objective legal
systems and decisions, and points out that law is a form of human activity, a
practice carried out by people (Olsen, 1990, p. 208). Boyle makes a similar
point by arguing that ineradicable subjectivity is brought to the legal system by
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the very fact of the judge's humanity (1985, p. 692). According to the CLS
scholars, the activities of lawyers and judges are embedded in social structure,
not objective procedures that stand above social reality and power relations
(Streeter, p. 4). In the same vein, Bettig (1989) analyzed the Betamax case on
home recording rights and VCRs, and found that the formal rules that judges
are supposed to follow in reaching decisions in particular areas of litigation
are biased toward the protection of private property. He points out that not
only are the judges themselves biased toward the protection of private
property rights, but so are the formal rules that they are required to apply (p.
190). However, the selection of particular rules and different interpretations
of the rules were not examined in this study.
The CLS scholars also argue that it is impossible to separate law from
politics not only because of the judge'S subjectivity, but also of the
impossibility of constructing a set of rules that could be applied in a neutral or
objective manner (Boyle, 1985, p. 692). Critical Legal Studies reject the notion
that law is principled, which is based upon the belief that law consists of a few
rules and principles and that these general rules provide a principled basis for
deciding individual cases (Olsen, 1990, p. 208). According to CLS scholars, law
is actually made up of an agglomeration of specific rules and some general
standards, and the rules are too specific, definite, and contextualized to count
as principles and the standards are too vague and indeterminate to decide
cases (Olsen, 1990, pp. 208-209). Therefore, law is not abstract and principled
but personalized and contextualized (Olsen, 1990, pp. 208-209).
This non-principleness of law has implications related to the concept of
legal indeterminacy advanced by Critical Legal Studies. Most forms of legal
Liberalism rely on some sense of the permanence and universality of the
meaning of words. Liberal legal scholarship assumes that given a certain set
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of legal rules and a certain legally defined situation, a properly trained judge
or lawyer, within certain boundaries, can use his or her expertise in legal
language and reasoning to arrive at, or at least approximate, the correct
interpretation (Streeter, 1990, p.46). CLS reject this "idealized model" of law
by stressing the inconsistency in the application of legal doctrine, evidenced
by the wide range of choices and outcomes that are possible in any particular
case.
Indeterminacy parallels the linguistic and literary premise that the
meaning of words is not fixed by their referent, but signs are arbitrary and
conventional (Streeter, 1990, p. 47). According to CLS, just as there is no
immutable language standard or logic that determines the "correctness" of
grammatical structures, there is no fixed, objective logic that can determine
the correctness of a legal decision (Cohen, 1935; Streeter, 1990, p. 47). The
premise that the meaning of words is not fixed, similarly illustrates that the
law enacted by the Congress is interpreted by the judiciary in individual cases
and is constantly re-interpreted and re-defined. As Patterson and Lindberg
(1991, p. 3) argue that all rules of law contain implied extensions and implied
limitations and are therefore subject to interpretation, it follows logically that
different interpretations can be possibly made from a single law.
Some of the CLS scholars have explored how legal modes of
interpretation change dramatically over time, so that what was once
considered a correct legal decision would now be considered incorrect, and
vice versa (Streeter, 1990, p. 47). From this perspective, law is fundamentally
indeterminate (Streeter, 1990, p. 47). Using detailed textual analyses of laws
and legal judgments, CLS scholars show that opposite interpretations are
equally valid within the logic of legal reasoning (Streeter, 1990, p. 46-47). In
the absence of a coherent set of neutral or a priori premises, legal decisions
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and practices seem inescapably political and value-laden (Boyle, 1985, p. 740),
and contain enormous amounts of room for private action, and consistent
private action can essentially "make" law by re-shaping existing customs (or
even creating new ones) that may subsequently be honored by the courts.
The premise of the CLS suggests the importance of legal arguments and
discourse. Since legal actors are human and social beings, the understandings
and the perceptions of the judges and lawyers about the issues are important
in decision-making. In addition, the legal system and rules upon which the
decisions are based are not determinate nor principled. The understandings
and perceptions of a judge could be influenced by arguments made by
petitioners and defendants. The role of communication is important in
terms of who makes what kind of arguments in what ways with what effects
in the legal decision-making process. If legal decisions are assumed to be
highly subject to constant knowledgeable interplay, the activities of legal
scholars such as the types and modes of arguments may influence these
decisions. Also, the ability to make effective arguments may also influence
the decision-making process. The mechanisms through which legal decisions
are influenced by arguments are worth examining.
Studies on the legal decision making process in the particular area of
copyright are not substantial. Except for some studies concerning judges'
attitudes and their socialization, it is even harder to find studies that consider
individuals as active and knowledgeable actors in the legal decision making
process. If the legal system and decisions are not objective, neutral, and
principled as CLS suggests, there is no one principle or one set of rules that
can be relied upon to make a "correct" decision. Then decisions about who
should have the authorship, what kind of copyright should be given to
whom, etc. inevitably require value judgments emphasizing certain values or
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rights over other values or others' rights, which may be the result of
arguments made by actors. The activities of lawyers and judges are inevitably
embedded in the social structure, therefore these activities cannot be
considered objective procedures that stand above social reality and power
relations (Streeter, 1990, p. 46).

From the Structure versus Agency Dichotomy to the Process of Structuration

If legal decisions are closely interconnected with social structures and

the social actors' understandings and perceptions, it follows logically that
attention should be given to the mechanisms through which the legal
decisions may be influenced by social structures and actors. Many critical
scholars from the traditions of Marxism, neo-Marxism, and Critical Legal
Studies have provided some insight on this question, although copyright has
not been an issue of particular interest to these scholars.
Most of the approaches suggested by these critical scholars can be placed
into two broad categories: structuralism and instrumentalism.
Instrumentalism tends to emphasize human agency at the level of
consciousness while structuralism stresses unconscious, structural
determinations. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, but rather
represent different levels of analysis and emphasis. Both structuralism and
instrumentalism each by itself is a partial reflection of a dialectical interaction
between human agency and social structures. Among the various attempts to
deal with this nexus, Giddens's theory of structuration is suggested as a useful
framework to approach the legal decision making process and its relationship
to social structure and agency.
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An instrumentalist approach is in rejection of both deterministic

structuralism, and of formalism and of objectivism, upon which modern
legal thought is based. An instrumentalist perspective sees the struggle of the
agency and the ruling class to maintain their power as a main force of
influencing the social structure. Instrumentalist analysis seeks to explain
how the capitalist class is consciously able to protect and extend their interests
through the exercise of power in private and public institutions.
An instrumental approach to the role of law in capitalist society begins
by identifying the class background or social status of judicial elites. Miliband
argues that judges themselves are "by no means, and cannot be, independent
. of the multitude of influence, notably class origin, education, class situation
and professional tendency, ... (1969, p. 138)." He adds that judicial elites are
drawn mainly from the upper and middle layers of society. Miliband goes on
to emphasize the common professional legal background of most judges as a
profession that produces individuals "whose ideological dispositions are
traditionally cast in a highly conservative mold" (p. 138).
Kairys from the CLS perspective similarly stresses the humanity of
judges. He argues that judges share common backgrounds from their law
school experiences and from typically practicing commercial forms of law
(1982, p. 5). Bettig points out that these ideological influences enter the
process of legal decision-making and produce results that are not random
(1989, p. 188). CLS scholars, including Kairys, attempt to explore the ways in
which the law is neither separate from nor above politics, economics, culture,
values, or the particular ideological dispositions of judges (Kairys, 1982, p. 17).
They also emphasize the influence of social and political factors on judges,
both at the conscious and unconscious levels.
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However, this instrumentalist view of the law is criticized by many
scholars including Marxist scholars themselves. Some anti-rationalists point
out that it is very hard to imagine so many individuals accurately perceiving
their long-term self-interest and acting in concert to institutionalize it as law,
and always have the intended consequences (Boyle, 1985). A more general
criticism centers around the argument that the instrumentalist view tends to
de-emphasize the other aspects of the legal system. The recognition of this
deficiency provides the impetus for the second standard position in Marxist
legal thought. This is the move away from a focus on the wishes of the
individuals who make up the ruling class, and toward a focus on the
objective structural interests of that class (Miliband, 1969).
The theoretical approaches of structuralism have been applied in the
study of law and legal institutions. With law appearing as neutral, objective
and quasi-scientific, the judicial process itself in turn "lends a broader
legitimacy to the social and power relations and ideology that are reflected,
articulated, and enforced by the courts" (Unger, 1983, p. 4). The structuralist
picture of law generally has two tiers, a determining substructure and a
determined superstructure. Structuralism tries to explain why the social
structures reinforce class domination and inequalities. The structuralist
analysis sees the law as evolving out of the logic of capitalism, and hence
emphasizes particularly the determination of structures by the logic of capital
(Boyle, 1985, p. 722). This view sees the economy as determinant and the legal
system as an output. There are different accounts of the process by which the
economic substructure determines the ideological superstructure of the law,
morals, religion, and aesthetics, but all tend to stress the one-way nature of
the relationship: economy determines law rather than vice versa (Boyle, 1985,
pp. 722-723).
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The structuralist account of law is criticized as both being too
deterministic and assuming of the objective reality. I will discuss these two
criticisms separately. One important critique of structuralism is related to its
assumption of the "objective" structures and the "objective" legal principles.
But as discussed earlier, our ideas of "the subject" and "the structure as the
object" are both socially or inter-subjectively produced categories, and both
ideas come from the social world. Then it becomes meaningless to imagine
that there is an objective set of historical laws that act on the subjects of those
laws (Boyle, 1985, p. 759). Boyle argues that even if we assume that we
concede the existence of a structure, the structure is ultimately a distillation of
our experience of social life (pp. 759-760).
Gordon makes a similar point. He asserts that Marxist inquiries into
the objective determinants of social reality are meaningless, precisely because
it is social reality, that is, a reality constructed by subjects, and not by structures
(1982, p. 287). Gordon goes on to argue that "what we experience as 'social
reality' is something that we ourselves are constantly constructing... (p.
287)." His argument, however, is also vulnerable to another criticism stating
that it merely switches the privilege from the structuralist strand of hidden
economic determinism to the subjectivist strand of hidden personal choice
(Boyle, 1985, p. 776). Therefore, any amalgam of the two strands to create a
social theory becomes unstable.
Also relevant to the point made by Boyle is a criticism about the
deterministic aspect of structuralism. The structuralist approach to the law is
considered only to switch the determining power away from the individual
wills of capitalists towards the structural requisites of capitalism, and so does
not solve the deficiency of considering multiple social forces. But the
particular forms and functions of the structures are neither precisely
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determined nor inevitable because human beings create and recreate these
structures (Bettig, 1989, p. 196). The interdependency of the structuralist and
instrumentalist accounts seem to be recognized by some CLS scholars. Boyle
illustrates that in order to explain what is the structure, we have to posture
some "agency" to whom the knowledge of structural constraint will be usefuL
Similarly, to describe the instrumentalist strand, we have to rely on the
vision of transcending or breaking through a dominant structure. Therefore,
each strand both contradicts and relies on the other (Boyle, 1985, pp. 743-744).
A tension between the instrumentalist (also called subjectivist) and the
structuralist strands has long existed in critical legal thought. While the
instrumentalist strand stresses the importance of the individual's subjective
experience, conversely, the structuralist strand focuses on structures. Many
scholars from various scholarly perspectives have tried to resolve this
tension between structure and actors. As a response, a "relatively
autonomous" account of the law has been suggested, which leaves room for
dialectic interaction between multiple sets of structures, and imagines the
possibility of historically informed subjects. But critical theories of law
discussed so far, whether of instrumentalism, of structural determinism, or of
relatively autonomous varieties, all seem to be vulnerable to the criticism of
giving emphasis to one of the other of the elements, while disregarding the
interactive processes among them.
In order to solve the tension, the switch from structural or subjectivist
determinism to a social creation process is necessary. Some CLS scholars
suggest that we should try to expose the constraining quality of the structures
of everyday life, which are embedded in legal decisions, in standard
arguments, or in the assumptions upon which a discussion is based (Boyle,
1985, p. 743). In this case, "structure" is applied in a broader sense than its

16

technical usage, to mean a focus on clusters of beliefs, ideas, or economic
forces that supposedly have their own internal logic, and that somehow
organize, explain, or are reflected in the subjective experiences of those who
are affected by them (Boyle, 1985,p. 742).
The "processes" by which individuals in the society and social
structures interact through communication together to maintain or change
social relations are emphasized by some scholars. Some of the critics argue
for local theory or analysis, which Boyle defines as "a partial, non-privileged
account of particular areas of life that is informed by the mediating devices
that the tension had uncovered" (p. 774). Boyle, referring to Michel Foucault
(1980), suggests that our social theory should not be based on the analysis of
large-scale ideologies (p. 773). Here the attempt to reweigh the balance
between the subject and the structure involves making up local maps by
capturing momentarily our experience of the world (Boyle, 1985, pp. 778-780).
Foucault (1980) notes on the importance of local research:
"It is not that these global theories have not provided, nor
continue to provide in a fairly consistent fashion, useful tools
for local research.... But I believe these tools have only been
provided on the condition that the theoretical utility of these
discourses was in some sense put in abeyance, or at least
curtailed, divided, overthrown, theatricalised, or what you will.
In each case, the attempt to think in terms of a totality has
proved to be a hindrance to research.
So the main point to be gleaned from these events of the
last fifteen years, their predominant feature, is the local character
of criticism.... I believe that what this essentially local character
of criticism indicates in reality is an autonomous noncentralized kind of theoretical production, one,that is to say,
whose validity is not dependent on the approval of the
established regimes of thought." (p. 80-81)
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The research orientation suggested by Gordon also follows Foucault,
and looks for practices of domination in "the smallest, 'most routine, most
ordinary interactions of daily life" (Gordon, 1982, p. 290). The focus at the,
level of daily life is indeed useful and necessary if we want to examine the
processes in which legal decisions regarding copyright are made in which
individuals act relying on the structures that they have made. Giddens's
theory of structuration reflects his attempt to embrace this notion of routine
interactions in order to reconcile structuralist and subjectivist perspectives of
social theory (1984). The theory of structuration, which is consistent with the
assumption of this study that the reality (including the legal reality) is
symbolically and socially created rather than objective and concrete, provides
a useful framework to understand the interactions between social actors and
structures. The theory of structuration will next be discussed in detail.

Reproduction and Change of Structure

Giddens argues that "the basic domain of study of the social sciences is
neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form
of societal totality, but social practices ordered across time and space" (1984, p.
2). He notes that all structuralist theory fails to conceptualize structure as
being actively produced and reproduced by reflexive human agents, and
draws upon Weberian constructs of social action rejecting the tendency of deemphasizing the role of the subject (Parsons, 1989, p. 11).
The integration of structuralism and subjectivism is attempted by the
theory of structuration through its rigorous conceptualization of structure.
According to Giddens, structures are the rules and resources people use in
interaction, and they are analyzed as dualities: both the medium and the
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outcome of interaction. The structures act not only to constrain social action,
but also make social action possible by providing the paths for appropriate
behavior. Therefore, Giddens's structuration theory is different from the
structuralist view, not only in terms of its emphasis on social action, but also
in its explicit argument that structural elements "enable" as well as constrain
social action. He suggests social structures, or social systems to be envisioned
not as frameworks outside of and constraining social action, but as a product
of social action, enabling as well as limiting it. This is what he means by the
"duality of structure." Giddens argues that the parameters of structures are
continually re-created in the daily routines of social life:
"By duality of structure, I mean the essential
recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices:
structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of
practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution
of the agent and social practices, and 'exists" in the generating
moments of this constitution (Giddens, 1984, p.5)"

Therefore, structuration is the production and reproduction of social
systems through the application of generative rules and resources. Giddens
emphasizes the importance of recognizing the role of antecedent frameworks
of meaning in the recursive creation of social reality (pp. 25-28). The systems
of deeply layered structures explain the "framework" of the organization, in
this case, copyright law system, while people creating and recreating
structures form the patterns of interaction. The importance of individuals in
structuration needs to be underscored, since they are carriers and creators of
the rules and structures. Thus, structuration is grounded in individual
interactions that, over time and space, constitute institutions, and its analyses
can work to bridge the macro/micro dichotomy. A central concern of the
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structuration theory, therefore, is the identification of the conditions that
govern the continuity, or transformation, of structures; and thus the
reproduction of systems.
Stress is placed on social behavior and more specifically on the
purposiveness of individuals in situated practice. The knowledgeability and
directedness of social agents is underscored. Three levels of social awareness unconscious, practical, and discursive - are considered in the general theme of
re-creating the social fabric across time and space (Giddens, 1984, pp. 5-14).
Unconscious levels of social awareness have a psychological sense of
requiring a basic security or needs system. Practical consciousness refers to
that level of knowledge or awareness whereby daily social life is constituted
and reconstituted across time and space. Discursive consciousness presumes
the ability to give a coherent account of the social rules that govern one's
situation and action.
Since action involves power in the sense of transformative capacity,
the major issue is the power dimension inherent in the ability of an
individual to create his or her own reality (Giddens, 1984, p. 15). Power is
defined as the ability to achieve outcomes: it "presumes structures of
domination whereby the power flows smoothly in the process of social
reproduction" (Giddens, 1984, p. 257). Power is exercised and realized through
two types of social resources, allocative and authoritative (Giddens, 1984, p.
16). Allocative resources are of a material nature, while authoritative
resources tend to be associated with control over persons. Power, generated
through control of such resources, results in the continual reconstitution of
social domination: "Structures of domination involve asymmetries of
resources employed in the sustaining of power relations in and between
systems of interaction" (Giddens, 1979, p.93). But Giddens also recognizes that
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power relations are always two-way, in that even the most dependent actors
have some resources with which to influence the activities of their superiors
(1984, p.16). Giddens' notion of the relationship between resources and the
structure of domination illustrates that differences in the resources of the
legal actors may result in different levels of their discursive ability to make
arguments in the court, which in turn may influence the court's decisions.
Social change itself, consequently, cannot be based on structural or
dialectic models (Giddens, 1984, pp. 227-256). Rather, the social system is both
maintained and modified in every social act. The subtle but powerful
movement of change is contained by that component of the duality of
structure that precedes and frames social action, which in itself is the product
of antecedent social practice and both the intended and unintended
consequences of such activity. Change is also influenced by motivations of
knowledgeable social actors who seek to control the feedback that helps
further define and reconstitute the system. Also, unintended consequences
are an important outcome of this interaction of dominant and inferior agents,
which Giddens calls the "dialectic of control." Both intended and unintended
consequences serve to influence perceptions of social reality and social forms,
to modify future structures - rules and resources, and figure as a component
in social change (Giddens, 1984, p. 288-97).
Giddens's theory of structuration offers a conceptual framework for
understanding this process of power and dominance presumed in the process,
although it does not focus on organizations as actors due to its
anthropological orientation, and it does not explicitly address the legal
decision-making process. Employing the perspective of the structuration
theory, this study views the process of legal decision making as that of
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reproducing and transforming the structure by knowledgeable actors who use
the precedent structural framework, i.e., the process of'structuration.

Communication as a Force in Structuration

The following discussion concerns the way these concepts of the
structuration process might serve to illuminate social processes, especially the
process of legal decision making on copyright. A central concern of the
structuration theory is the identification of the conditions that govern the
reproduction or transformation of structures. In the routinization of
everyday life, many aspects of social systems develop a transparency, a "takenfor-grantedness," that commands their habitual reconstitution, but militates
against their conscious manipulation. Alternatively, some components are
apparent and understood and thereby open to attempts at control. Each
component plays a role in affecting social or political interaction, and such
interaction in turn reconstitutes those different forms. Since actors tend not
to see such structures as greatly malleable, their "taken-for-granted" nature
provides the lever for their chronic social regeneration.
Thus, this study on copyright decision making can be informed
through the analysis of both the transparent and the apparent components of
social structure and the examination of how the structure of the copyright
system is reproduced. Differing areas of analysis are needed to answer this.
First, the examination of the reproduction of the structure starts with the
analysis of the pre-existing structural rules and resources which are used as
assumptions of authority and legitimacy which frame interactions among
legal actors. The identification of rules and resources that constrain and
enable legal actors in issues of copyright protection of computer software is
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necessary. How these rules and resources change over time are also
examined.
The second analysis assesses the allocative resources of the
knowledgeable actors which can be used to employ these rules and resources.
In the case of copyright law decision making, the actors comprise judges,

petitioners, and defendants. Thus a description of resources available to
various actors, of how such resources are used, and of how there might be
"asymmetries of autonomy and dependence" among knowledgeable actors
(Giddens, 1984, p.289) is the main concern of this analysis.
The symmetries or asymmetries of the actors' resources are expected to
be reflected in the ways in which they employ those rules and resources in
making interpretive schemes and norms. Therefore, the third analysis
attempts to discover how the rules and resources defined in the first analysis
are used in interpretive and normative arguments regarding the copyright
protection of computer software. The ways in which the structural rules and
resources as well as allocative resources shape the communicative
interactions of actors in future litigations are the main concern of the
analysis.
Based on these analyses, the relationship between the level of actors'
allocative resources and court decisions is analyzed. In addition, the
relationship between the use of rules and resources and court decisions is
analyzed. Decisions made by judges become intended and unintended
consequences of these activities of knowledgeable actors which again form
conditions for further action, although these consequences may not be
acknowledged by actors. How the decisions and arguments accepted as
legitimate contribute to reproducing recursive structure consisting of rules
and resources can be also examined by conducting these analyses. The
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analyses that are conducted across time allow us to learn when and how
changes in the structure may occur.
It is examined how resources and other structured properties of the

copyright legal system are drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable
actors in the course of communicative interactions, and how these
communicative interactions relate to the judges' decision making processes.
In this way, the patterns of maintenance and transformation of rules and

resources relevant to the ways in which knowledgeable actors make
arguments are examined. The interplay between the legal structure related to
copyright and the actors' use of the structural frameworks, which again forms
the structure for further action, is significant in determining how the
relationships of domination are sustained. The findings of this study should
provide an insight on the processes in which power and dominance are
practiced through communication in the copyright decision making process.

Typification and Objectification Through Legal Arguments

The process of communication activities in legal decision making is a
central notion of this study. This section discusses the two central concepts of
the news discourse analysis that are directly related to the process of
structuration: typification and objectification. A conceptual framework and
analytic methods of examining news discourse that have developed and
refined in the field of communication provide a fruitful insight in examining
the role of legal arguments in the decision making process.
The analogy between the perspectives in the legal scholarship and in
the study of news is striking. There are two broad theoretical perspectives
that could guide studies on news stories: One is the research on news bias and
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objectivity and another is the research on news framing in the construction of
news discourse. The study of objectivity and bias and Liberal legal formalism
are both under the doctrine of objectivism, in which value-free and fixed
accounts of reality are assumed to be possible. The news discourse approach
and Critical Legal Studies, on the other hand, share the premise of
constructivism, in which meanings of language are not fixed but arbitrary and
conventional, and the notion that reality is seen not as a given set of facts or
rules, but as the result of particular way of constructing reality (Hall, 1982).
The notion of journalistic objectivity consists of two dimensions:
"factuality" and "balance or impartiality" (McManus, 1991). Balance or
impartiality means giving fair and equal treatment to opposing camps and
requires that reports include both positive and negative value judgments
(McManus, 1991; Hacket, 1984). The notion of factuality suggests that news
reporting is a mirror of reality, and that the journalist's mission is to find
truth and disseminate it (Hacket, 1984). The two components of factuality and
impartiality are incompatible at an epistemological level. The notion of
balance assumes a relativist position in which bias is avoided by juxtaposing
competing, incompatible, and equally valid world views, while the goal of
factuality implies a non-relativist affirmation of the ultimate "knowability"
of the truth. It logically follows that news content that can be regarded as
"balanced" reporting is not necessarily a "reflection of reality" (Hacket, 1984).
In addition to their incompatibility, the assumption that a plurality of
viewpoints approximates truth is also problematic. Networks' attempts to
balance news stories are partly a response to government fairness rules and to
the concerns of affiliate stations (Epstein, 1974). Also, the journalist's attempt
to present conflicting truth-claims is one of several "strategic rituals,"
through which news workers protect themselves from such occupational
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hazards as missed deadlines, libel suits, and superiors' reprimands
(Tuchman, 1972). Since journalists often depend upon legitimized
institutions for "objective" facts and information, media professionalism and
the cannons of objectivity, ironically become an unarticulated commitment
to the established order.
Another assumption of objectivity is the notion of "factual reality." The
notion assumes that facts can be separated from opinion or value judgments,
that journalists can be fully detached observers of the external world, and that
a neutral transmission of an event through the media is possible. But since
language cannot function on its own to transmit the meaning presumably
inherent in news events, neutral and value-free news is impossible. Even
those who advocate journalistic objectivity acknowledge that it is impossible
for journalists to stay value-free in reporting social events because no account
is independent of the perceiver (McManus, 1991).
If no observation or presentation of observation via text can be value-

free, it follows logically that the news media unavoidably structure their
representations of social and political events in ways which are not pre-given
in themselves, nor is this representation necessarily the "distortion" of the
real. Thus, news media inevitably involves a process by which meaning is
constructed. The premise that social reality is constructed actively is reflected
in analyses of the role of mass media frames in shaping public discourse and
in reproducing the dominant culture (Tuchman, 1978; Gitlin, 1979; Gamson,
1988). It is suggested that through the process of ideology as a system of
coding reality, journalists tend to serve as a support for the reproduction of a
dominant ideological discursive field (Hall, 1982).
Constructivism makes interpretive processes central, and stresses the
interpretive scheme which plays a decisive role in the construction of
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meaning of everyday life (Berger and Luckman, 1967). In this perspective,
discourses have been defined as "historically specific, socially situated,
signifying practices" (Fraser, 1992). In discourse analysis, news text is viewed
as a system of organized signs and of symbolic devices that may interact with
audience members in the construction of meaning. Assuming that these
signs and symbolic devices are not put together randomly, but are involved
with some kind of persuasion, discourse analyses pay attention to the
basically ideological nature of the media reconstruction of reality, as a form of
reproduction of the dominant forces and ideologies in society.
Drawing on these premises, scholars of news discourse analysis
consider discourse as a process rather than a text, and understand the news
discourse as a meaning construction process. The act of making news is
considered the act of constructing reality, and the news itself is socially
constructed (Tuchman, 1978). Van Dijk (1988) also approaches news as a type
of discourse as a form of interaction, and views media discourse as a form of
social and institutional practice. In short, news discourse analysis is
concerned with the interplay between the interpretive processes of actors and
the structural elements in a society, which relates to the ideological processes
of news discourse. The primary contribution of the scholars in this area is
their attempt to link social and cognitive dimensions of the news
construction process. The central concepts of the news discourse process
involving the news text production and comprehension are typification and
objectification.
The notion of typification relates to the social coordination of time and
space in human activities. Drawing on the concept of frames (or script,
schemata, constructs, etc.) as a concept related to human cognition, framing is
viewed as an act of providing the ordering of activities and meanings. Berger
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and Luckman (1967) observe that the reality of everyday life contains
typificatory schemes in terms of which others are apprehended and dealt with
in face-to-face encounters. In face-to-face situations, the typificatory schemes
of the two people enter into an ongoing negotiation. They argue that social
structure is the sum total of these typifications and of the recurrent patterns of
interaction established by means of the typifications. Goffman (1974) also
notes that frameworks that are implied when people recognize a particular
event render what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect into something
meaningful. He argues that people intend to perceive events in terms of
primary frameworks, and the type of framework they employ provides a way
of a description to which it's applied.
Tuchman (1978) applies this notion of frameworks or typificatory
schemes to the news production process. Her notion of typification refers to a
classification in which relevant characteristics are central to the solution of
practical tasks or problems at hand, and are constituted and grounded in
everyday activity. She points out that by reducing all phenomena to known
classifications, newsworkers are allowed to manage the unexpected and
produce a fixed amount of news (independent of what really happens) within
the constraints of deadlines or budget limitations. Owing to these
typifications, the occurrences of the everyday world can be subjected to
routine processing and dissemination. These classificatory schemes also
channel the newsworkers' perceptions of everyday world and guide decisions
on what is newsworthy. Therefore, the news typifications become part of the
reporter's professional stock of knowledge-at-hand, and the use of typification
is a necessary, routinized, organizational device that helps to produce news.
Typification and classificatory schemes can be an element that
influences, and is influenced by the internal structures of news texts. Hall
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(1982) makes a similar argument that since meaning does not depend on
"how things are" but on "how things are signified," the internal structures
rather than content will be important. According to him, particular
discursive formulations would be ideological, not because of the manifest bias
or distortions of their surface contents, but because they were generated out
of, or were transformations based on, a limited ideological matrix or set.
Tuchman's (1978) concept of typifications is also rather content-free. She
argues that typifications of kinds of news draw upon the "way" occurrences
happen, not upon "what" is happening, although some sort of occurrences
are likely to happen one way.
Gamson (1983; 1988), in his examination of the mechanisms by which
frames in the news text relate to the public opinion, also argues that
journalists' working norms and practices, including journalists' routine
relationship with official sponsors and with other journalists, play an
important role in the production of an issue culture, since they influence the
organization of signature elements in the newsmaking processes. He
emphasizes that the idea elements in an issue culture are not separated, but
are organized and grouped into interpretive packages. He calls this package
an "interpretive" package to relate it to human cognitive processing.

These

interpretive packages are produced in a complex process involving an
interaction between sources and journalists.
These packages are divided into two parts: one deals with the pattern
organizing (framing) nature of the issue culture, and the other with
reasoning and justifications for positions. Framing devices are metaphors,
exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images. The reasoning
devices are roots, consequences, and appeals to principle. Using these
elements, Gamson provides a sophisticated framework in which to analyze
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framing devices, called a signature matrix. His categorization of a pattern
organizing nature and a reasoning/justifying nature of framing is related to
Giddens's (1984) notion of interpretive schemes and normative schemes as
modalities of communication. Normative elements and codes of
signification are the two feature of structural rules. According to Giddens,
interpretive schemes are the modes of typification incorporated within actors'
stocks of knowledge, applied reflexively in the sustaining of structuration.
Thus typification and objectification can be parallel to Giddens's notion of
signification and legitimation.
Typification is a concept that is employed to relate the cognitive
schemes of newsmakers and the internal structure of the news text.
Typification is a routinized framework and/or schemes through which
newsmakers understand phenomena in the world and process other source
materials. Therefore, typifications work not only as constraints but also as
enablements to newsmakers. These cognitive schemes, and the notion of
newsworthiness defined through the schemes, are being constantly redefined
by newsmakers and influenced by the structure of the news text itself.
An important point related to the notion of typification is that of

objectification. The typified categories are often presented as objective
categories, not as constructed or changeable (Tuchman, 1978). If objectified,
typifications are more likely to be used by newsworkers and taken for granted
by them and the audience. Presenting the typificatory schemes as objectively
real elements is a legitimation process (Berger and Luckman, 1966). The
"taken-for-grantedness" is also recognized by Giddens (1984). According to
him, many aspects of social systems develop a transparency, a taken-forgrantedness. Since actors tend not to see such structures as greatly malleable,
their taken-for-grated nature provides the lever for their social regeneration.
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In order to routinize their work and at the same time obtain legitimacy

and credibility, newsmakers try to provide facts and legitimate sources
(Tuchman, 1978). Thus, the facticity used by newsmakers not only creates an
illusion of objectivity and credibility, but also ultimately legitimates the status
quo. The rules requiring and identifying proper sources, and identifying and
gathering facts are embedded in socially structured understandings of the
everyday world and its institutions (Tuchman, 1988). Therefore, despite the
fact that questions of "what are the facts," "what are the relevant facts," "who
are the legitimate sources" are all socially and ideologically defined and
constructed, the selective use of sources and facts can serve to legitimate the
sources themselves and the ideologies from which definitions are drawn.
Therefore, ideology or social meanings are crystallized into common sense
knowledge, considered natural, taken for granted, and thereby legitimated
and reproduced.
Many scholars stress how institutions including the media objectify
social meanings. Social meanings, constituted in social interactions, are
transformed into institutional and organizational rules and procedures that
may be invoked as resources to justify actions. Through these processes in
which social meanings are redefined and legitimated, the "processes" in
which the meanings are constructed themselves are also defined and
legitimated (Tuchman, 1978; Berger and Luckman, 1966).
In this process, the "facts" taken for granted by members of society
become resources to be invoked for the accomplishment of action (Tuchman,
1978). The facts and sources that have been socially constructed gain
legitimacy and facticity, thus serve as resources in the reproduction of social
structures. Therefore, socially, these resources are unequally distributed, and
individuals have different access to and ability to use the resources (Berger
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and Luckman, 1966; Tuchman, 1978). This implies that some people have a
greater ability to reproduce social meanings and construct social reality.
Therefore, a power dimension is inherent in the ability of an individual to
create his or her own reality (Giddens, 1984). Power is exercised and realized
through resources - allocative and authoritative - and since the typified
schemes and facts become resources, structural rules and resources are
reproduced.
The above discussions have tried to unify the various scholarly
approaches to news discourse into a coherent framework through the notions
of typification and objectification. News discourse is a process of meaning
construction in which the interplay between cognitive frameworks and
textual structures plays a central role. Newsmakers employ typified schemes
(frameworks) in the course of their daily activities to routinely negotiate the
production of news. These typificatory schemes which enable and constrain
this process involve the cognitive processes of the actors. The process of
typification relates to the structure of text as a discursive product. By being
objectified, typifications gain legitimacy and credibility. The objectified
typificatory schemes become structural rules and resources that people will
use in future interactions. Therefore, the schemes are a medium through
which news discourse process occurs and at the same time become an
outcome of the process. In this way, the parameters of structures are
continually re-created in the daily routines of social life. In addition, the
resources are not equally distributed, and power is exercised through the use
of these rules and resources to construct social meanings.
The application of this framework to the legal discourse generates a
two-fold contribution: one is in relation to the larger conceptual framework,
and the other from the discourse analysis devices suggested. Considering the
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legal decision making process as a meaning construction process involving
signification and legitimation practices, the framework discussed above
provides a helpful conceptualization of the legal decision making process, in
which meanings are mediated by legal arguments of the actors Oudges,
plaintiffs, and defendants) within the enablements and constraints of
routines related to the judiciary and larger social structure and ideologies.
Therefore, in analyzing legal discourse, the rules and resources of the legal
actions that frame the interactions among legal actors are essential.
Institutional rules or typified categories in the law system should be
identified.
The structure of the legal decision-making system can be considered to
be constructed by legal rules and facts - the structural rules - and human and
allocative resources that actors have. The actors employ these rules and
resources in generating the court opinions and decisions, and the decisions
are transformed into objective facts. Here, the legal rules and facts are
objectified and become themselves resources for legal actors. Through this
process of gaining facticity and objectivity, both the court decisions and
opinions as a discursive product, and the sources and facts used in the
decisions are legitimized. In this way, the structural rules and resources are
reproduced in the legal discourse. Therefore, identifying relevant legal rules
and facts and the resources that actors have provides an entry point for the
study of legal argumentation and decision-making.
Conceptualizing legal arguments and the decision-making process as a
form of discourse provides a particular insight, in that it suggests the
importance of analyzing the structures of discourse text in their relationship
to cognitive schemes. Through these cognitive schemes that involve the
codes of typifications and objectifications (interpretive schemes and
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normative schemes in Giddens's sense), the arguments made by plaintiffs
and defendants may shape the frames and options and thus influence the
judges' opinions.
Regarding the specific devices of analyzing the structures of arguments,
Gamson's (1983; 1989) categorization of exemplars and metaphors as framing
devices, and roots, consequences, and appeals to principle as reasoning
devices is particularly relevant to legal argumentation. Metaphors are used as
an explicit device to signify a certain understanding of the issue, by providing
an association between the metaphor and the principle subject. Exemplars are
the real events of the past or present which are used to frame the principle
subject. In legal argumentation, precedent cases and opinions are essential
elements that are often suggested as authorities to support actors' arguments.
Although all of these are "real" events or cases, the choices of the relevant
cases and proper interpretations of the opinions are not usually definitive.
The use of metaphor also involves choices of relevant objects or events, and
can be particularly powerful when used to present a new subject or event.
Thus these choices necessarily involve some social and ideological
judgmental processes. Therefore, the use of metaphors and exemplars is
another process of social construction of meaning, and also serves to
reproduce the existing structure. The representation of possible causes and
consequences, and justification through the moral appeals to some general
principles (in this case, statutes, precedents, etc.) are also frequently used in
legal discourse. The precedent as exemplars and as appeals to principles are
often used because they are considered as the "facts" and the "rules" in the
legal decision making. And the decisions made in this way with the use of
facts, sources and norms will gain facticity and objectivity, and become
another "facts" which are authoritative resources for later decisions. The
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kind of sources and facts that are more likely to be used and legitimized in
terms of expert testimony, the precedent, etc., may illustrate how the legal
system is maintained and changed.
Gamson (1988) also emphasizes that there is ample room for
disagreement within the overall frame, thus the frame can be interpreted in
different ways. This is why he constructed a matrix containing the "core
frame" and the "core position" separately, arguing that frames should not be
confused with positions for or against some specific policy measure. In the
analysis of legal argumentation, therefore, not only should the presence or
absence of certain legal theories be considered but also should the
interpretations of the theories and their relevance to the theories presented by
plaintiffs and defendants be examined.
As noted before, news typifications are considered part of the reporter's
professional stock of knowledge-at-hand (Tuchman, 1987). Being a
professional reporter capable of coping with idiosyncratic occurrences means
being able to use typifications to invoke appropriate reportorial techniques.
In a similar way, being a professional lawyer means being able to use
typifications (legal rules and facts) to invoke appropriate legal technique. This
point underscores the importance of the lawyers' ability to find out relevant
rules (legal theories) and factual evidence and authorities to support the
theories, which may help to frame the discourse in a way that is more likely
to give advantage to their clients. Therefore, these typifications and the
practical ability to employ them become rules and resources which enable
them to work effectively, and at the same time, constrain them, by providing
the frame for categorizing and evaluating events.
Related to this, Gamson's (1983) notion of sponsor activities can be
particularly relevant to the case of legal discourse, since it deals with more
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intentional and strategic arguments. He argues that certain framing packages
frequently have sponsors interested in promoting their careers. He suggests
that usually organizations employ professional specialists to prepare
materials. The importance of the use of legal expertise as a resource to
influence the framing of the issue is illustrated here again. Organizations
engaged in the court cases can be an another example of "signifying agents"
who are actively engaged in the production of meaning (Snow and Benford,
1988).

The framework of discourse analysis provides a dynamic model of
legal decision making processes which involve the interactions between
structures and actors, and between their social and cognitive dimensions.
Examining legal argumentation in terms of a legal discourse will help us to
understand how the legal actors work within these structural rules
employing their resources, and at the same time, redefine and reproduce the
structures. Through the interpretive processes among the actors, between
actors and textual structures, and between textual structures and larger
structural frameworks, a legal system is reconstructed. It is suggested that the
potential of change as well as of reproduction is also contained in the duality
of structure which are the product of antecedent practices (Giddens, 1988). As
Hall (1980) also implies, the possibility of the transformation of the system
may be also found in the change related to classificatory schemes, in other
words, the use of structural rules and resources.
Based on the discussions and the application of the framework, it is
proposed that a study be implemented to examine legal discourse regarding
copyright protection of computer software. This study should examine the
ways in which these rules and resources work as enablements and constraints
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to the actors in the system who try to obtain their objectives through their
communicative activities - their arguments. The main: con:cern: of the study
is how, in doin:g so, the legal actors produce and reproduce those rules an:d
resources in: the legal system, which in itself is the in:tended and unin:tended
product of antecedent social practice, and thereby reproduce the enablements
and constraints that are implicit in social and economic power relation:ships.
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Ill.

PLACING THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The second chapter discussed theoretical approaches which may be
applied to legal decision making processes, and proposed an analytical
framework in which the theory of structuration is applied to legal decision
making processes. In this chapter, the conceptual framework is placed in the
area of copyright law regarding computer software. The key concepts of the
framework in the context of copyright protection of computer software
should be defined in terms of structure (rules and resources) and processes of
action (arguments of actors who employ structural rules and resources). In
order to understand the structural rules of the copyright system, many
scholars have attempted various approaches to analyze the history of
copyright law and its origins and modern principles. Through a critical
examination of theses different approaches, a more detailed framework of
analyzing legal arguments in this study is drawn. Research questions are
developed in the end.

Structural Rules of the Copyright System: Legal Rules and Factual Evidence

In order to conceptualize the structure of the copyright system,
institutional orders of the legal system that frame the interactions among
legal actors should be identified. As noted before, the institutional orders
refer to the "rules and resources." Rules are first discussed in this section.
The concept of "rules" as an element of the structure in the structuration
theory is not the same as the conventional meaning of "rules," which some
of the scholars cited in this chapter also use. Rules, by Giddens, mean not

38

followable prescriptions but a form of practical knowledge of "how to do
something" rather than how something ought to or must be done (Cohen,
1987, p. 27). In order to avoid the possible confusion, rilles as an element of
structure will be referred to as "structural rules," whereas particular rilles to
be applied in legal decision making will be referred to "legal rules" in this
study.
Conrey and O'Barr (1990) point out that the law is rule-oriented, in
theory, if not always in practice. A thought process learned by law students
involves finding the facts, selecting the proper legal rules, and then applying
these rules to the facts to produce a result (Conrey and O'Barr, p. 59-60). In all
stages of legal decision making, the argument is central, whether in a written
or oral form. The structure of the argument is typically a complex blend of
legal theory and factual statements to justify the theory (Majone, 1989, pp. lOll). This paper conceptualizes "legal rules" and "facts" (or legal theory and

evidence) as the two important elements that constitute institutional orders
of the legal decision making system. In order to make any interactions in
courts meaningful, actors should act within this framework of legal rules and
facts.
The legal rules as an essential element of the legal structure are
illustrated in the study of Conrey and O'Barr, which examined the ways in
which ordinary people relate to the American legal system. Conrey and
O'Barr find a striking difference between the approaches of lay people and
legal professionals to the resolution of everyday problems. They categorize
litigants of informal courts as "rule-oriented" and "relational." Relational
litigants were found to focus heavily on status and social relationships,
believing that the law is empowered to assign rewards and punishments
according to broad notions of social need and entitlement. Rule-oriented
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litigants interpret disputes in terms of rules and principles that apply
irrespective of social status, seeing the law as a system of precise rules for
assessing responsibility, and rejecting as irrelevant everything not
circumscribed within these rules (pp. 58-59). Therefore, "rules" mentioned by
Conrey and a'Barr more precisely mean "legal" rules as opposed to
"structural" rules.
Conrey and a'Barr focus also on a fundamental division between those
who view the law as an enabling mechanism and those who view it as an
instrument of limitation. Among litigants, those with an ideology of
enablement tend to be those with a philosophy of social governance that we
characterize as relational. Thus they seek to apportion rights and
responsibilities according to need and social worth rather than rules of law.
However, Conrey and a'Barr argue, the "official" ideology of the legal system
is the ideology of limitation. The law in the framework of the official
ideology is limited to dealing with violations of specific rules of narrow
applicability. Moreover, far from seeking out wrongs to rights, the legal
system responds only to claims that are framed in appropriate terms.
Litigants who share this ideology, or are able to come to terms with it, enjoy
obvious practical advantages in dealing with the system (p. 163-164). The
rule-oriented accounts contain few "extraneous" facts, but instead concentrate
on the issues that the court is likely to deem relevant to the case. Conrey and
a'Barr argue that since the law is (legal) rule-oriented, these rule-oriented
accounts mesh better than relational ones with the logic of the law and the
agenda of the courts.
In addition to legal rules, "facts" are another element consisting of the
institutional order of the legal system. Facts are examined first in order to
find appropriate legal rules. The emphasis on facts upon which actors
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interact is well known in legal scholarship. Wren and Wren (1986), in their
book on legal research, point out the role facts play in actual lawyering and
suggest ways to gather and analyze facts for legal researchers. They suggest
people, tangible evidence, books,periodicals, reports, expert witnesses, etc., as
sources of pertinent information (pp. 29-31). Patterson and Lindberg (1991)
also note the role of facts, especially in copyright decisions. According to
them, in enacting copyright legislation, Congress starts with the intellectual
property clause of the Constitution. In deciding copyright cases, however, a
judge starts with the facts of a single case and goes back to the Copyright Act.
Facts playa critical role in legal decision making through its
relationship with rules they support. Rules become significant determinants
in decision making when the rules are considered appropriate for the
particular case and for the particular facts in the case. If it is decided that there
is insufficient factual evidence, the rules are not considered to be applied.
Therefore, it is important that rules are chosen by its relevance to the facts
and are supported by appropriate precedent decisions and opinions. In that
sense, it is important to point out that a specific combination of rules and
facts, rather than certain rules or facts themselves, may constitute structural
rules at a given time for a given case.
A combination of legal rules and facts is used by actors in providing
"interpretive schemes and norms" in Giddens's sense. Interpretive schemes
are the modes of typification incorporated within the actors' stocks of
knowledge, applied reflexively in the sustaining of communication (Giddens,
1984, p. 29). Their interpretive scheme would influence judges' and other
actors' understanding of the problem and copyright issues by providing
factual evidence. Normative accounts of interaction always center upon
relations between the rights and obligations 'expected' of those participating
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in a range of interaction contexts (p. 30). Thus a legal theory that actors
choose should provide them with the normative grounds whereby their
activities or arguments can be 'justified' (p. 30).
Actors act within this framework of legal rules and facts, in which they
make use of their knowledge in such a way as to render their interchange
meaningful (Giddens, 1984, p. 331). By invoking the institutional order in
this way, they contribute to reproducing it. Moreover, in reproducing it they
also reproduce its "facticity" as a source of structural constraint (Giddens, 1984,
p.331). How this framework consisting of legal rules and facts is related to the
nature of stakeholders and their arguments will be discussed later in this
chapter.
An important point related to the role of "facts" in the legal system
involves the following interrelated processes: arguments of legal actors are
framed within the framework of facts; decisions are influenced by the
relevant factual evidence; and once a decision is made, the decision and
opinion become "facts," which are "accepted-as-real" in future cases. As
Giddens suggests, the structural rule becomes both the medium and outcome
of actions. Precedent court decisions and opinions are considered as
"authorities," sometimes mandatorily and other times optionally, which
provide a basis for future decisions. In their study on the effects of the expert
testimony on some court decisions about school segregation, Chesler,
Sanders, and Kalmuss (1988) interviewed one social scientist whose remarks
keenly illustrate the importance of precedent decisions:
I remember in one case I was talking with the judge from the
witness box, and questioning some of the testimony in Brown (v.
Board of Education of Topeka I). He asked me, "Are you questioning
the facts of Brown?" And I said "Yes," and he said, "Well, that's not
admissible for you to be doing that." So it kind of stymies a person.
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The evidence in Brown argues that desegregation will change attitudes,
increase self-esteem, and improve school performance, when in fact
that doesn't happen. We know that it doesn't happen. But there's a
difficulty in making that point with the judge. (Chesler and others,
1988, pp. 43-44)

Thus the court decisions which have become facts often overrule "sociallyaccepted-facts."
Precedent court decisions and arguments become important structural
rules that enable and constrain the legal cases in the future. Consequently,
each case in different time periods has different structural rules. The nature
of decisions in related former cases and the extent to which those decisions
are differentially cited in other cases should be analyzed to assess structural
rules.

Legal Actors and Resources

The stakeholders in the software debate can be categorized in many
ways. According to the Office of Technology Assessment, software
stakeholders include software creators, software users, large and small
commercial software developers, computer hardware manufacturers,
educators, students, academic and other software and computer science
researchers, etc. (1992, p. 9). In a broader categorization, the actors in the
copyright system regarding computer software consist of judges and
stakeholders including software users (private, corporate, or government),
software creators (individuals or organizations; small or large firms), and
software distributors.
In the cases related to copyright protection of computer software,

however, the parties involved in the litigations do not usually include
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members of the public as end users of software. Rather, most consumers of
software tend to be large firms which use the software for their own
businesses, or other immediate consumers who are retailers distributing the
products through licensing agreement. Therefore, the involved parties in
copyright cases usually consist of software developers who own their
copyright at the same time, developers who are not copyright holders, and
copyright holders who are not developers, or non-developers and noncopyright holders but retailers or other sellers.
The nature of the legal actors itself can become an important resource
in their communicative activities. The controversy along the lines of "large
firm vs. small developer" could have significant implications in how
copyright decisions are made. For example, when a legal actor effectively
presents itself as a developer who contributes to important innovation in the
software industry, the actor may gain a sense of legitimacy in making his or
her arguments, thus be in a strong position to gain a judge's sympathy. In
that sense, the nature of the actor can be considered a status resource.
Conrey and O'Barr try to link the (legal) rule-orientation of the legal
system to the notion of hegemony. According to them, this rule-orientation
could be characterized as an acquired skill, so the mastery of rule-orientation
helps the dominant class to maintain its authority, since members of the
other classes have little opportunity to acquire the skill. They also point out
that this system of control is both subtle and particularly effective because
rule-oriented decision making has an appearance of strict neutrality (p. 80).
Attorneys try to choose the rules that the court would most likely use
in its opinion and the authority to support the rules. Thus the mastery of the
institutional orders of the legal system then becomes a resource for legal
actors to meet their ends in courts. Resource-mobilization or resource-
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dependency approaches help us to understand the relationship between the
resources that organizations acquire and their organizational activities.
Resource-dependency models basically argue that the ability to adapt
organizational practice to the demands of resource acquisition ultimately
means the difference between organizational survival or death (Pfepper, 1972;
Aldrich, 1979). Resource mobilization is the process by which the
organization gains control over resources that it previously did not control
(Knoke and Wood, 1981). The perspective of the resource-mobilization
model is similar to that of the resource-dependency models, although it gives
relatively more emphasis on the process rather than the structure. The
organizational capacity to act in terms of their ability to monitor and gather
relevant information influences the degree to which they can meet their
organizational interests (Lauman and Knoke, 1987).
Resources are broadly defined as any means or facilities potentially
controllable by an organization that can be used in adaptations between the
organization and its environment (Knoke and Wood, 1981). A variety of
items may serve as mobilizing resources. Many scholars demonstrate various
essential elements of sustaining organized activity: funds, personnel,
information, and products or services (Aldrich, 1979), money and authority
(Benson, 1975), money, information, legitimacy, and power (Parsons, 1966),
specialized expertise, personnel, funds, good connections, authority (Lauman
and Knoke, 1987).
The types of resources an organization can bring to bear in attempting
to meet its objectives differ depending upon the type of the organization and
the type of the environment the organization attempts to influence. In the
case of the legal decision making process, importance should be given to the
organization's ability to gather relevant information and communicate
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effectively using the information. Since certain legal rules and facts may
become important structural rules in which the actors should interact,
mobilizing resources are the factors that help the organizations to use
persuasive legal theory and to gather and use relevant factual information to
support the theory. In that sense, resources suggested by Chesler, Sanders,
and Kalmuss (1988) are also useful.
Chesler and others examined how social movement organizations
mobilize legal resources as a strategy to influence judges' understandings of
the causes and effects of problems and decisions. The legal resources included
"people willing to go to court, attorneys with legal knowledge of and ability in
constitutional litigation, a legal theory which would cause courts to grant the
relief sought, facts to support the application of that theory in a specific
situation, witnesses to present those facts, and enough money to support all
of these people in their efforts and to pay the costs of litigation" (p. 15).
Although these are quite useful and comprehensive accounts of possible
factors that may influence the legal decisions, they consist of factors of
different dimensions and stages. This paper conceptualizes people willing to
go to court, attorneys with legal knowledge and ability, witnesses to present
the facts, and money as human and allocative resources. However, the
precedent arguments and decisions that include legal theories supported by
facts are conceptualized as structural rules of the legal decision making
system.
Although all legal actors presumably have considerable knowledge of
the institutional orders of the court system, they may have differing degrees
of ability to use legal theory or provide factual evidence more persuasively.
The possible resources that are chosen will be discussed in more detail:
specialized attorneys, judges' characteristics, scientific experts, money, and
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precedent court arguments and decisions. In order to choose a legal theory
which would cause courts to reach a decision sought by the organization, and
to communicate effectively based upon the theory, attorneys with legal
knowledge of and ability in constitutional litigation are also important. Since
copyright, especially the copyright of computer software, is a specialized area,
full-time specialized lawyers working for the organization may become
important resources.
The factual accounts to support the theory can be provided by parties,
witnesses, and experts. In a legal system, recruiting and preparing experts are
essential parts of a plaintiff's mobilization strategy (Chesler and others, 1988,
p. 89). It is a feature of the American legal system that evidence is almost
always introduced by a witness. As a result, parties to litigation must find and
mobilize individuals willing to testify about facts and ideas in court (Chesler
and others, 1988, p. 62). Chesler and others find that the use of social science
and expert testimony altered judges' general understanding of the causes of
school segregation and this altered understanding affected the way judges
interpreted evidence of violation, the nature and scope of the remedy, and
the procedures used by the judges to construct a remedy, although there have
been limits according to the judicial capacity and the movement
organizations themselves (p. 203, pp. 233-234).
Expert testimony can be even more significant in the area of computer
software which is one of the newer areas of debate. Since the copyright
protection of computer software involves technical and scientific matters that
judges and other actors do not always find familiar, testimony of experts are
often necessary and determining. In addition, when there is no objective way
of checking the conclusions of analysis, the credibility of the expert also
becomes important (Majone, 1989, p. 4).
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The characteristics of the judge may become another important
resource. Since judges' understanding of the issues and implications can
have important intervening effects on decision making, their ideological
orientation may play an important role. As discussed in the case of
journalists as agents, the judges' ideological inclination may influence the
ways in which they understand issues and events. Various studies on the
relationship between the judges' characteristics and their voting behavior
have suggested that political orientation of judges may influence the
decision-making process especially on the economic and moral issues (Nagel,
1961; Ulmer, 1962; Glick and Emmert, 1986). Although it is difficult to assess
the political and ideological orientation of each judge, investigation into the
administration under which the judges were appointed could provide some
indication of what their orientation is likely to be.
The judges' ideological orientation may relate to decision making in
software copyright cases in two contradictory ways. It is possible that
Republican judges are more willing to decide in favor of providing copyright
protection as much as possible if it will preserve the status quo and thus
benefit large corporations. Democratic judges may favor limiting the scope of
copyright protection if that is considered to enhance the public interest. On
the other hand, it is also possible that Democratic judges are more willing to
decide in favor of broadening copyright protection, as they are supposed to be
more willing to intervene to help small businesses in the industry. If that is
the case, it seems that the relationship between the judges' characteristics and
their decisions may depend on the situation of the software industry, i.e., how
monopolized or centralized it is. This is a question that may be best answered
through data analysis.
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Recruiting and preparing specialized lawyers, experts, and preparing for
court cases can all be costly. Thus enough money to support all these people
and procedures is also an important mobilizing resource. Although it is not
always the case, large firms usually have a relative advantage on these
financial matters over small firms or individuals. It can be expected that the
size of the organizations may have a relationship to the organizations' ability
to acquire mobilizing resources. It seems that the legal and financial
resources partly inferred by the size of the firms give important characteristics
to the stakeholders in the copyright decisions in relation to computer
software. The human and allocative resources can be assessed in terms of the
size of the firm and the expertise of the legal counsel. This study examines
how the legal and financial resources of the stakeholders may have
implications on the current copyright decision-making process.

Legal Arguments: Principles and Theories of Copyright Law

The structural rules and resources discussed above serve as constraints
and enablements originating from the actors' capabilities and the givenness
of the environment. Within the framework of structural rules and resources,
actors interact in order to meet their objectives. The essential processes of
their interactions occur through their communication activities in the legal
decision making system, since arguments are central in all stages of the
decision making process. The arguments composed of legal theories and
factual evidence are the result of strategic efforts of the participants, and can
influence the understanding of what copyright is, what the problem is, and
what the causes and effects of the problem are.
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As argued before, in order to make effective and persuasive arguments,
legal actors must be able to use typifications (combinations of legal rules,
factual evidence, and authorities to support the theories) to frame the
discourse in a way that is more likely to give advantage to their parties. How
these typifications become "taken-for-granted" structural rules through the
legal actors' communicative interactions, and how in this process, the typified
structures gain objectivity and legitimacy, is the main concern of the study.
The arguments thus center around the statement of legal principles
and rules supported by factual evidence. The legal rules are usually drawn
from documented laws such as the Constitution, statutes, or precedent court
decisions. Therefore, in theory, the purpose of these rules, theories, doctrines
is to "balance the exclusive right of copyright owners against the public's
interest in the dissemination of information affecting areas of universal
concern, such as art, science, and industry" (Wainsright Secs. Inc. v. Wall
Street Transcript Corp.). But in reality, the Constitution, a statute, or legal
principles and rules are subject to more than one reading (Wren and Wren,
1983, p. 83). Rules are "interpreted," sometimes through claims to reveal the
original intent of the Founding Fathers or the legislature. The very attempt
to add clarity, precision, and meaning to legislative words by the courts
inevitably puts the courts in the role of adding dimensions to those words
(Patterson and Lindberg, 1991). In the copyright law of computer software, the
ambiguity of statutes is even larger because the matters to which legislators
responded to when they enacted the early copyright statutes would not have
included written computer programs. Therefore, copyright-related legal
theories can be interpreted in different ways by legal actors seeking different
objectives.
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In order to define various frames in the copyright discourse, this study

categorizes the types of arguments in relation to the copyright protection
principles and legal theories. This categorization does not necessarily allow
one any expectation on whether a certain principle or theory would benefit
the plaintiff or the defendant; it only provides a framework for the legal
actors to approach the copyright issues and for other actors in the court to
understand the issues. The use of particular theories, not others, and
interpretations of the theories in a certain way, not in another way, also
provides frames with which people make sense of the copyright issues related
to the court cases;
The concepts of "frames" and "framing" have been developed by
Goffman (1974) and elaborated by communication scholars, especially in
studies of interpersonal communication and media content (Edelman, 1988;
Gitlin,1980). Frames are organizing devices that individuals or organizations
use to impose meaning on issues. The concept of framing rejects the
proposition that there can be a single possible meaning that a text can offer or
that a text can be understood by everyone in the same way. Rather, the
structural and lexical features of the text will have an influence of
"constructing some of the limits and parameters within which decodings will
operate" (Hall, 1980: p. 135). Therefore, "some degree of reciprocity" seems to
exist between frames in the arguments and the frames with which actors
understand the issues (van Dijk, 1989; Hall, 1980). But this reciprocity does
not suggest that there is a "necessary correspondence" between a set of
structural and lexical features of a text and its meanings, since meanings
result from actors' active interpretations of the text by linking the textual
features to their knowledge and experiences (Hall, 1980). These frames are
neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. All of these frames may be
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equally valid, but they provide a different insight of the trend in copyright
law and the underlying values that are protected and reinforced by the
copyright law.
The frames should be defined in a way that they could suggest socially
embedded values that become constraints and enablements in the copyright
discourse in relation to computer software. These social values may be
discerned by principles that lead to rules of action in concrete copyright cases.
A great number of scholars have attempted to understand and define the
principles and rules at work in the copyright system, employing historic,
economic, literary, legal or interdisciplinary approaches. These approaches
are not mutually exclusive nor contradictory with each other (rather, they
seem to be interrelated), but differ in terms of which kind of tension or
conflicts of interests in the copyright law they focus on. In order to derive a
useful framework to understand values implicit in copyright law regarding
computer software, different ways of categorizing legal arguments are
discussed as follows.
Many of the critical historical analyses focus on demonstrating how the
process of shaping copyright laws deprived or minimized the author's rights
while the publishers were granted exclusive rights in the works created by the
authors. Another frame that is commonly considered pertains to policy
implications and consequences on the market. Some of policy-oriented
arguments focus on the tension between the public access to the intellectual
work and the author's rights to the work. This tension can be captured as a
tension between authors and users or a tension between the public interest
and private proprietary rights. A marketplace theme can be understood as an
economic version of focusing on the tension between the public access and
the author's rights or between the innovation and control. The most recent
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trend in the comments on the copyright law regards the distinction between
authorship and the work as a product of the author's skills and effort. This
frame focuses on the tension between the authorship (especially the
Romantic notion of author-genius) and the work alienated from the author.
Some scholars argue that the underlying tension of this distinction between
work and authorship represents the conflict between individual autonomy
and collectivism. The arguments of scholars who employ each frame are
discussed in detail.

Authors versus Copyright-Holders (Publishers)

Many of the historians have demonstrated how the power relations
among the authors, publishers, and the State to legitimize their own interests
contribute to the shaping of copyright law. Patterson and Lindberg (1991)
noted that because copyright was originally the product of a new
communications technology (the printing press), and copyright issues now
extend to include products of other new communications technology (the
computer), the early history of copyright has a particular contemporary
relevance. Bettig (1992) argues that copyright evolved as a legal concept
during the period of the Renaissance, coinciding with the growth of
industrialization and the rise of capitalism in Western Europe. According to
him, the roots of copyright as a legal statute can be traced to the proliferation
of the book trade in Europe, concomitant to the advent of printing in the
early part of the fifteenth century.
Although some legal scholars posit that nascent forms of copyright had
already existed as early as ancient Graeco-Roman times, and were observed by
Western societies throughout the Middle Ages (Ploman and Hamilton, 1980;
Stewart, 1983), the copyright that existed during these times emerged more
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out of concerns about the moral or natural rights of the authors of intellectual
and creative works rather than out of economic or political considerations
(Aziz, 1990). According to Ploman and Hamilton, the rights of authors had
already been recognized in classical Greek culture, in the Talmudic principles
of ancient Jewish law, and in the Roman publishing system (1980, p. 5-8). For
example, in Talmudic law, reporters who orally passed on principles of law
from one generation to another were very careful not to express such
principles without mentioning the author. Analyses of authors' rights in
Roman law indicate that plagiarism was recognized as morally wrong, but
there was no direct evidence that legal sanctions existed (Ploman and
Hamilton, 1980). Therefore, the copyright laws of early Rome and Greece
placed its emphasis on the "moral rights" of the authors rather than
economic rights (Stewart, 1983). Also, plagiarism was viewed as morally
wrong in the Jewish culture, and the principle of rightful attribution to an
author was a major concern of the Jewish prophets.
It is suggested that during the Middle Ages the religious institutions,

particularly the monasteries, primarily participated in the preservation and
development of intellectual works. The monks functioned as copyists,
scholars, and authors, but very few works during this period reveal the name
of the author. Authorship was not considered a right of a monk as an
individual, but was attributed to the monastery as a moral person (Ploman
and Hamilton, p. 8). Plagiarism and the wrongful or incorrect attribution to
an author were subject to society's ridicule but not a law suit (Stewart, 1983, p.
15). The scholars argue that this emphasis given to moral rights changed
when the legal concept of copyright emerged with technological
developments.
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The technology of printing by movable type rendered copying
manuscripts much easier and faster. Printing enhanced the spread of literary
activities as m.uch as it inspired new thought and the spreading of new
knowledge (Eisenstein, 1983). The proliferation of the printing press and the
book trade brought about two major concerns: printers, who also functioned
as bookbinders and publishers, soon had to face competition from those
printing unauthorized copies of the books; secondly, the State perceived the
free dissemination of ideas as threatening to the status quo (Ploman and
Hamilton, 1980).
The mechanism adopted for organizing and controlling the printing
trade was to grant a publisher of a specific work individual privileges which
contained a prohibition preventing anyone other than the beneficiary to sell
the privileged work. Hence, the granting of rights and privileges came out of
the political and economic considerations of the censorship of printed matter,
and the protection of the interests of entrepreneurs involved in the printing
and publishing activities. Therefore, Ploman and Hamilton (1980) argues,
functions of the privileges had little to do with the protection of the author
and his or her rights.
The first country to adopt a copyright statute in the modern sense was
England. The Stationer's Company, consisting of members of the book trade printers, bookbinders and booksellers, held a virtual monopoly over printing
and publishing in England. The Stationers' Company originally used
copyright to regulate trade by protecting works published by one member
from piracy. The Star Chamber Decrees of 1586 and 1637 and a series of
licensing acts granted exclusive privileges to the Company. Bettig (1990)
argues that all of these acts protected the economic rights of Company
members, but there was no reference to the protection of authors' rights
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regarding their creative works in these acts. Stewart (1983) also indicates that
"though the economic rights of the merchant class of printers and publishers
were made explicit and protected by the system of royal patronage and the bylaws of the Stationers' Company, the rights of authors in their creative works
per se were not contained in or formalized by the licensing acts or anyone of
the Star Chamber Decrees." (p. 21)
By the end of the 17th century, writing became a way of making a
living, and was gradually becoming an individual pursuit for personal
recognition. Authors and printers began to articulate the notion of "natural
rights" in creative and intellectual works. Some scholars argue that the
concept of the author's intellectual property right was being defined by
scholars like John Locke (Ploman and Hamilton, 1980, p. 13). In the second of
his Two Treatises of Government (1947), Locke articulated the conception of
"natural rights" within the notion of common law property by extending his
labor theory of value (Ploman and Hamilton, 1980, p. 13).
. . . every man has a property in his own person, thus nobody has
any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of
his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in,
he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is
his own, and thereby makes it his property. (p. 134)

However, for Locke this natural right to property did not belong to
servants and wage laborers who had to sell their labor to survive. Thus
laborers alienated their natural right to own the products they produced
when they contracted to labor for someone else (Bettig, 1989, p. 9). Rather,
this notion of natural right was used by publishers to argue that since authors
had a natural right in their works as a result of their creative labor, the
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transfer of the right to copy to the publisher gave them a license in perpetuity
to publish and profit from the work (Bettig, 1989, p. 9). Aziz notes that
although the Lockean view of intellectual property rights which positions the
author as the "natural owner of his or her works implicitly meant the shift of
the ownership rights from the publisher to the author, it was used by
publishers to secure perpetual ownership of the rights to multiply copies once
authors surrendered their original manuscripts for printing in this time of
the impending decline of the power of the Stationers' Company" (1989, p. 6465). There seemed to be little question that authors should be paid for their
manuscripts, but the payments from publishers were not based so much on
legal as economic grounds (Ploman and Hamilton, 1980, p. 11-12).
It is suggested that this Lockean libertarian idea coupled with the

abolishment of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641, the decreased regulatory
power of the Stationers' Company after the English Civil War, and the
rampant piracy in the aftermath of the House of Common's refusal to renew
the Licensing Act, the members of the publishing industry began to seek some
form of statutory protection, and argued for it in a petition to the House of
Commons in 1707. The campaign for authors' rights was led by publishers
because they perceived that when the statutory terms of copyright protection
expired they would lose their monopoly privileges. The petitioners - the
copyright owning publishers, a few printers who still owned valuable
copyrights, and the wholesalers tied to the monopoly, but no authors - finally
secured legal protection in the "Act for the Encouragement of Learning and
for Securing the Property of Copies of Books to the Rightful Owners Thereof
(known as the 1710 Copyright Act or the Statute of Queen Anne)" (Bettig,
1989, p. 10).
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The Statute codified not only the Stationers' copyright but also the
author's right to copy. The Statute of Anne made it legal for any person, not
only the authors and publishers, to acquire copyright. Thus, this statutory
copyright was limited in time but broadened in terms of those eligible to own
the right. However, as Ploman and Hamilton points out, the Act had the
effect of benefiting publishers since the Act did not provide for "natural" right
ownership to an author when the copyright was transferred to a publisher or
passed into the public domain:
"The Statute concerned the right to copy and no more. There
was nothing in this Statute that touched upon the creative or
moral rights of the author. The right protected was a "property"
right. (1980, p. 13)"

Therefore, the critical analysis of the history of the copyright law
suggests that the legal notion of intellectual property supported the expansion
of the realm of creative human activities that could be commoditized. It also
suggests that copyright law facilitated the private appropriation of intellectual
creativity, and legitimized the concentration of the ownership of literary and
artistic works in the hands of publishers, a part of the emerging capitalist class
(Bettig, 1990). In exchange for political loyalty, economic privileges were
granted to printers and entrepreneurial booksellers. Through such patronage,
"property" ownership of literary and artistic works and their reproduction
rights were highly concentrated in the hands of the publishers. This group, by
virtue of their offer of a specialized entrepreneurial activity, justified claims
to the perpetual right of property by articulating the idea of the creators'
"natural" rights (Aziz, 1990, p. 60). First, the author's natural right was not
recognized in copyright, but when it was recognized, it was used as a rationale
by publishers for granting property rights to themselves.
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The history of the British publishing industry and the development of
copyright also demonstrates that copyright in a legal sense has emerged as an
instrument through which certain groups and institutions - authors,
publishers, and the State - legitimize their own interests. The incorporation
of an author's right into copyright principles has obscured the separate
interests of authors and publishers. However, in the realm of literary and
artistic creativity, scholars argue that the actual creators of the copyrighted
work lost control over their product and were separated from it when
copyright protection became exclusive for the owners of the copyright usually publishers with capital (Bettig, 1992). This was mostly due to the
persuasive arguments of publishers articulating the rationale of granting the
author's right for the publishers' own sake, which fit with ideas of the State to
organize and control the information flow in society. Most of these
provisions were contained in the United States' first federal Copyright Act of
1790, which replicated those of the English copyright Statute of Anne.
The 1710 Statute of Anne is the direct ancestor of American copyright
law: its full title identified the fundamental ideas (the encouragement of
learning, copyright for authors, and limited times) of the copyright clause of
the Constitution, and the statute itself clearly served as the model for the
Copyright Act of 1790, the first U.S. copyright statute (Patterson and Lindberg,
1991, p. 47). Patterson and Lindberg (1991) argue that the history of copyright
reveals that the copyright served to give economic rights to publishers, while
the authors of the copyrighted work lost control over their work. They also
claim that copyright for television and the computer today serves precisely
the same function that copyright for the printing press served originally - to
give entrepreneurs a monopoly over their products - with little regard to, or
concern for, the authors who produce the product (p. 7). Responding to this
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claim, the current study explores how the modern copyright arguments and
decisions regarding computer software reflect this struggle between authors
and publishers.

Public Interest versus Private Property Rights
The public/private contradiction has been considered by many scholars
as the fundamental conflict of purpose in the copyright law. On the one
hand, copyright aims to promote public disclosure and the dissemination of
the information product. On the other hand, it seeks to confer on the creators
the power to restrict of deny distribution of their works. This conflict is
reflected in the tension between public benefit and private reward inscribed in
the full title of the first British copyright law, the Statute of Anne of 1709: An
Act for the Encouragement of Learning by vesting the Copies of printed Books
in the author's or Purchasers of such Copies dying the Times therein
mentioned. "
In the U.S. Constitution, the purpose of copyright is stated in the

intellectual property clause which grants to Congress the power to enact
copyright legislation:
The Congress shall have power ... to Promote the progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries (U.s. Consti. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.).

The keystone of copyright is thus the promotion of learning, and the
protection of the author is given as an instrument for achieving this.
On the other hand, many critics point out that although the promotion
of learning for the public interest still serves as a rationale for protecting
economic rights, there is a gap between the purpose and the means through
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which to achieve this purpose in the modern

u.s. copyright system.

They

question the basic assumption of the American copyright clause that granting
rights to authors will bring some benefit to society by promoting learning.
They argue that this assumption is not always supported in reality since
protecting authors' economic rights itself does not necessarily promote
learning. In that sense, a marketplace norm is an important concept that is
related to policy implications as to the public benefit. Marketplace norms
imply a theory of incentives: in securing opportunities for profits on the
marketplace, copyright is supposed to provide maximum amount of
information product available to society. Samuelson and others (1994),
acknowledging this gap in the assumption of the authors' incentives and
innovation especially in the area of computer software that has a critically
functional aspect, advocate for a market-oriented legal regime for the
copyright protection of computer software.
Geller (1994) suggests that the marketplace norms have been elaborated
against a background of enlightenment values, and argues that AngloAmerican copyright laws, in the usual course of affairs, rely on marketplace
norms while Continental European laws, when a case calls for a choice, favor
authorship norms. According to him, although marketplace and authorship
norms often lead to much the same results, in some hard cases, following one
norm can lead to results inconsistent with those reached in following the
other.
By comparing the codified copyright clauses of the U.S. copyright and
French systems, and by comparing their philosophical origins of the copyright
law, many scholars have argued that the French laws tend to place authors'
rights (often their moral rights) on a more elevated basis than the AngloAmerican copyright law (Goldstein, 1994). Even though Geller himself points
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out the inadequacies of the framework of the marketplace versus authorship
norm as a conceptual tool for describing copyright, and tries to provide
alternative ways to thinking about copyright law, and another scholar
Ginsburg (1994) refutes the notion of the incompatibility of French and
Anglo-American copyright law through an examination of the regimes of
literary copyright in Revolutionary France and America, the conceptions of
French copyright law as author-oriented and of Anglo-American copyright
law as society-oriented or market-oriented still seem to be a prevalent view.
The analysis of this frame of public interest versus private rights, or
that of marketplace versus authorship rights, examines how often the policy
concerns are the focus of legal arguments, and in what ways those concerns
are expressed in those arguments, i.e., whether they involve public interest
concerns, present the speculation or data on actual consequences on the actors
or on the market, merely restate the policy concern without any basis, or use
the encouragement of author's creativity as the only rationale.

Authorship versus Work
Some scholars suggest that the formulation of the public/private
contradiction may not accurately capture the true essence of the fundamental
conflict of interests that underlies copyright (see Jaszi, 1994). It is partly
because the public/private distinction is not a concrete entity but a construct,
of which meanings change according to situations. Accordingly, some
scholars suggest the examination of the different meaning of the
public/private constructs. On the other hand, other scholars suggest a
formulation of the work versus authorship as a more useful framework to
understand the copyright system.
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The work versus authorship frame is drawn from a series of critical
arguments regarding the Romantic notion of authorship, which considers
that "genuine" authorship is "originary,"in the sense that it results not in a
variation, an imitation, or an adaptation, and certainly not in a mere
reproduction, but in an utterly new, unique, "original" work which may be
said to be the property of its creator and to merit the law's protection as such
(Woodmansee and Jaszi, 1994). In "What Is an Author?" Michel Foucault
(1979) posed questions about the causes and consequences of the persistent,
over-determined power of the author construct. Locating the emergence of
the "author" in the cultural context of the eighteenth century, he called our
attention to neither neutral nor inevitable, but culturally laden concept of
"authorship," which he argued represented means to the end of constraining
the "proliferation of meaning." Scholars who examine the construction of
authorship note that the Romantic ideas about creativity and individual
authorship (which do not encompass comparative manifestations of
creativity) remain in the realm of copyright. In addition, Kaplan (1967)
pointed out the emergence of new kind of intellectual work, which "is now
being made by teams, a practice apt to continue and grow." He argued that
such collaboration may diffuse and diminish emotions of original discovery
and exclusive ownership that is prevalent in copyright law.
Their arguments that the ideology of individual creativity is praised in
copyright law are seemingly contrary to the other scholars' claim that the
authors' right was not recognized in copyright or only used as a rationale by
publishers for granting property rights to themselves. However, these two
strands of arguments actually agree in acknowledging that the shaping of the
copyright law is influenced by interactions of stakeholders. Their conclusions
seem to be contradictory in terms of their focus: the former focusing on the
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conflict between publishers and authors that resulted in furthering unequal
power relations between them, and the latter focusing on the construction of
the author as the bearer of special legal rights and cultural privileges which
carries consequences for the ways in which power and wealth are distributed.
Jaszi (1991), in his "Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses
of Authorship," illustrates how the authorship construct has been mobilized
in legal discourse, especially in its relationship to the concept of the "work"
alienated from its author. According to him, the authorship construct has
been constantly modified but remains as the central notion in copyright,
reflecting the contradiction between the collectivism of the marketplace and
the prerogatives of the autonomous individual.
He argues that the inherent instability of the "authorship" construct
renders "work" the vehicle for a significant expansion of copyright
protections. The "work" was the commodity form or the objectification of the
"author's" labor, and the publisher was able to realize the surplus value of
that labor. Thus the "work" displaced the "author" as the central idea of
copyright law, minimizing the threat to free exchange posed by the notion of
an intimate link between the author and her productions, which Jaszi calls
the strategic suppression of the "author." On the other hand, the maturation
of the "work" as a legal concept increased the leverage of publishers and other
purchasers of "authors" rights.
One example of the arguments in which the focus is on the work
rather than on its author is the objective test of copyrightability for derivative
works. According to Jaszi, the nature of any creative investment in the
variations is, as a practical matter, simply irrelevant to the outcome, save in
one respect: the variations must be traceable to a human actor; they cannot
arise from mere mechanical mishaps. In this sense, he argues, "authorship"
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still matters. In substance, the opinion marginalizes and trivializes
"authorship"; but in form, it continues to acknowledge the centrality of the
concept by transforming itself into the "minimalist" and "democratized"
vision of authorship.
Another example illustrating how the notion of authorship interacts
with the notion of the work involves the ownership or authorship dispute of
the program. Jaszi argues that the individualistic Romantic vision of
"authorship" is central to the conceptualization of the so-called "work-forhire" doctrine. On the one hand, when a work is deemed to have been made
"for-hire," that alienation of creative workers from the products of their labor
is formally and legally complete: the "author" of the "work" is the person on
whose behalf the "work" was made, not the individual who created it. On
the other hand, the employers' claims are rationalized in terms of the
Romantic conception of "authorship" with its concomitant values of
"originality" and "inspiration."
The analysis of authorship construct and of the relative emphasis on
the authorship versus work in copyright arguments concerns how the ways
of conceptualizing the creative production influence the distribution of
power and dominance. As James Boyle (1992) points out:
we are driven by a number of factors to confer property rights in
information on those who come closest to the image of the
romantic author, those whose contributions to information
production are most easily seen as original and transformative.
(T)his is a bad thing for reasons of both efficiency and justice; it
leads us to have too many intellectual property rights, to confer
them on the wrong people and dramatically to undervalue the
interests of both sources of and audiences for the information we
commodify (pp. 1-2).
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Employing the work versus authorship frame and Jaszi's interpretive
scheme of analyzing the construct of authorship, this study analyzes the
underlying values in the copyright arguments and decisions regarding
computer software, and examines how the values sustain or change through
the process of arguments over time.

The review of some approaches to describe and understand the shaping
of copyright law has included several important concepts: the author, the
work, the public interest, marketplace. One important concept that seems to
be missing is that of use. The use of the programs by purchasers as end users
is only implicitly included in the discussion of the public interest and
marketplace. In addition, the notion of the use of the underlying program by
a potential developer of another program is important and complicated,
which has not yet been considered explicitly in the above approaches. As
Samuelson and others (1994) note, many programs on the market are
composites of programs, each of which could exist separately because there is
no material difference between a "task" and a "sub-task." Therefore,
innovation in software development is typically incremental and largely
cumulative. By adopting available software design elements either wholesale
or to a new context, programs contribute to and benefit from a cumulative
innovation process. These characteristics of computer software, when
acknowledged as distinguishable from other works of authorship in
copyright, could be used as a basis to hold different decisions in infringement
cases according to the nature of the defendant's use of the underlying
program. Examining how the courts combine this issue of the nature of use
with the various constructs of authorship will illustrate the ways in which
the copyright law balances the different values underlying those concepts.
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Therefore, the key concepts in analyzing legal arguments of this study
are authorship, work, and use. The concepts of authorship and work can be
divided into those of the plaintiff and those of the defendant when necessary
for analysis. The concept of use includes the use by the defendant, the use of
the public as end users of the program, and the marketplace that determines
the potential use of the program. While all the legal arguments are
categorized in terms of these frames, many of the legal arguments also
contain identifiable legal rules or theories that are commonly used in the
copyright law. The description of each legal rule and its possible
interpretations is provided in the analysis chapter. The legal theories are
neither mutually exclusive nor are an exhaustive set of possible legal
theories, but these theories are the rationales often suggested as a reason or
means to implement copyright. All of these theories claim to serve the
purpose of copyright, and all of them are valid on their own in regards to the
copyright protection of computer software. At the same time, all of these
theories are subject to different interpretations. An argument using one
doctrine can be used as an argument either in favor of or in opposition to
extending the copyright protection. Thus, the ways in which these theories
are presented differently by different stakeholders in their arguments can
have significant implications on how the copyright law is actually
implemented, and on who receives the benefit and who receives the
detriment.
The categorization of the frames and legal theories does not necessarily
allows us any expectation on whether a certain frame or theory would benefit
the plaintiff or the defendant. Instead, the use of the frames and rules
provides a framework of approaching the copyright issues. How the frames
and rules are interpreted by the plaintiffs and defendants, how these different
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frames and theories function in relation to resources of the actors, and how
the structural rules are reproduced and mobilized through the process of
communicative interactions, are the main concern of this study.

Research Questions

This study examines the process in which copyright stakeholders
regarding computer software use their strategic efforts to influence court
decisions by their arguments, rationale, and interpretations. By examining
the ways in which judges accept and reject the plaintiff's and defendant's use
and interpretation of legal frames and theories, processes in which the
structural rules and resources are reproduced and mobilized through actors'
discursive interactions are explored.
The structure of the legal decision-making system can be constructed by
legal rules and facts - the structural rules - and human and allocative
resources that the actors have. This study examines the ways in which these
rules and resources work as enablements and constraints to the actors in the
copyright system who try to obtain their objectives through their
communicative activities - the arguments. How, in doing so, the legal actors
produce and reproduce those rules and resources in the copyright system, and
thereby reproduce the enablements and constraints that are implicit in social
and economic power relationships is the critical concern of the study.
This study first examines the structural environment of legal rules,
interpretations, or copyright decisions over time. It is important to identify
the ways in which social meanings are embedded and transformed into the
frames, legal rules, and interpretations. This analysis of legal arguments is
combined with an examination of how human and allocative resources of
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legal actors relate to the ways in which they make legal arguments. It is
explored how the two factors -- resources of actors and structural
environment -- may interactively relate to the ways in which the parties
make arguments. It is then examined how the relationship between
resources of legal actors and court decisions can be explained by the
relationship between resources of legal actors and the ways in which they
make arguments using legal rules and facts.
This study tries to identify the conditions in which certain arguments
using certain rules and facts are accepted or rejected by judges. In this process,
the typified rules and facts become objectified when the court decisions and
opinions once decided become the rules and facts in future cases. Therefore,
examining these conditions helps us to explore the processes in which
structural rules are reproduced and transformed, and thus social meanings
embedded in the structure are reproduced and transformed.

Answering the following set of questions will contribute in revealing
the mechanisms by which the copyright system is shaped and reproduced
through legal arguments. The questions start with the ones related to
descriptive analyses of important factors of the study. Then the relationships
between the court decisions and possible explanatory variables such as the
nature and resources of legal actors, judges' characteristics, or the nature of
the case in terms of the programs are analyzed. Analyses of legal arguments
are followed. In order to gain the compatibility, legal arguments are analyzed
according to the issue of the cases. In each issue, legal arguments made by the
actors including the use of frames, legal theories, and their interpretations are
analyzed. The changes in legal arguments according to the time frame are
also discussed.
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r

1

What are the general legal characteristics of the cases and actors?

1.1

What are the distributions of the state and the circuit in which

the cases were held, the procedural status of the cases, the judges'
characteristics, the major topic of the cases, the subject matter of the
dispute, the kind of program developed by the defendant, if any, and
the decisions of the cases? Have the general characteristics of the cases
changed over time?

2.

What are the characteristics of the actors?

2.1

How is the nature of the actors (in terms of whether they are

software developers, copyright holders, both developers and copyright
holders, distributors, or users) distributed? Is there any change over
time?
2.2

What are the nature of the cases derived from the nature of the

actors? Is there any change over time?

3

How are the human and allocative resources are measured and

distributed?
3.1

How are the human and allocative resources, measured in terms

of whether the party was an individual or a firm, distributed?
3.2

How are the human and allocative resources, measured in terms

of the size of the organization, distributed among legal actors?
3.3

How does the nature of the actors relate to their human and

allocative resources?

4

What are the factors that may influence the judges' decisions?
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4.1

How do the general characteristics of the cases relate to judges'

decisions?
4.2

How do the nature of actors relate to judges' decisions?

4.3

How do the human and allocative resources relate to judges'

decisions?

5

How can the legal arguments be characterized?

5.1

What are the identifiable frames of the legal arguments?

5.2

What are the legal theories that are used by the plaintiffs,

defendants, and judges?
5.3

What are the different ways of interpreting the theories and

arguments?
5.4

What are the possible social meanings embedded in the frames,

legal theories, and interpretations?
5.5

What are the typified legal rules and arguments that become the

structural rules of the copyright cases pertaining to computer software?

6

What is the relationship between the actors and their legal

arguments?
6.1

Are there any differences in the use of frames and legal theories

between plaintiffs and defendants?
6.2

Are there any differences in the interpretations of the frame and

legal theories between plaintiffs and defendants?
6.3

Are there any differences in the use of frames, legal theories and

interpretations according to the nature of the actors (developer,
copyright holder, both, neither)?
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6.4

Are there any differences in the use of frames, legal theories and

interpretations according to the nature of the cases indicated by a
different combination of actors?

7

What is the relationship between legal arguments and judges'

decisions?
7.1

Is there a particular frame of arguments that is more likely to be

accepted or rejected by judges?
7.2

Are there particular legal theories that are more likely to lead

into certain kind of decisions?

8

What are the conditions under which certain arguments are

accepted or rejected by judges? How are the conditions related to the
ways in which the parties use their resources and structural rules?
8.1

What are the frames, legal theories or certain kinds of

interpretations that are accepted or rejected by judges in arguments
made in each issue of the cases?
8.2

Are there any differences in the judges' acceptance or rejection of

the frames, legal theories, and interpretations according to the
argument makers? In other words, does the relationship between the
nature of the actors and the use of legal arguments explain the
relationship between the actors and decisions? Does it also explain the
relationship between the nature of cases and decisions?
8.3

What kind of social meanings can be inferred from these

conditions in which certain arguments (and frames, theories and
interpretations used in the arguments) are accepted and rejected?
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9

Are there identifiable ways in which the structural rules are

reproduced or transformed (thus social meanings transmitted in them
are reproduced or transformed) through these communicative
interactions?

These research questions try to examine how different actors with
different resources make arguments in the framework of legal rules and facts
and how their interactions through arguments influence the decisions. This
study attempts to provide an important understanding on the ways in which
the difference in the resources of actors are reflected in their arguments,
through which the structure of power and dominance is maintained and
transformed.
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v.

MElHODS

This chapter describes the methods that are employed in this study.
First, this chapter introduces an overview of the research design and its major
conceptual categories. Following this, the data of the study are described.
Then the discussion of instrumentation of each conceptual variable follows.
Finally, the ways in which the data are analyzed are presented.

Research Design

This study utilizes both quantitative and qualitative approaches to
examine how different rules and resources that legal actors employ function
as enablements and constraints in their communicative activities, and how
these communicative activities relate to the court decisions. Content analysis
of legal arguments is conducted and then related to the analyses using other
variables of legal arguments, legal actors' resources, and court decisions.
First the level of resources of each legal actor in the court cases
regarding the copyright of computer software is assessed. The legal resources
including the nature and status of legal actors and financial ability are
identified. In addition, the structural environment is assessed by examining
precedent decisions by the time each case was held and the use of legal rules
and interpretations in the precedent cases. How the structural environment
has changed over time is also explored. This study involve three related
areas of analyses: the relationship between the resources of actors and the
copyright decisions; the relationship between the copyright decisions and the
use and interpretation of rules and facts in legal arguments; and the
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relationship between the resources of actors and the use and interpretation of
rules and facts in legal arguments.

Data Collection

All of the federal court cases at the u.s. Court of Appeals and U.S.
District Court levels regarding copyright of computer software programs that
were filed and published by 1993 were selected to be analyzed. A
comprehensive list of the relevant cases was obtained by a series of
procedures. The Lexis/Nexis database was used to generate the initial list. In
the library of federal copyright cases in the Lexis database, two hundred and
eight cases regarding computer software were found. All of the 208 cases
which were retrieved from the Lexis database were compared with the
previous list and were read to determine whether each case is directly related
to copyright protection of computer software. Those cases that are not directly
related to the copyright infringement or copyrightability issues of computer
software were excluded from the data. Cases that only concern trade secret
preemption issues, patent issues, monopolies, license agreements, fraud,
copyright registration issues were also excluded. Unpublished cases were not
used as data because it is not possible to obtain relevant information to use in
the analyses. In this way, one hundred and fifteen cases were selected as data
of this study (a list is presented in the appendix).
The full-text reports of all the cases are analyzed in order to examine
the rules and resources of the copyright court that enable and constrain the
actors. Allocative resources of the actors were gathered using outside
materials including many data sets. The reports of the cases that are basically
the judges' opinions and rationales of the decisions indirectly reflect the
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arguments of the plaintiffs and defendants. Therefore, arguments of the
plaintiffs and defendants are also assessed through the reports of the judges'
opinions.
This may pose some problem to this study that relies on the judges'
reports in analyzing arguments of all the actors. Judges may accept or ignore
certain arguments made by plaintiffs or defendants without explicitly
mentioning them. In order to examine the degree of discrepancy between the
parties' initial arguments and their arguments reflected in the court opinions,
a sample of 13 cases was drawn and the briefs submitted by the counsels of the
plaintiffs and defendants were obtained. In 7 of the 13 cases briefs of the both
parties were obtained and in the remaining 6 cases, briefs of only 1 of the
parties could be obtained. Each issue included in the briefs, with a special
focus on the use of legal theories, was recorded and compared with the
judges' opinions. Among the 29 identified arguments used by the parties,
only 3 of them were missing in the judges' opinions. And all the three
arguments that are missing were the ones of the winning parties, which
suggest that the omitted issue was not likely to be critical in decision-making.
Between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the issues and legal theories they
used in the briefs tended to be the same. Even when one of the issues that
was covered in one party's briefs was not included in the other party's brief,
the other party always included that issue in their reply brief.
Due to the tendency that the two parties usually communicate before
the actual trial, the issues and legal theories that are used by the parties tend
to be the same eventually, even though the interpretations of theories or
conclusions they draw from the issue tend to be contrasting. This confirms
the importance of analyzing different ways of interpreting legal theories
rather than focusing exclusively on the existence of the theories. And the
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judges are found to be more likely to examine in their opinions all the issues
that were initiated by the parties in their opinions. This is consistent with the
arguments of Conrey and O'Barr as well as other critical legal scholars and
feminists that legal decision makers, especially those in the adversarial U.S.
system, choose among contending voices, and the law cannot have a voice
apart from the voices of the participants (1990, p. 169).
In addition, the rejection of certain arguments and behaviors is an
important mechanism by which other actors, both involved in the legal cases
and involved in the creation, distribution, and consumption of software in a
society, learn and understand the copyright system. As the judges' opinions
and decisions that define precedent are what become influential in the
process of copyright law, examining the court reports written by the judges
will provide a valuable insight into the processes in which structural rules
are reproduced and transformed through communicative interactions among
the legal actors.

Instrumentation

The methods of measurement are discussed in three subject areas:
resources, decisions, and structural rules. As discussed before, legal resources
include the nature and size of the firms. Legal arguments are analyzed in
terms of the ways in which frames and legal theories are used, the legal
theories are interpreted, and the precedent cases are provided to support the
legal theories. The decisions and arguments in precedent cases as well as
characteristics of judges become structural environment.

Procedural status of cases
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The cases are different in terms of the procedural status. There are
cases that are being decided on the merits, i.e., whether infringement has or
has not occurred, after full trial on all the contested facts. In this case, final
judgment is made.

Judges grant summary judgments when there are no

relevant facts in dispute, but only different legal interpretations given by the
parties to the facts -- in which the judge can decide the case without a trial (but
summary judgments will only be affirmed if there are no facts in dispute).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c))."
Preliminary injunction is granted to temporarily enjoin the alleged
infringer from copying, manufacturing, using, or distributing the original
program. There are four factors of which satisfaction many courts require: (1)
the plaintiff has a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim; (2) the
plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy at law and it will suffer
irreparable harm without the injunction; (3) this harm is greater than the
injury the defendant will suffer it the injunction is granted; and (4) the
injunction will not harm the public interest. Other courts require that the
plaintiff show either irreparable harm and likelihood of success, or
irreparable harm and the existence of serious questions going to the merits
and balance of hardship.
The exact combination of the above factors depend on the judge and
the court, while judges usually require some kind of variation of the four
factors. Judges tend to claim that none of the four factors are definitive,
although there are some judges who explicitly weigh the factors differently.
In order to examine how these factors are considered in the arguments and
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decisions, arguments in the preliminary injunction cases will be analyzed
separately.
Arguments regarding the likelihood of success on the merits in
preliminary injunction cases have similar structure and considerations to the
arguments on the merits in final judgments and summary judgment cases.
The only difference is that the judges in preliminary injunction cases decide
on the basis of only the "reasonable likelihood" of the success on the merits.
Therefore, the arguments around the merits will be analyzed in all the cases.

Subject matter

A computer program is defined as a "set of statements or instructions
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result" in the Copyright Act of 1980. There are many ways to categorize
computer programs. First, computer programs can be classified according to
form, having either literal elements or non-literal elements. Literal elements
are divided into object code and source. A program in object code form, called
machine language, can be directly executed by the computer. Because
machine language consists of a series of binary numbers, programs in object
code form are difficult for programmers to work with directly (Gage, 1987, p.
868). Thus, programmers use higher level computer languages based on
English words or symbols. Programs written in higher languages are called
source code programs and must be converted into object code before the
computer can execute the program. Non-literal elements include the
structure, sequence, and/or organization, screen display, user interface, and
function or purpose.
Second, programs can be categorized by function, either as application
programs or operating system programs. Application programs allow the
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computer user to accomplish specific tasks such as using spread sheets,
playing games, or editing text. In contrast, operating system programs direct
the computer to carry out steps which allow the user to operate the computer
and run application programs. Video game programs are included in the data
and considered a separate category in this study.
And third, computer programs are classified according to their
embodiment, the memory device on which a program is stored. Computer
programs are commonly stored on either magnetic disks or silicon chips.
Within magnetic disks, a program is recorded on the face of a rotating disk
and can be modified or copied relatively easily. While disks containing
programs are generally kept outside the computer until needed, silicon chips
are built into the computer. Within tiny silicon chips, a program is stored in
integrated circuits and cannot be modified without substantial effort.
The computer programs considered in these legal cases are classified
according to their form, function, and embodiment. In every case there is an
original computer program of which the movant claims copyright
ownership, and which the movant claims is infringed by the program
developed or used by the other party. It is examined whether this original
program is an operating system program, an application program, or a game
program, whether the main issue of the cases is the literal (object code or
source code) or non-literal elements (user interfaces, screen display, or
structure, sequence and organization) of the original program, whether the
original program is embodied in silicon chips or in magnetic disks.
There can be other computer programs than the original programs
which are developed or used by the defendant. In copyrightability cases, there
is usually no other program involved, as the claims of the challengers of the
copyright validity focus on the issue that the original program should not be
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copyrighted or its copyright is not valid. All the classifications that are made
to the original program are applied to the other programs in the cases as well,
i.e., what kind of characteristic the other programs have in relation to the
original program. For example, whether the other program has the same
function, but is written in different language, whether the other program is
an application program that works on the original operating system program,
whether the other program is a device to alter features of the original
program, etc., is examined.

Nature of parties involved in the case

The parties involved in the case consist of plaintiffs and defendants.
Usually plaintiffs initiate the case alleging that the defendants infringed the
copyright of the plaintiff's program. However, in some cases, the plaintiff
initiates the case as a response to the accusation of defendant that the plaintiff
infringed the copyright of the defendant's program. The cases in which
defendants become movants and vice versa are very rare (10 out of 115 cases).
Therefore, for the purpose of analysis, this study categorizes the movant of
the case as the plaintiff and the alleged infringer (in infringement cases) or
the challenger of the copyright validity (in copyrightability cases) as the
defendant.
The nature of the actors is first examined according to the involvement
of each actor with the original program, i.e., the developer of the original
program who is not the copyright holder, the copyright holder of the program
who is not a developer, the developer and copyright holder of the program,
and neither (retailers, importers, etc.). In a case that a defendant is not
involved with the original program in any way, it is important to examine
whether he or she is associated with other kinds of programs or not. Thus, it
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is also examined whether an actor is a developer or a copyright holder of any
other programs.

Judges' characteristics
The judge's characteristics such as ideological orientation, age, and
education may be an important factor of the structural environment that may
have some intervening influence on the decision making process. Some
studies focusing on civil rights cases or antitrust cases show that decisions
may be predicted according to the judges' ideological orientation. As
discussed earlier, the judges' ideological orientation may playa role in the
case of the copyright protection of computer software in two contradictory
ways according to the market situation and the judges' view on the best way
to enhance the public interest. Therefore, the examination. of the relationship
between the judges' characteristics and their decision-making in this area
remains to be exploratory.
In order to find an accurate indication of their ideological orientation,
surveyor data that provide information on the nature and the degree of
ideological orientation of each judge were searched. Information on the party
affiliation of a substantial number of judges was not available because many
of the judges did not report their party affiliation in these sources. Therefore,
the administration under which the judges were appointed was assessed
alternatively, since it can offer a relatively reliable indication of the judges'
resources in terms of their ideological orientation. Information on the
appointed year, age of the judges, and education was also found in the

American Bench - Judges of the Nation and BNA's Directory of State &
Federal Courts, Judges, & Clerks.
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Time periods
This study does not assume one clear classification according to time
change. However, due to the number of cases of data, dissecting the 16 year
periods to a smaller category is sometimes needed for the sake of analysis. In
that case, the 16 years were divided into 5 periods, each of which has a 3 year
period, except for the third period that has four years. In this way, the first
period is from 1978 to 1980, the second period from 1981 to 1983, the third
period from 1984 to 1987, the fourth period from 1988-1990, and the fifth
period from 1991 to 1993.

Decisions
The court decisions are first categorized as in favor of the plaintiff
(movant) or of the defendant (alleged infringer in infringement cases and
challenger in copyrightability cases). Next analysis is on whether the decision
is that infringement occurred or that infringement did not occur in
infringement cases, and that in favor of granting copyrightability or against
granting copyrightability in copyrightability cases. The decisions are also
categorized as "broadening the scope of copyright protection" or "narrowing
the scope of copyright protection." In the preliminary injunction cases, the
decisions are also made as to whether the injunction was granted for the
plaintiff or not. The decisions at the level of court of appeals and the
Supreme Court, additionally include the following categories: affirmed,
reversed, and reversed and remanded. The cases can be ordered to be
"remanded" to send the case back to the court at the lower level. In these
cases, they are later combined with the "reversed" category.

Size of firm
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As noted before, large organizations usually have relative advantage
on financial matters over small firms or individuals. Since recruiting
specialized lawyers, experts, and preparing for court cases can be all costly, the
size of the firm was found to relate to the ability of the firm to effectively use
rules and resources in some of the cases.
It can be speculated that there are two ways in which the size of the

firm may relate to legal arguments or decisions. First the financial ability to
hire qualified attorneys and spend more money for litigation seems to be
more directly related to the sales revenue. On the other hand, the perceived
status of the firm can be either related to the number of employees or sales
revenue. Therefore, two indices of the size of the firm are separately assessed
and used in the analyses. Using Dialog Business Connection service
including Dun's Market Identifiers in D&B database and the Computer Select
database, the number of employees and the sales revenue are assessed for
each company in the relevant cases.
It is important to note that the variables of the resources of legal actors

such as the nature and size of the firm should be considered in relation to the
opposing party in each case. A copyright holding firm of a middle size can be
perceived in very different ways when it has a litigation against an individual
developer and against a large non-developing corporation. Therefore,
another variable is created to indicate a relative size of the firms in each case.

Legal counsel
The ability to hire attorneys with legal knowledge and ability in
litigation and expertise in the copyright law is an important legal resource.
The names of the lawyers in the sample cases are identified in the reports of
the decisions. The Martindale-Hubble Law Directory provides legal ability
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ratings on both lawyers and firm ratings on law firms. "A" represents the
rating from very high to preeminent, "B" from high to very high and

"e"

from fair to high. The ratings of the law firms only consist of "A" and "B."
The ratings of the lawyers and the law firms they represent are used to
construct an index that indicates the ability and expertise of legal counsel. In
the case the organization employs an in-house lawyer, the law firms for
whom they worked previously are identified.

Arguments
The arguments of the plaintiffs, defendants, and judges in court
opinions are analyzed to examine the actors' use of rules and resources in
their communicative activities. The reports usually start with a description
of the case including the issue of dispute, nature of the plaintiffs and
defendants. The structures of legal arguments differ according to the judge.
Usually judges respond to plaintiffs' and defendants' arguments even when
they structure their arguments with their own analytical style. Since judges
tend to argue why they reject certain arguments made by a losing party rather
than provide reasons why they accept certain arguments, the judges'
arguments mainly consist of the arguments that they are about to reject,
followed by the judges' opinions on each point and issue.
The unit of analysis in relation to decision variables and actor variables
was a case. For an analysis of arguments, however, I coded each argument in
each case in order to include all the theories and issues dealt with in the case,
because a case can have several different arguments. This usually does not
pose any problem in analysis since the analysis of the arguments is conducted
according to the issue of the case, about which each case tends to have one
argument. Therefore, the unit of analysis in terms of the case and that in
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terms of the arguments remains the same in the detailed analysis of
arguments conducted according to each case, unless the case has many
arguments using the same frame and the same theory (some judges tend to
write more when it's actually one argument). In that case, the analysis of
arguments employs each case as a unit of analysis considering the arguments
as one.
Arguments of legal actors are first coded according to whether the
argument-maker is claiming: the subject matter is (or not) copyrightable,
should (or not) be copyrighted, the copyright is (or not) valid; copying did (or
not) occur; two programs are (or not) substantially similar; the copying does
(or not) constitute infringement; and the plaintiff (or the defendant) is the
author. All of these arguments can be more broadly categorized as either
broadening copyright protection or limiting copyright protection.
The contexts of these arguments are important in analyzing the legal
arguments. In order to compare the plaintiff's and defendant's arguments
and to examine the trend over time, arguments in the same category of issues
should be compared. Thus the arguments are broadly categorized as
copyrightability, ownership/authorship dispute, and infringement, and the
analysis of frames and theories are conducted in each issue.
When the arguments are not initiated by judges, the judges' response
to the arguments made by plaintiffs or defendants is coded as follows: accept
the plaintiff's argument; accept the defendant's argument; reject the plaintiff's
argument (implicitly accepting the defendant's argument; and reject the
defendant's argument (implicitly accepting the plaintiff's argument). Since
rejecting one party's argument usually means accepting the other party's
argument in the court of adversarial system, all of the judges' arguments can
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be broadly categorized as in favor of the plaintiff and in favor of the
defendant.
Also examined is the reason for the rejection of the rules or the
arguments about the rules made by plaintiffs or defendants: because the rule
itself is not right or appropriate; on the basis of different interpretation of the
rule; because the rule is decided to be not relevant to the case; because the rule
is decided to be not applicable to the particular facts considered; due to
insufficient factual evidence to support the rule; or due to the wrong use of
the authority.
Most importantly, the legal arguments are categorized in terms of their
primary frame, the existence of legal theories, the interpretation of the
theories, and the provision of factual evidence and authorities to support the
theories. As discussed in the previous chapter, frames of each of the legal
arguments can be categorized as the author, the work, the use (by the
defendant), the public interest, and market consequences. Examples of coding
the arguments according to the frames are presented as follows (also see the
coding scheme in the appendices).
Arguments that used the frame of the plaintiff's work are usually
about whether computer programs are copyrightable as a subject matter or
whether the copyright of the plaintiff's program is valid. For example, in
Uniden v. EFT, EFJ, who manufactured and sold two way radio systems,
developed a software program, and Uniden developed and sold a compatible
radio system. Uniden argued that EFJ's computer code is not copyrightable
because a computer program is a "useful" work, but the judge held that a
computer program is a "literary" work, thus copyrightable. These arguments
were coded as having a frame of the plaintiff's work. Most of these
arguments are made in the cases pertaining to court decisions on the
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copyrightability of the subject matter, and some of these arguments are also
made in infringement cases where the defendants try to argue that the
similarity between the two programs falls under the idea of the program
rather than the expression of the program.
The frame of the plaintiff's authorShip usually involves arguments on
the originality of the program developed by the plaintiff. For example, in
Kramer v. Anrews, when Andrews and other defendants argued that the
copyright of a video poker game 'Hi-Lo Double Up Joker Poker' developed by
Kramer was invalid because it lacked originality, the judges argued that the
standard for originality is minimal, enough if it is something "his own" and
held that the copyright of the plaintiff's program was valid. These arguments
are coded as having the frame of the plaintiff's authorship. The arguments
that use the frame of the plaintiff's authorship are usually made in the
copyrightability cases, but in some infringement cases where the defendants
try to challenge the validity of the plaintiff's copyright by challenging the
originality of the program.
Many arguments focus on determining the substantial similarity
between a program developed by the plaintiff and a program developed by the
defendant. When the argument centered around finding the textual or
functional similarity of the two programs, the argument was coded as having
the frame of the defendant's work. When the argument focused on the effort
or expertise of the defendant in developing her program, the argument was
coded as having the frame of the defendant's authorship. For example, in
Atari v. Williams, Williams who developed a game program 'Jawbreaker'
argued that his idea came from Atari's 'PacMan; but the expression of the
idea through symbols and graphics was not similar to'PacMan'. Employing
some similarity tests, the judge held that 'Jawbreaker' did not infringe the
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copyright of 'PacMan' because Atari failed to show any possible confusion
between the two games. These arguments were coded as having the frame of
the defendant's work.
On the other hand, when Holiday Steel argued that they sought to
create its own product through a laborious and expensive process in NEe v.
Holiday, the judge held that a great effort to copy a work does not mean that a
copier is not an infringer. Also, in NEe v. Intel, when Intel argued that NEe
must have copied its 8086 and 8088 microcodes because NEC's creator of the
program was inexperienced, the judge disagreed by saying that he believed
NEC's expert testimony that the NEC's creator did have expertise and talent
as opposed to Intel's argument. These arguments that focused on how much
the defendants contributed to the development of their own programs are
coded as having the frame of the defendant's authorship.
The arguments that have the frame of the defendant's use usually
center around either fair use doctrine or the adaptation of the program.
Modifications of programs were made valid under 17 U.S.c. §117, which
permits the adaptation of the program for utilitarian purposes and for
archival use. In Allen-Myland, Inc. (AMD v. IBM, AMI argued that their
copying of the IBM's microcodes is permissible as it is an essential step in the
owner's enhancement and used for archival use, and the judge held that
these doctrines do not apply to AMI's copying. These arguments were coded
as having the frame of the defendant's use of the program. Also, there are 4
factors required for fair use: the purpose of use, nature of the copyrighted
work, amount and substantiality of the portion used from the copyrighted
work, and the effect on the potential market. The arguments regarding fair
use are usually coded as the ones having a frame of the defendant's use,
unless one of the factors is considered a decisive one and discussed
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elaborately, in which case its frame is decided according to that particular
factor. An analysis of how each of the 4 factors was considered is separately
presented later.
Arguments that use the frame of market consequences usually focus
on the impact of the defendant's program on the market or on the incentive
to innovation. For example, in Vault v. Quaid (appeals), Quaid
manufactured a program called 'CopyWrite' with a segment of 'Ramkey'
which allows a user to make copies of programs contained on floppy
diskettes. Vault argued that because purchasers of 'CopyWrite' use them to
make unauthorized copies, Vault lost customers of its program 'Prolok'. But
the judges decided that while a purchaser of 'CopyWrite' violates the law,
Quaid who developed the program does not. The plaintiff made an
argument on the basis of the issue of market consequences and the judge
rejected its argument implying that the market consequence is not an
important factor to be considered. The plaintiff's and defendant's arguments
were coded as having the frame of consequences.
The public use frame is not very common, as will be discussed in the
next section, but when the arguments focus on how the public may benefit
from gaining more access to the programs or that the program was made
available to the public, the arguments were coded as having the frame of
public use/benefit.
In addition, plaintiffs, defendants, and judges often make arguments
based on various legal theories such as originality, fixation requirement, idea
versus expression, adaptation, fair use, first sale, etc. The theories are applied
to the facts and sometimes interpreted in different ways by the courts and the
judges. Even though certain theories tend to fall into a certain frame rather
than the other, such as the originality theory usually falling into the frame of
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authorship, one theory does not necessarily match one particular frame. This
is because parties in opposing interests can use the same theory to frame the
arguments in their favor and the judges interpret or apply the theories
differently according to the nature of the arguments and the nature of the
cases. Therefore, legal theories and interpretations are coded separately.
Sometimes the focus of the arguments is not definitively on one of
these. For example, arguments regarding whether the plaintiff's work is in
the public domain involve the nature of the plaintiff's work, but in relation
to the others' potential use of the work. In this case, the decisive factor of the
arguments, i.e., the factor on which the judge made her decision regarding
that issue, is considered the frame of the argument.
The use of metaphor is particularly important. As the copyright law
has recently begun to be applied to the area of computer programs, many
actors in the legal cases use metaphors that create analogy between computer
software and other works that have been protected by copyright, such as
literary works, artistic works, audiovisual works, graphic and pictorial works,
etc. The use of different metaphors may have an importance influence on
decision-making.
Other elements that consist of legal arguments are the presentation of
evidence and authorities. The ways in which judges require evidence and
authorities, i.e., scientific or lay observer's, are coded when relevant. How the
judges respond to the use of evidence and authorities is also examined.

Analysis

The data obtained are analyzed in three aspects. First, descriptive
analyses of the important variables and their variances over time are
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conducted. The relationship between the court decisions and possible
explanatory factors such as the level of resources, the nature of the case, the
nature of actors, subject matter and topic of the case is analyzed by using
analysis of variance and cross tabulations. The legal arguments are then
analyzed to examine the use of frames and interpretations of legal theories
and to identify structural rules prevalent in copyright cases. The analysis of
legal arguments includes the examination of how the actors' nature and
resources relate to the ways in which legal theories and facts are used in legal
arguments -- communicative interactions -- is conducted. Interpretive
readings and cross tabulations are combined for this analysis. The important
question here is to define the conditions under which the parties make
arguments that are perceived as credible and convincing by the judges. Figure
1 illustrates the interrelationships of the analyses that are conducted using the
cases regarding copyright protection of computer software. These analyses
attempt to explore the mechanisms by which actors' resources and decisions
relate to each other, by introducing communicative activities of the actors as a
critical intervening factor.

Expectations

The results of the three related analyses provide an understanding on
the ways in which the rules and resources of the copyright legal system enable
and constrain the legal actors with different level of resources to employ the
rules and resources, and the ways in which the rules and resources are
reproduced and changed. The study tries to demonstrate the critical ways in
which social and economic power relationships embedded in the
enablements and constraints are maintained in this process. In addition, this
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study provides a basis to categorize the legal discourse and to evaluate
propositions with regard to the scope of the copyright protection of computer
programs.

93

VI.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASES
(DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS)

All the federal cases regarding copyright protection of computer

software are used as data for this study. The presentation of results starts with
the description of the characteristics of the data. Among one hundred and
fifteen cases, 87 (76%) cases were held at the District Court and 28 (24%) at the
Court of Appeals. In terms of the circuit in which the cases were held, 30
(26%) cases were held at the ninth circuit, 16 (14%) at the second circuit, and
13 cases at the third circuit and seventh circuit, 11 at the fifth circuit, 9 cases at
the fourth circuit, 6 at the tenth circuit, 5 at the first circuit, 4 at the 11th
circuit, 3 at the sixth circuit, 2 at the eighth and the D.C. circuit, and 1 at the
federal circuit (see table 1). The most cases were held in the state of California
which held 19 (17%) cases, and in the state of New York that held 12 (10%)
cases.

Procedural status
The most cases (41 cases, 36%) were decided on the preliminary
injunction issue, and 33 (29%) cases were final judgments. 28 (24%) cases
were appeals cases (which are a part of the final judgment cases) and 13 (11%)
cases were summary judgments.

Topic of the case
The topics of the case can be broadly categorized according to whether
the issue in dispute was about copyrightability or infringement. 6 (5%) cases
decided only the issue of whether the program in issue is copyrightable or
whether the copyright of the program(s) is valid (see table 2). For these cases,
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the decision about infringement was not made. 75 (65%) cases assumed the
copyrightability of the program and decided only whether infringement
occurred. Some of these cases do address the question of the copyrightability
of the program but as a part of the discussion on the ownership of valid
copyright or the copyrightable expression in infringement issues. In these
cases, decisions involve only infringement and not copyrightability. 22 (19%)
cases were decided on both issues of copyrightability and infringement. These
cases have decision variables on both issues. There are 12 (10%) cases in
which the primary focus of the arguments is authorship of the program and
ownership of the copyright, but also deal with infringement issue. Later cases
tend to focus on the infringement issue only.

Year

There is a tendency that more cases are held in later time periods,
although it is neither consistent nor linear. Meaningful temporal trends are
found in relation to the ways in which arguments are made, which will be
discussed later. The first two cases regarding the copyright protection of
computer software were decided in 1978, 1 in 1979, 1 in 1980, 10 in 1981,11 in
1982,7 in 1983, 3 in 1984, 4 in 1985, 5 in 1986, 7 in 1987, 8 in 1988, 11 in 1989, 12
in 1990, 13 in 1991, 17 in 1992, and 3 in 1993. According to the five time
periods created in the methods chapter, there were 4 cases in the first period,
28 in the second, 19 in the third, 31 in the fourth, and 33 in the fifth (see table
3).

Subject Matter

There are 17 (15%) cases which consider the operating system programs
the original program (see table 4). In 65 (57%) cases, application programs are
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considered the original program, and in 33 (29%) cases, video game programs
are the original program. 26 (23%) cases dealt with literal elements of the
program only, and 33 (29%) cases dealt with non-literal elements only. In 18
(16%) cases, both literal and non-literal elements were considered, and 38
(33%) cases did not distinguish between literal and non-literal elements.
Among the 44 cases that dealt with literal elements, 1 case specifically
considered the issue of only the object code, and 5 cases considered the issue
of only the source code. The other 38 (33%) cases considered the object code
and the source coded together. Among the 52 cases that deal with non-literal
elements, the focus of the most (32) cases was the screen display of application
programs or the audiovisual display of video game programs, and 10 cases
focused on the structure, sequence, and organization. 9 cases focused on user
interfaces, and there was only 1 case that dealt with non-literal elements in
general.
There was some difference in the subject matter according to different
time periods. In the first period (1978-1980) all of the four cases dealt with
application programs, but in the second period (1981-1983) the subject matter
of most (64%) cases was video game programs. During the last three periods
(1984-1993), application programs were the subject matter of most (69%) cases.
As most cases dealing with video games programs focused on their
audiovisual display, during the second period all of the non-literal elements
considered were screen display, while in the other periods they were more
evenly distributed.
In the cases involving the issue of copyrightability only, there is no

other program involved because the program used by the other party is the
same as the original program. In the cases involving the issue of
infringement, however, there can be other programs. Among these cases
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involving other programs,49 (43%) cases involve competing products, which
achieve similar functions as the original program. There are 37 (32%) cases
that can be also categorized as competing products, but have particular
characteristics related to the underlying program. 29 of these programs have
characteristics that may not disserve, if not benefit, the developer of the
original program by providing more choices for the users: programs written
in another kind of computer language (5), programs that work on a different
system (9), programs that are used to enhance or update the underlying
program (2), programs that are made to be compatible with the underlying
program (9), application programs that can work on the underlying operating
system (2), an enhanced version of the underlying program (4). 6 of these
programs have characteristics that can clearly disserve the developer of the
original user than other competing products in general: programs that are
used as a device to alter the original program (4), program device to reproduce
the original program (1), and program device to de-effect the original program
(1).

The reason the programs other than the original program are
categorized in this way is to examine whether the decision-making is more
related to the characteristics that can benefit or harm the developers of the
original program by providing more diverse products that are related to the
underlying program in the market, or more related to the possible
involvement of the alleged infringer in any kind of developing activity. The
programs that have the former characteristics are referred to as "add-on"
software, which typically offers some enhanced functions to an existing
program, either modifying the other program's behavior or supplementing it
in some way (Samuelson et. al., 1994). Samuelson and others (1994) indicate
although some courts allow the add-on software to be marketed due to its
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added pleasure for the users, a market-oriented approach to copyright will not
excuse the developer of add-on software from infringement because the addon software rely heavily on the value of the program by building on the
underlying developer's research and development.
Therefore, examining how the courts deal with these computer
programs that have clearly different characteristics will help us understand
the ways in which the copyright law deals with the notion of users' choice or
pleasure as opposed to the process of independent creation. If the programs
with the characteristics that can be assumed to benefit the users and possibly
the developers of the underlying program are considered differently from the
programs with the characteristics that can harm the original program, it
suggests that the users of the infringing product are considered seriously in
decision-making. However, if these programs that have two different kinds
of characteristics but were created as a result of some developing activity are
considered in a similar way in decision-making, it suggests that the degree to
which an independent developing activity is involved to produce the
allegedly infringing program is playing a critical role. Therefore, the
important question in analysis using this variable is whether the last category
of the programs with characteristics that are more harmful to the underlying
program are considered more similar to the other competing programs or to
the cases in which no other programs were involved.

Nature of actors
Movants of the cases consist of 7 (6%) developers of the underlying
program who do not have the copyright of the program, 77 (67%) developers
who are at the same time copyright holders of the program, and 30 (26%)
copyright holders who are not developers of the program (see table 5). There
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is 1 case in which it was being decided whether the movant was a developer
of the program. The movants can be also categorized as whether the movants
are developers of the program no matter whether they are copyright holders
or not. The movants of 84 cases (73%) are developers and those of 30 cases
(26%) are non-developing copyright holders.
Alleged infringers or challengers of copyright validity are more diverse
than the movants (see table 6 for broader categories). 2 (2%) of them are
developers of the program in issue in the involved cases, and 2 (2%) of them
are copyright holders of the program in issue. Most of them are neither
developers of the original program in issue nor copyright holders of the
original program in issue. However, they can be divided in terms of whether
they are involved in developing other programs or whether they own the
copyright of other programs. Defendants of 21 cases (18%) are neither
developers nor copyright holders of any kinds of computer programs, but
retailers, distributors, etc. Those of 67 cases (58%) are neither developers nor
copyright holders of the underlying program in issue, but developers of other
computer programs. Those of 8 cases (7%) were neither developers nor
copyright holders of the underlying program in issue, but copyright holders of
other computer programs which the movant alleges infringed the copyright
of the original program. In 8 cases (7%), the copyright holders of the
underlying program in issue had claims against the developers of the
underlying program who did not own the copyright of the original program
but developed other programs, which the movants claim infringed the
copyright of the underlying program. In 6 cases it was being decided on who
owns copyright .of the program, so in these cases it was not clear who are
developers or not. In 2 cases (2%) the developer of the program filed suits
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against a copyright registrar who denied granting registration for copyright of
the program.
These diverse characteristics of the alleged infringers or challenger of
the copyright validity can be broadly divided into two categories: 77 (67%) are
developers of any kind of computer programs and 37 (32%) are nondevelopers of any computer programs.
The nature of actors shows some change over time. In the second time
period, there were more (64%) non-developing plaintiffs than developing
plaintiffs, while in all the other periods most of the plaintiffs were developers
(100% in the first period, 95% in the third, 81% in the fourth, and 79% in the
fifth). This variation according to time seems to be related to the fact that in
the second period many cases dealt with video game programs, which tend to
involve more non-developing copyright holders.
The nature of the alleged infringers also change over time. In the
fourth period, about half of the defendants are non-developers, while in the
other periods more of them were developers (100% in the first period, 64% in
the second, 68% in the third, and 79% in the fifth). In the second period, in
which many plaintiffs were non-developers, more than half of the
defendants were developers. This illustrates that video game cases which
comprised of many cases in the second period tend to be the cases in which
defendants involved in some kind of developing activity in relation to the
underlying program, of which copyright is owned by non-developing
plaintiffs.

Nature of the case

The nature of the cases can be drawn from the nature of actors. There
are 4 cases in which developers of the original program filed suits against
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copyright holders of the program (see table 7). In 3 cases copyright holders of
the programs in issue filed suits against developers of the programs in issue.
In 76 (66%) cases developers who are also copyright holders had claims
against competitors. Among these 76 cases, 17 cases involved no other
program than the original program, while in 59 cases programs other than
the original program were involved. In 22 (19%) cases, copyright holders who
are not developers filed suits against competitors. Among these, 3 cases
involved only the original program while 19 cases involved other programs
that are not the original programs. In 2 cases the developer of the program
had claims for copyright against the copyright office registrar. In 6 cases the
copyright holder of the program in issue sued the developer of the program,
based on the infringement claim of other programs developed by the
developer. In 2 cases, the developer and copyright holder at the same time
sued their clients. These are the only cases in the data that involve end-users
of the program.
These cases can be categorized more generally. There are 59 (51%) cases
in which developers of the original program had claims against developers of
any kind of programs. In 24 (21%) cases, developers of the original programs
had claims against non-developing actors who mayor may not be copyright
holders of any kind of programs. In 32 (28%) cases, non-developers claimed
against developers of any kind of programs or non-developers.
There is another dimension by which these cases can be divided: the
number of program(s) involved in the case. In every case, there is the
original computer program of which the movant claims the copyright. 28
(24%) cases involved only this original program. In the other 87 (76%) cases,
other computer programs than the original program are involved, whether
the programs are decided to be infringing the original program or not.

101

There is a difference in the nature of the cases according to the time
period. In all the cases in the first period, 76% of the cases in the fifth period,
and 63% in the third period, developers sued developers. In the second
period, as expected, non-developers sued developers in 64% of the cases. In
the fourth period, the nature of the cases was evenly distributed.

Judges' characteristics
Judges' characteristics that may have some relation to the ways in
which they decide the copyright cases include their age, presidents who
appointed the judges, the year in which they were appointed, the political
party of the appointing presidents. Information about six of the judges were
not available from any of the references that were used. For analysis, even
when a judge decided more than one case, she was counted as one judge each
time she decided on a case.
The age of the judges at the time they decided the cases range.from 45
to 90. 5 judges were in their forties, 15 in their fifties, 43 in their sixties, 32 in
their seventies, and 14 were between the age of 80 and 90. The year in which
the judges were appointed were between 1959 and 1992. 20 judges were
appointed between 1959 and 1970,55 between 1971 and 1980, and 29 between
1981 and 1992.
There were 8 presidents by whom the judges were appointed. 3 judges
were appointed by Eisenhower, 19 by Kennedy, 25 by Johnson, 46 by Nixon, 15
by Ford, 93 by Carter, 53 by Reagan, and 18 by Bush. 61 judges were appointed
by a Republican president and 48 by a Democratic president.

Decisions
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The decisions of the study can be categorized in various ways. First
they are categorized according to whether the movant of the case won the
case, or the alleged infringer (in infringement cases) and/or the challenger (in
copyrightability cases) won the case. Among the 115 cases, the movants won
73 cases (64%) and the alleged infringer and the challengers won 42 cases
(36%). When the decisions were divided broadly according to whether the
decision was limiting the scope of copyright protection of computer software
or expanding the scope, 43 cases (37%) limited the scope and 69 (60%) cases
expanded the scope (see table 8). Three cases (3%) were about who owns the
authorship or ownership rights only, so could not be categorized into either
limiting or expanding the copyright scope.
According to the topic of the case, the cases may have decisions on
copyrightability, infringement, or both copyrightability and infringement.
Therefore, separate variables were made for the copyrightability decision and
infringement decision. Among the 115 cases, 29 cases dealt with the issue of
the copyrightability of the program. 26 (90%) of the copyrightability cases were
decided in favor of granting the copyright, while only 3 (10%) cases were
decided against granting the copyright to the program (table 9). Among the
115 cases, 107 cases dealt with the infringement issue. Among these 107 cases,
65 cases (61%) decided that infringement occurred, while 42 (40%) decided that
infringement did not occur (see table 10). Therefore, it seems that a higher
degree of consensus has been achieved in the courts on the issue of granting
copyrightability to computer programs than on the issue of infringement,
although more cases decided that infringement occurred.
Another dimension of the decisions was whether the case decided for
or against the developer of the program or the copyright holder of the
program. The movants of the cases consist of developers of the program, or
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developers and copyright holders at the same time, and copyright holders of
the program who was not involved in developing processes. One-hundred
and eleven out of 115 cases involved the copyright holder of the program
whether they were developers or not. Among these copyright holderinvolved cases, 70 cases (63%) decided in favor of copyright holders, while 41
(36%) decided against copyright holders. There were 92 cases that involved
developers of the program whether they were copyright holders of not. 59
cases (64%) decided in favor of developers and 33 (36%) decided against
developers.
The copyright cases regarding computer software tended to decide in
favor of granting the copyright rather than against granting the copyright, to
find an infringement than not, in favor of developers than against them, in
favor of copyright holders than against them, and in favor of developers than
in favor of copyright holders when they are in dispute. In conclusion, the
courts were generally in favor of expanding the scope of copyright protection
of computer software, rather than limiting the scope of copyright protection.

Size of actors
One of the various measurements that indicate the level of resources is
whether the actors are individuals or firms, or multiple firms acting together
for the case. 4 (4%) of the movants are individuals, 3 (3%) of them are
individuals who are affiliated to some firms (usually they own the
companies), 100 (87%) of them are firms, and 8 (7%) of them are multiple
firms. In the case of alleged infringers of challengers of copyright validity,
there was 1 individual, 4 (4%) multiple individuals, 19 (17%) individuals
who own the companies, 45 (40%) firms, 14 (12%) multiple firms, 30 (26%)
firms with other individuals, and 2 (2%) copyright registrars. In a broad
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categorization, 7 (6%) of the plaintiffs were individuals and 108 (99%) of them
were firms, while 26 (23%) of the defendants were individuals and 89 (77%)
are firms.
The nature of the case can be drawn from this categorization. Most
(77%) cases were between firms, and in 20 (17%) cases firms claimed against
individuals. In 6 cases, the plaintiffs and the defendants were both
individuals. There was only one case in which individuals filed against a
firm.
In the case of firms, their size can be measured by the revenues and the
number of employees. Due to the difficulty of obtaining this kind of data
despite the extensive use of various databases, among the 108 cases in which
the movants were firms, information was obtained for 62 (57%) cases.
Among the 89 cases in which the alleged infringers/challengers were firms,
information was available for 58 (65%) cases. It is likely that there is a
systematic difference between the firms about which the information is
available now and the firms about which the information is not available
now. However, it is difficult to imagine that the systematic bias, if any,
operates in different ways for the plaintiffs and for the defendants.
In the 62 cases, movants were found to have greater revenues than
alleged infringers, but was not statistically significant because the variances
were very large. Among the movants, the firms in 29 cases had revenues less
than 100 million dollars, and in 33 cases more than 100 million dollars.
Among the alleged infringers/challengers, firms in 49 cases had revenues less
than 100 million dollars and only in 11 cases more than 100 million. The
average number of employers in the firms of movants was greater (9246) than
that of alleged infringers/challengers (8121). The average age of the firms of
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the movants was also higher (17) than that of the alleged
infringers/ challengers (14).
As noted before, the level of resources only has a meaning when it is
compared between the two parties involved in each case. Therefore, it is
important to analyze only the cases for which the information on the both
parties is available, although the problem of the lack of data is more
compounded. In 88 cases in which both parties are firms, information on
both parties was obtained for 31 (35%) cases. In 21 (68%) cases the revenues of
the movants were greater than those of the defendants, and in 10 cases it was
vice versa.
In a similar vein, among the 44 cases for which information for both

parties' numbers of employees are available, in 31 (70%) cases plaintiffs had
more employees, and in 11 cases defendants had more employees. In 2 cases
the number of employees was the same between the two parties. The age of
the firms of the both parties was available in 30 cases. In 19 (63%) cases firms
of the plaintiffs were older and in 10 cases those of the defendants were older.
In one case the age of the firms was the same. Thus the available data suggest
that in every aspect the plaintiffs had greater allocative and human resources
than the defendants. Although the data only constitute 35% of the total data,
there is no reason to suspect that the availability of information on the size of
the firms is systematically different between the plaintiffs and the defendants.
The ratings of the legal counsels and the law firms were turned out to
be extremely homogeneous. Since almost all of the counsels and firms had
"AU ratings, the variance was not enough to make any comparison. It seems

that all the parties sought to gain the first rate legal service as the stake
involved in copyright cases pertaining to computer software tends to be very
high.
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VI.

DYNAMICS BETWEEN ACTORS, ALLOCATIVE RESOURCES AND
DEOSIONS

Based on the characteristics of each variable, this chapter examines how
these factors related to the judges' decisions. This chapter does not include
variables that were not found to be related to the decisions in any way, such as
the level of the court (district court versus appeals court), circuit and state in
which the case was held, the form of the program (literal or non-literal
elements). The interaction of the actors' legal arguments with these factors
will be examined in the next chapter.

Procedural status
Decisions regarding infringement were slightly different according to
the procedural status of the cases. In the summary judgment cases, more (7
out of 10) cases did not find any infringement, while in the other cases of all
the other procedural status, more decisions found an infringement than not.
This result can be attributed to the nature of the status. Because summary
judgments can be given only when there are no genuine facts involved in the
case, if it is found that there is any factual dispute, summary judgment cannot
be given. The fact that the summary judgment was not given does not mean
that the opposing party won the case on the merits, but means that the merits
should be decided at trial.

Topic
The topic of the cases sharply influences decision-making. When the
topic of the case is copyrightability, 25 (89%) out of 28 cases were decided in
favor of granting copyrightability. In the infringement cases, it was not as
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consistent. 61 (62%) out of the remaining 98 cases were in favor of deciding
that infringement has occurred, and 37 (38%) were against deciding that
infringement has occurred. Some of these cases include both issues of
copyrightability and infringement. In the cases that deal with the
infringement issue only, the rulings were even more evenly decided. 35
(47%) out of the 75 cases ruled that infringement has occurred, and 40 (53%)
cases ruled that infringement has not occurred.

Judges' Characteristics
In general, judges' characteristics were not related to the decisions. The

age of the judges at the time of the decision-making and the year in which
they were appointed did not have any significant relationship to the way they
made copyrightability or infringement decisions. Also, the appointing
presidents and the political party of the appointing presidents did not
influence the ways in which they made decisions in any significant way.
Especially in copyrightability cases where decisions did not vary much, most
of the judges decided in favor of granting copyrightability of computer
software regardless of their appointing presidents. In infringement cases,
slight differences were found among the judges. For example, the judges
appointed by Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, and Reagan found an infringement in
about half of the cases they decided. The judges appointed by Kennedy and
Bush were more likely to find an infringement and the judges appointed by
Johnson and Carter were more likely to find that there was no infringement.
This result seems to suggest only that in the copyright cases with regards to
computer software, individual differences among the judges may playa larger
role in decision making rather than their political orientation.
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Allocative and human resources of actors
In examining whether the allocative and human resources of the
actors relate to the judges' decision making, there are different dimensions by
which the level of resources can be measured. The first one is whether the
actors are individuals or firms. When the plaintiffs were individuals, they
were more likely to lose the case than when the plaintiffs were firms. On the
other hand, when the defendants were individuals, they were more likely to
win the case than when they were firms. When both actors are firms, their
resources are also measured by the revenues, number of employees, and age
of the firms. These three measures were not found to be influencing the
decisions. Whether the decisions were in favor of the plaintiffs or in favor if
the defendants, the mean revenues, number of employees, and age of the
firms were not significantly different. This may be related to the fact that the
data on these variables are not complete, but there is no reason to assume that
the size of firms about which the information was not available differs for the
plaintiff and for the defendant. Tentatively, it can be concluded that the
actors' allocative resources relate to the decision making more in terms of
whether they were individuals or firms than in terms of the actual financial
and human assets they possess. This conclusion suggests that it is important
to examine how the nature of the actors relates to the decision making.

Nature of Actors
The decisions were not found to be influenced by the nature of the
movants, i.e., whether the movants were developers or not. However, the
nature of the alleged infringers was found to be significantly related to the
decision making, while the nature of the challengers of the validity of
copyright was not found to be related to the decisions. No matter whether the
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defendants in copyrightability cases were developers or not, decisions tended
to be made in favor of granting copyrightability. In general, alleged infringers
are more likely to lose the case than the movants of infringement cases. But
when the alleged infringers were non-developers, they had only a 20% chance
to win the case, but if they were developers of any kind of programs, they had
a 45% of probability to win the case.
Therefore, it is concluded that the copyrightability decisions tend not to
be influenced by the nature of actors, but the infringement decisions tend to
depend greatly on whether the alleged infringers have been involved in the
developing activities in any way.

Subject matter
First, the nature of the plaintiff's program in terms of whether it is an
operating system program, an application program, or a video game program
was not found to be related to decisions in any ways. However, the nature of
the other programs than the plaintiff's program involved in the case was
found to be clearly related to decision-making: These other programs are the
ones that were created and/or used by the alleged infringers. In some cases,
they used the plaintiff's programs, but in other cases they developed other
programs, which may have infringed the plaintiffs' underlying programs.
Some of these newly developed products have particular characteristics in
relation to the underlying program, as described in the previous chapter.
Some of the characteristics may be reasonably expected to benefit the users
and possibly the developers of the original program, while the other
characteristics are clearly harmful to the developers of the original program
because these programs help reproduce, de-effect, or alter the nature of the
original program.
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These two different kinds of characteristics did not result in different
kinds of decisions. Regardless of whether the characteristics may be beneficial
or clearly harmful to the users and possibly the plaintiffs, alleged infringers
who developed these programs were much less likely to be decided that they
infringed the copyright than the alleged infringers who developed no new
programs or developed competing programs without these particular
characteristics. For example, in Vault v. Quaid. even though Quaid marketed
a program that can be used to make unauthorized copies of other copyrighted
software programs and Vault made an argument based on its consequences
on the market of its own program, the judges decided that the Qauid program
did not infringe on the copyright of Vault. Qn the other hand, when the
defendant's software program can be considered "add-on" software which
typically offers some enhanced functions to an existing program, the courts
were split in their decisions and more likely to decide that there was an
infringement than not. For example, when Artic sold electronic devices
intended to stimulate Midway's 'PacMan' and 'Galaxian; as well as devices
designed to be inserted into the Galaxian Game to speed up and otherwise
alter the play of the game, the judge decided that the Artic's game kits are
infringing derivative works. But when Lewis Galoob marketed a video game
accessory 'Game Genie; which can be attached to a video game cartridge such
as Nintendo products and allow the player temporarily alter certain attributes
of the game, the judge decided that the game accessory did not infringe on
Galoob's copyright.
This result clearly suggests that the copyright decisions tend to consider
the degree of involvement in the developing activity of the alleged infringers
more than the possible impacts of these other programs to the original
developers and users. In addition, this result is consistent with the finding
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that the nature of alleged infringers is significantly related to decisions.
When the alleged infringers were developers of any programs, they were less
likely to be ruled as infringers of the copyright than when they were nondevelopers of any programs. Thus it can be inferred again that the copyright
decisions in general tend to consider the involvement with developing
activity very importantly.
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substantial similarity issue. In this context, judges ask the question of the
validity of copyright again, in order to define whether the copied portion of
the program was a copyrightable expression or not. 39 (15%) arguments of the
judges were placed in this context. Altogether, the copyrightability question
was asked in 120 (46%) of the 261 arguments and was a recurring theme in
almost all of the cases. Finally, if it is found that copying has occurred and the
copied portion was the copyrightable expression, the court should decide
whether the copying constitutes infringement or not. 72 (28%) arguments
were placed in the context of copying as infringement. A question that was
less frequently asked but carries a great significance in copyright law is about
the authorship/ownership dispute. 17 arguments (7%) centered around this
issue.
There is a high association between what the plaintiffs and defendants
argued and what the judges argued, naturally because many of the judges'
arguments were responding to the other parties. Among the 70 arguments of
the plaintiffs that were explicitly mentioned by judges, 20 (29%) of them were
about copying as infringement, 19 (27%) 21 about the substantial similarity, 15
(21%) about copyrightable expression, 8 (11%) about ownership/authorship
dispute, and 7 (10%) about copyrightability. The distribution of the
defendants' arguments is similar to that of the plaintiffs', except that more of
their arguments regarding the copyrightability issue were considered by the
judges. Among the 184 arguments of the defendants that were mentioned by
the judges in court opinions, 51 (28%) were about the copyrightability, 49
(27%) were about infringement, 26 (14%) were about substantial similarity
and copyrightable expression respectively, 19 (10%) about the validity of
ownership, and 12 (7%) about authorship/ownership dispute.
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VII.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS: USE OF SmUCTURAL RULES AND
RESOURCES

The analysis of arguments will begin with the description of general
characteristics frames and theories used by the legal actors. Based on the
approaches that have been discussed in a previous chapter, the legal
arguments are analyzed according to the frame of the public interest versus
the private reward, and then according to the frame of authorship, work, and
use. For the sake of comparison between frames and time periods, detailed
analysis of legal arguments according to each issue of the copyright cases is
conducted. Important structural rules that have been established are
identified by examining the parties' arguments and the judges' responses in
earlier cases. How the legal actors use these structural rules in relation to
their resources, and how the judges respond to the ways in which the parties
use their communicative resources in their legal arguments, is examined.
Possible change or reproduction of structural rules that occur through this
process is explored as well.

General Frames

Regarding the form of the argument units, most frequently, the judges'
arguments were explicitly responding to the defendants' arguments. In 145
(52%) out of 261 arguments, judges identified what the defendants'
arguments were, but did not identify the plaintiffs' arguments. In 38 of the
arguments, judges indicated the characteristics of both the plaintiffs' and
defendants' arguments. In 36 arguments, the judges only identified what the
plaintiffs' arguments were, but did not identify the defendants' arguments.
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Judges did not explicitly identify any of the parties arguments but presented
their own analyses in 42 (16%) arguments.
The judges' arguments tended to be in favor of broadening the scope of
copyright protection (74%) than limiting the scope (26%). In order to examine
the general trend of the arguments and the use of frames over time, the time
periods developed in the methods chapter were used. Even though the
original time periods consisted of 5 categories with 3-4 year in each period,
because the first period has only 4 arguments, the first and second periods are
combined for analysis. As a result, the first period (1978-1983) has 69
arguments, the second period (1984-1986) 45 arguments, the third period
(1987-1990) 68 arguments, and the fourth period (1991-1993) 79 arguments. It
was found that the trend of broadening the scope of copyright protection was
more clear in the first two time periods (81% and 84% for broadening the
scope) than in the last two time periods (70% and 74%).
The most frequent issue of the case was that of copyrightability. In 58
(22%) arguments in the copyrightability cases, judges dealt with the question
of whether the computer software or any element of it is copyrightable as a
subject matter or the plaintiff's copyright in the original program is valid.
They also asked the same question in infringement cases but in slightly
different contexts. In order to decide on the infringement case, the court
should first decide whether the plaintiff owns a valid copyright in the
program involved in the case. Thus, another 27 (10%) of the judges'
arguments regarding the question of copyrightability were placed in this
context. Once the ownership is established, the court should decide whether
the defendant copied the plaintiff's program, which can also be inferred by
showing access and substantial similarity. Except for one case, access was not a
matter of dispute. 54 (21%) arguments were placed in the context of the
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When the judges responded to the other actors' arguments, most
frequently judges discussed about how they rejected to the defendants'
arguments. Among the 219 arguments in which judges were responding to
the parties, 163 (63%) of them were rejecting the defendants' arguments while
44 (17%) of them were rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments. In these
arguments, judges explicitly or implicitly accepted the other party's
arguments. Not so frequently judges only presented arguments that accepted
a party's argument while not explicitly rejecting any arguments. In only 5
(2%) cases judges indicated that they were agreeing to the plaintiffs'
arguments and in 7 (3%) cases judges indicated they were agreeing to the
defendants' arguments. In summary, judges tended to agree, explicitly or
implicitly, with the plaintiffs more frequently (167 arguments) than with the
defendants (52 arguments).
Narrowly constructed frames are identified as follows: the nature of the
plaintiff's work, the authorship (creation process) of the plaintiff, the nature
of the defendant's work, the authorship (creation process) of the defendant,
the nature of the use by the defendant, market consequences, and the public
use and benefit. The frame that was most frequently used by judges was that
of the nature of work (62%, 162 arguments) followed by the frame of use (22%,
57 arguments) and the frame of authorship (16%,42 arguments) (see table 11).
The frame of work and the frame of authorship can be further divided in
terms of whose work and whose authorship was being considered. The
nature of the plaintiff's work was more frequently considered (100
arguments) than the nature of the defendant's work (62 arguments).
Similarly, the authorship issue of the plaintiff was more frequently
considered (27 arguments) than the authorship issue of the defendant (17
arguments). The frame of use also can be further divided in terms of its
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focus: the use ofthe defendants (36 arguments), the public use (14), and
market consequences (7).
The frames used by the defendant were similar to those of the judges'
while the plaintiffs' use of frames was slightly different. The defendants used
the frame of work most frequently (58% of the arguments), followed by the
frame of use (25%) and the frame of authorship (18%). The plaintiffs also
used the frame of work (61%) most frequently, but they used the frame of
authorship (23%) more often than the frame of use (16%).
It was also examined if there is any difference in the frame of

arguments when the judges were explicitly responding to the parties and
when the judges did not clearly mention the other parties' arguments. When
judges used their own arguments, they tended to use the frame of work even
more frequently (81%) as opposed to the frame of authorship (5%) than when
they were explicitly responding to the other parties (58% for work and 20% for
authorship). Also, when they used their own arguments, their arguments
tended to have frames of the defendant's work/authorship (67%) more than
frames of the plaintiff's work/authorship (31%), while when they were
responding, the use of these two frames was more evenly distributed.
Therefore, the most frequently used frame when judges used their own
arguments only was the nature of the defendant's work (52%) while the most
frequently used frame, when judges were responding to the others'
arguments, was the frame of the plaintiff's work (37%). Also, the judges'
arguments employing the frame of the public interest or market
consequences were usually made when they were responding to the other
parties (20 arguments). These frames were used only once when judges were
making their own arguments.
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The judges' use of frames also differed according to the kind of their
arguments in terms of the scope of copyright protection. When the judges'
arguments were in favor of expanding the scope of copyright protection, they
were more likely to be using the frame of the nature of the plaintiff's
work/authorship (52%). But when the judges' arguments were in favor of
limiting the scope of protection, they were most likely to use the frame of the
nature of the defendant's work/authorship (57%). Using the frame of work
versus that of authorship did not make a clear difference in the judges'
arguments in terms of the scope of protection.
In general, the arguments of the first 2 time periods focused more on
the nature of the work (80% in the first period and 76% in the second period),
while the arguments of the last 2 periods were more evenly distributed in
terms of the use of frames (see table 12). In the third period, 31 (46%) of the
arguments made by judges used the frame of work, 23 (34%) of the arguments
used the frame of use (including public interest and marketplace frames), and
14 (21%) used the frame of authorship. In the fourth period, 42 (53%) used
the frame of work, 21 (27%) used the frame of use, and 16 (20%) used the
frame of authorship.
In a similar fashion, the judges' arguments also focused on the
plaintiffs' work/authorship more frequently (64%) than on the defendants'
work/authorship (28%) inthe first time period, but as time went by, the
arguments tended to include the frame of the defendants' work or authorship
more frequently (28% in the first period, then 47%,53%, and 48%).
These changes over time in the use of frames, from the frame of work
toward that of use and from that of the plaintiff's toward that of the
defendant's, seem to result from a change in the issues considered in the cases
over time. In the first time period, most of the arguments were about the
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issue of copyrightability (61%). However, in later time periods the
copyrightability arguments decreased (49% in the second period, 34% in the
third period, 39% in the fourth period). At the same time, the arguments
dealing with the issues of substantial similarity and copying as infringement
tended to increase (36% in the first period, 47% in the second period, 59% in
the third period, and 51% in the fourth period).
The use of frames differed according to the issue (see table 13). When
the issue was the authorship/ownership dispute, all the 17 arguments used
the frame of authorship. When the issue was copyrightability (including
those in copyrightability cases and in infringement cases), most of the
arguments (97 arguments, 82%) had a frame of work, and only some
arguments (18 arguments, 16%) had a frame of authorship. Among the 97
arguments that used a frame of work, 94 of them focused on the plaintiffs'
work, while only 3 focused on the defendants' work. When the issue was
substantial similarity, most of the arguments also used a frame of work (49
arguments, 91%), but among the 49 arguments, 46 focused on the defendants'
work while only 3 focused on the plaintiffs' work. When the issue was
copying as infringement, the most frequent frame was that of use (54
arguments, 75%).
As the issue of the cases relates to the use of frames, it is important to
analyze legal arguments separately according to the issue of the cases.
Although the frame of use includes the use of the public interest and the
market consequences as well as the use of defendants in this framework, the
focus of the detailed analysis is on how the concepts of work and authorship
interact with each other and are mobilized, and how these two concepts
operate in conjunction with the concept of use which appeared later.
Therefore, a separate framework of analysis is needed to examine the
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question of how the concept of public interest versus private proprietary
rights plays a role in copyright cases, and how the marketplace norm and
rationale relate to the concept of enhancing public benefit through the
encouragement of innovation. Thus, before the analysis that used the frames
of work, authorship, and use is presented, legal arguments are analyzed in
terms of how the public interest or marketplace considerations are dealt with
in copyright cases with regards to computer software.

Frame of Public Interest versus Private Property Rights

Despite the premise that the fundamental principle of the copyright
regime concerns the public interest, the public interest is a theme that hardly
becomes a basis for decision in copyright cases regarding computer software.
In the arguments that decided the merits or arguments in summary
judgment cases, the public interest or policy considerations were only
occasionally argued as a rationale for a decision. Even in the preliminary
injunction cases of which four basic requirements included the public interest
factor, this factor was often ignored in decision-making or was merely restated in the arguments without any further discussion. The considerations
of the public interest and marketplace in preliminary injunction arguments
and in arguments that decided on the merits are separately analyzed.

Policy Considerations and Public-Regarded Legal Theories in Final Judgment
and Summary Judgment cases

The arguments employing the concept of public policy or public
interest were found to be rare in the copyright cases in regards to computer
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software. The judges in only 8 cases among the 115 cases explicitly used the
notion of public policy as a rationale for supporting their arguments and
decisions on the merits. There were 3 different kinds of policy considerations:
the intent of the Congress, the public benefit, and the consequences on
innovation or competition. There was no significant relationship between
the use of policy considerations and the nature of the actors or cases. But it
was found that these policy considerations were argued in the context of
certain frames in the arguments, such as the nature of the plaintiff's work
and the use of the plaintiff's program.
Among the 8 cases, 2 cases were about whether to grant
copyrightability, and the remaining 6 were about finding an infringement. In
the 2 copyrightability cases, the judges used the intention of the Congress as a
policy argument. In ruling whether the computer software on the ROM was
a "copy" or copyrightable, the judges stated that the intention of the Congress
is to copyright computer programs (Tandy v. Personal Micro Computers;
Williams v. Artic. appeals).
Among the 6 infringement cases that used public policy arguments, 2
of them, which were the same case that was held in the district court and in
the court of appeals, used policy arguments regarding the public access and
public benefit. In Sega v. Accolade, Accolade developed game cartridges
compatible with the 'Genesis' console developed by Sega, and argued that to
gain the "public's need for access" to programs, fair use should be allowed.
The district court judge commented that the public's need for access is fully
satisfied by the copyright owner's marketing of the original. However, the
judges in the court of appeals accepted Accolade's argument and argued that
allowing a particular use of the original program results in the public benefit,
and when humans cannot gain access to the unprotected ideas and functional
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concepts without making copies, it is against the public policy underlying the
Copyright Act not to allow the use. Consequently, it was held that Accolade's
game cartridges did not infringe Sega's copyright. In this case, the public
policy argument was made in the context of other legal rules such as fair use
and the functionality theory.
In the remaining 4 infringement cases, the policy arguments centered

around the possible consequences of allowing the use of the original
programs such as innovation and competition, and the judges were split on
that matter. When the policy considerations were argued in the context of
the utilitarian aspect or functional use of the plaintiff's program, the judges
decided that allowing the use of the program will preserve the market for
innovation or otherwise it will result in too little competition. In Foresight
v. Larry Pfortmiller, Pfortmiller developed a digitizer based on the plaintiff's
'Orafix' program and used this enhanced program only in its business. The
court held that this enhancement of the program falls within the adaptation
for the exception of infringement, and argued that allowing this kind of
utilization of the program would "preserve the market for improvements."
In Apple v. Microsoft, the judge argued that to accept Apple's desktop

metaphor and look and feel arguments would result in "too much
protection" and yield "too little competition" because the element of Apple's
user interface is a purely functional purpose as much as the automobile.
Therefore, considering the consequences for innovation or competition in
terms of the utilitarian aspect of the programs led into arguing for a narrow
scope for copyright protection.
In the other 2 cases, the judges focused on the literary aspect of the
program from the beginning of their arguments, or shifted the focus from
policy considerations to the nature of the program itself. In Pearl Systems v.
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Competition Electronics, Inc., the defendant argued that ruling the use of
computer program as infringement would discourage innovation. But the
judge shifted the focus of the issue from public policy to the idea versus
expression dichotomy, by saying that granting a copyright does not give him
or her the right to monopolize the idea. In Lotus v. Paperback. Paperback
argued that the judges should not find an infringement because the policy
favors extremely narrow copyright protection in computer programs that are
useful articles. The judge disagreed with the defendant's notion of the useful
article, and argued that, through copyright law, Congress intends to explicitly
give substantial protection to innovative expression in intellectual works,
including computer programs.
In all of the cases in which the public policy arguments were used, the

parties of the cases were both developers of different programs (in 7 cases) or
both non-developers (in 1 case). Thus it remains unknown whether the
nature of the parties would make any difference in the judges' use of policy
considerations. However, it seems that the ways in which policy
considerations are considered clearly relate to the context of the frame in
which the arguments are placed. When the policy consideration on the
intention of the Congress was combined with the frame of the nature of the
program, the arguments were made in favor of the broad scope of copyright
protection. The consideration regarding the public use and benefit
consideration that was combined with the frame of the use of work led the
judge to argue against broadening the scope of copyright protection. When
the policy consideration on innovation and competition was placed in the
context of the nature of the program such as the idea versus expression
dichotomy and in the context of the computer program as a literary work, the
judges favored a broader scope of copyright protection But when the policy
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considerations on innovation were placed in the context of a utilitarian
element or functional use of the program, the judges argued against
broadening the scope of copyright protection. Therefore, it is suggested that
the policy considerations tended to be influenced by the use of other frames or
existing legal rules rather than to operate as a decisive factor themselves.

Other than the policy considerations that were used in the above 8
cases, there are some cases that used legal theories relating to the issue of the
public interest -- publication/public domain doctrine and first sale doctrine -in infringement cases. In theory, these theories were designed to ensure the
adequate access of the public to the computer programs and to encourage
innovation by allowing the use of available codes. The first sale doctrine (17
U.s.c. §109) provides that the owner of a copy of the program can sell her
copy without the permission of the copyright holder.
Among the 11 cases that used these theories, 6 cases used the
publication/public domain doctrine and 5 used the first sale doctrine. Usually
defendants made arguments based on these theories and judges responded to
the arguments, more often unfavorably than favorably. It seems that the
nature of the parties, whether the party was a developer of computer
programs or not, was an important factor that related to how credible and
convincing their arguments appeared to the judges.
When the plaintiff was a developer and the defendant was a nondeveloper (4 cases), judges never accepted the defendant's argument that used
the doctrines of limited publication or first sale. In GCA v. Chance, the
plaintiffs manufactured and sold the computer machines and the defendants
were in the business of repairing the machines. While the defendants argued
that the plaintiff's program was already published when they used the
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program, the judge argued that the plaintiff's distribution of the program was
a "limited" publication since the plaintiff had no intention of distributing its
source code and object code to the general public. Similarly, in Allen-Myland,
Inc. (AMI) v. IBM, AMI was in the business of providing engineering services
to owners of IBM large scale mainframe computers and argued that it did not
infringe IBM's copyright in its 3090 microcode because the microcode was in
the public domain. But the judge held that there was no evidence supporting
AMI's argument, thus the microcode was not in the public domain. In ISC v.
Altech, Altech who serviced computer equipment and purchased and sold
used computer equipment, argued that ISC is not entitled to the protection of
its operating and applications programs under the first sale doctrine. But the
judge decided that the doctrine of the first sale was not applicable because ISC
did not sell the program to Altech but licensed it. In Data Products v.
William Reppart. the defendants for whom Data Products supplied their
application program packages also argued that their use of the plaintiff's
computer programs was legitimate and non-infringing due to the first sale
doctrine. But the judge held that the doctrine was not applicable in the case
since the defendant did not only use the software but made unauthorized
"copies" of the material while the doctrine only extends to the original copy
itself. The judges seem to have perceived that the theory of publication and
the theory of first sale does not have applicability when the defendants were
not developers themselves. The defendants failed to have appropriate
resources to use certain legal theories, i.e., being engaged in software
developing activities in these cases.
When the both parties were not involved in any activities related to
software development such as in Red Baron v. Taito, where Taito imported a
game program called 'Double Dragon' and Red Baron owned a copyright of

125

the program, the appellate court judges also rejected the first sale doctrine
used by the defendant. The judges argued that the exhibition of the images in
"sequence" of the game constitutes a "performance," and the first sale
doctrine is limited to the "distribution" right, and does not apply to the
"performance" right. There is only one case where the plaintiff was a nondeveloper and the defendant was a developer. But in this case, Midway v.
Strohon. the defendant's argument using the first sale doctrine was rejected
on the basis that the judge considered the doctrine applicable only in patent
cases.
Finally, when both parties of the case were developers of any kind of
computer programs, the decisions were split. There are 4 cases in which the
plaintiff was a developer of the original program and the defendant was a
developer of another program which the plaintiff allegedly infringed. In 3 of
the cases the judges rejected the arguments of the defendants using the
theories of first sale or public domain, while in 1 case the judge accepted the
defendant's argument based on the theory of public domain. For example, in
Hubco v. Management Assistance. Inc. (MAl), Hubco who developed an
upgrading program for MAl's operating system software argued that because
MAl publicly distributed its operating systems, Hubco's software did not
infringe MAl's copyright. But the judge disagreed by saying that the
important distinction is between "general publication" and a "limited
publication," and that MAl made a limited publication so it was not publicly
available. Also, in PRC v. National Association of Realtors (NAR). the judge
decided that NAR's modified program of PRC's software infringed the
copyright of PRC because the original program was not made available to the
public without restriction, so it was not publication as NAR insisted. In ~
Rubber v. Bando. the defendants who were former employees of the
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plaintiff's company argued that the plaintiff's copyright was not enforceable
because the program was unprotected due to prior publication. The court
held, however, that if any publication had occurred, it was a limited
publication.
On the contrary, the judges of the court of appeals in Data Cash v. IS&A
interpreted the concept of "limited publication" differently. They argued that
a limited publication was really in the eyes of the law no publication at all,
and thus JS&A's chess game program did not infringe upon the copyright of
Data Cash's chess game program. The Data Cash case can be distinguished
from the other 3 cases, in that the defendant's program in this case was a
competing product which was similar in its function but was not found to
have a clear relationship in terms of the developing process with the
plaintiff's program. The defendants' programs in the other cases were an
upgrading program for the plaintiff's program, a modified program of the
plaintiff's program, or a similar program developed by the ones who had
been involved with the development of the plaintiff's program. Therefore,
when judges try to decide whether the use of the program is legitimate
because the program is in the public domain or was already sold to the other
party, they seem to consider the apparent connection between the two
programs more importantly than the functional similarity of the programs.
In summary, there were only 11 cases that used the public access

arguments using the publication or first sale doctrines, and these arguments
were usually not accepted by the judges. Especially, when the parties
involved non-developers of any computer programs, the argument using
these doctrines were never accepted. Only when both parties were developers
of different programs did the party that used the argument based on these
theories have a chance to convince the judges, but they were not always
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successful. When the argument was accepted, it was when the defendant of
the case could successfully use not only the legal theory but also the actor's
resources, i.e., having developed another.program which was not related to
the plaintiff's program. Therefore, the most important concern in relation to
the use of these legal theories seems to be the ways in which the defendant's
program was developed (independently or by somehow using the underlying
program of the plaintiff).

Factors Regarding the Public Interest and Marketplace in Preliminary
Injunction Cases

Most of the arguments explicitly considering the public interest issue
were made in the context of preliminary injunction ·cases, since one of the
four requirements of deciding for preliminary injunction is a factor of the
public interest. Therefore, arguments in the cases deciding on a preliminary
injunction are separately considered here. In an infringement action,
preliminary injunction cases arguably have more issues on balancing equities
than in other final judgment or summary judgment cases. Because alleged
infringers are only "preliminarily" enjoined from copying, manufacturing,
using, or distributing the original program in these cases, decisions are made
on the basis of different considerations than cases decided on the merits. In
determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, courts require the
satisfaction of a various combination of the following four factors: (1) the
plaintiff has a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim; (2) the plaintiff
does not have an adequate remedy at law and he or she will suffer irreparable
harm without the injunction; (3) this harm is greater than the injury the
defendant will suffer if the injunction is granted; and (4) the injunction will
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not harm the public interest. Other courts require that the plaintiff show
either irreparable harm and likelihood of success, or irreparable harm and the
existence of a serious question going to the merits and balance of hardship.
There are 47 preliminary injunction cases including 8 cases at the court
of appeals. The decisions in the preliminary injunction cases are more likely
to be made in favor of finding an infringement (70%) than in other cases.
Although judges tend to claim that none of the four or two factors of
preliminary injunction cases should be definitive, not every factor is always
explicitly considered, nor are the factors that are considered given the same
weight in the arguments. For example, the issues related to the likelihood of
success on the merits were considered in every case, and in an extensive way
except for only one case. Moreover, the ultimate decisions of the case
regarding granting or denying the injunction were always made in the same
way as the decisions regarding the likelihood of success on the merits. In this
way, the likelihood of success on the merits is actually considered the
predominant factor in many cases. The arguments discussed to determine
the probability of the merits have similar characteristics and structure with
the main arguments made in all the other cases. Therefore, these arguments
will be analyzed together with the other arguments in other cases, which will
be presented in the next section.
The second most frequently considered factor was the irreparable harm,
but still 22 out of 47 preliminary injunction cases did not mention this factor
at all. In the 25 cases that did mention this factor, the judges in 19 cases
argued that the irreparable harm can be presumed if the plaintiff established
the factor of the likelihood of success on the merits. This tendency of
eliminating this factor altogether or of deciding that this factor was presumed
became even more clear in later cases. Among the 19 cases in which the
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irreparable harm was presumed, judges of 9 cases also provided some reasons
why they thought that there was a possibility of irreparable harm. The
reasons include that the plaintiff's reputation, although not sales, can be
harmed, that the video games have short-lived popularity, that the plaintiff
invested large sums of money and time in developing the program, the
defendant's sales constituted only small percentage of total sales, and that the
plaintiff was on the verge of bankruptcy.
In 2 cases, no basis was provided, but the judges just stated that there

would be irreparable harm if an injunction was not granted. In 4 cases in
which the judges did not presume the possibility of irreparable harm but
argued that there was the possibility, the rationale given was that the plaintiff
made a big investment in terms of time, money, and effort, or that the
defendant's sales of the particular program were not significant in the
defendant's business. In every case where the possibility of irreparable harm
was considered, the judges decided that there was a possibility. And in every
case in which it was decided that there was a possibility of irreparable harm,
an injunction was granted. It is interesting to find that the "plaintiff's"
investment in terms of "time, money, and effort" is often considered a factor
to make a decision in favor of the plaintiff, while the "defendant's" "labor,
time, and effort" (as opposed to the "creativity" and "independent
production") are always rejected in the arguments that rule on the merits, as
promoting a value that should not be considered in copyright law.
The factor of balance of harm was considered in 19 (40%) out of 47
cases. In 15 cases it was decided that the factor favored the plaintiff, and in 4
cases the factor favored the defendant. In some cases, judges explicitly stated
that the balance of harm was a less important factor than the likelihood of
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success on the merits, and thus would not consider this factor (Data General
v. Grumman).
In 4 of the 19 cases no reason or basis was provided for the judges

thought the plaintiff's harm exceeded the defendant's harm. The reasons and
rationales provided in the remaining 15 cases were related to the different
positions and situations of the actors. In 9 cases, the judges employed actual
comparisons between the harms, or employed the position in the industry as
a rationale, i.e., that the defendant would experience the elimination of sales
altogether while the plaintiff would experience only a decrease in sales, that
the defendant was still marketing the product while the plaintiff was not, and
that the plaintiff was better suited to withstand injury than the defendant. In
these cases, 4 cases were decided in favor of the defendant and 5 cases in favor
of the plaintiff. In 6 cases judges employed the position of the actors in the
case as a rationale, i.e., that the plaintiff's investment was large, that the
program in issue was not a substantial part of the defendant's business, that
the plaintiff's investment was much larger than the defendant's, that the
defendant's loss of profit did not deserve equitable consideration due to its
position as an infringer, and that the defendant's harm was its own fault. In
all these cases, the decision was made in favor of the plaintiff.
Therefore, when the actors' position in the industry and the actual
comparison of the harm were considered, the decisions were split and
defendants sometimes were granted a favorable decision. However, when
the judges considered the position of the actors as an investor versus an
alleged infringer in the case, the plaintiff always won the case.
The factor of the public interest was not mentioned or considered at all
in 31 (70%) out of 47 preliminary injunction cases. Among the 14 cases in
which the public interest was considered, 13 cases decided that the injunction
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should be granted. The basis of these arguments was that the public interest
would be served by free trade and competition.
In 3 out of 14 cases, the judges did not provide any rationale or

explanation in simply arguing that the public interest would be served by
granting the injunction. This is clearly contrasted with arguments relating to
the likelihood of success on the merits, in which the rules and issues are
considered in a very detailed and extensive way. Among the remaining 11
cases in which the judges did provide rationales regarding the factor of the
public interest, a judge in 1 case claimed that the public interest would be
served by prohibiting unfair competition. In the other 9 (64%) cases, the
judges argued that the public interest would be served by rewarding the
plaintiff's development, rewarding the author, encouraging individual effort
and creativity, rewarding creative expression, encouraging innovation, and
protecting the right of the copyright holder. The value of the public interest
and access

wa~

strikingly equated with the value of authorship which was

characterized by individual effort and creativity.
The analysis of the arguments and decisions in regards to preliminary
injunction factors show considerations of the public interest, users, or equity
were usually neglected. The three factors analyzed here are considered less
frequently than the likelihood of success on the merits. Irreparable harm was
easily presumed by the establishment of success on the merits, and usually
the basis to determine the possibility of irreparable harm was only that the
plaintiff invested a large amount of money and effort. This is usually.
inevitable in any of the copyright cases. Consequently, the judges tend to
make tautological restatements of the nature of the case.
The factors of the balance of harm and the public interest are even less
seriously considered compared with the other two factors, and also do not
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benefit from any of the specific guidelines. Judges do not show consistency in
dealing with the following conflicting bases to consider the balance of harm:
the actual comparison of the dollar amount of harm, the actors' pOSition in
the industry, or the actors' position in the case -- as a plaintiff versus a
defendant, and as a developer versus an alleged infringer. In regards to the
actors' position in the case as a sole consideration, this is again nothing more
than a tautological restatement of the nature of the case, and as a result, the
decisions were made always in favor of the plaintiffs.
The public interest factor was the least seriously considered factor. In
addition, not only did the arguments centering around the public interest
issue never deal with concerns of the users or the "public" as the users, but
also was the most frequently used rationale for this factor rewarding the
author's creativity and effort. The judges merely restated the assumption that
the public interest will be automatically served by rewarding individual
(authors') effort and creativity. In other words, by broadening copyright
protection to authors (and probably copyright holders). Therefore, the value
of the public interest was trivialized into providing a monetary reward to the
developers, and in the process, the value of "individual creativity" and
"authorship" was created and reproduced as an important structural rule in
the copyright cases regarding computer software.

Frames of Authorship, Work. and Use

This section presents detailed analyses of the legal arguments according
to each issue of the cases. As identified earlier, the issues include
copyrightability in copyrightability cases, the ownership / authorship dispute,
the validity of ownership, substantial similarity, copyrightable expression,
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and copying that constitutes infringement. The ways in which the plaintiffs,
defendants and judges use frames, legal theories, and interpretations in their
arguments are analyzed. In order to identify the establishment of structural
rules in copyright cases, and to define the conditions under which the
structural rules are reproduced and transformed, the ways in which the
plaintiffs and defendants employ their resources and structural rules, and the
ways in which the judges respond to their arguments, are examined (see table
14).

Copyrightability Cases

As expected by a large number of copyrightability cases in earlier time
periods, arguments pertaining to the issue of copyrightability mainly occurred
in the first time period, and the number of the arguments on that issue
decreased over time. Among the 58 arguments that dealt with the issue of
copyrightability, 25 were made in the first time period, 18 in the second
period, 14 in the third period, and only 1 in the fourth period.
Unlike the infringement cases, copyrightability cases do not consider a
question regarding the use of the plaintiff's program by the defendant. Thus
the frames used in these cases consist only of the plaintiff's authorship (7
arguments) versus the plaintiff's work (50 arguments), except for one policy
argument that was about the intent of Congress. The other frames such as the
defendant's work, the defendant's authorship, the defendant's use, the public
interest, or market consequences did not appear in the arguments pertaining
to this issue.
All of the 7 arguments that used the frame of authorship involved the
theory of originality. In only 1 argument the judge was responding to the
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plaintiff's argument while in 6 of the arguments judges were responding to
the defendants' challenge of the originality of the plaintiffs' programs.
Through these arguments, the judges clearly defined the concept of
originality as a minimalisticrequirement.
The first question regarding the originality of the plaintiff's computer
program was raised in 1982 in Apple v. Franklin. Even though the
preliminary injunction that Apple sought was denied in the district case (later
preliminary injunction was granted in the appellate court), pertaining to
Apple's operating system programs, the judge stated that an "original work"
need not be a work of genius. This minimalistic view on the originality
requirement was stated again later in 1986 in M. Kramer v. Andrews. When
the defendants challenged the validity of the plaintiff's audiovisual work on
the basis of the lack of originality, the judges argued that the standard for
originality is minimal, which is enough if it is something "his own." Where
the work is an audiovisual work, not a work of art, the judges argued, "true
artistic skill" is not required.
In Atari v. Oman that was decided in 1988, the district court agreed

with the copyright register who was the defendant of the case and held that
Atari's videogame lacked "minimal artistic expression," and admittedly
independent efforts are too trivial or insignificant to support copyright. The
district court's holding, however, was rejected by the appellate court, which
argued that the usual standard of creativity for copyright is "minimal,
modest, and very slight." In the 3 cases that followed, the judges consistently
adopted this minimalistic view of the originality requirement by arguing: that
originality means only that the work "owes its origin to the author," i.e.,
"independently created" (NEe v. InteL 1989); that the defendant's files were
substantially "re-worked" (Service & Training v. Data GeneraL 1990); and that
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he standard of originality is minimal that it only requires "independent
creation" (Apple v. Microsoft, 1991).
The analysis of the arguments in relation to the plaintiff's authorship
suggests that the scope of copyright protection was broadened by the
minimalistic view of the originality requirement. This result is consistent
with Jaszi (1991)'s argument that the concept of "authorship" continued to be
strategically used to extend copyright protection to new kinds of subject
matter, by making it dissociated from "genius" and then reassociated with the
meanest levels of creative activity, as something more than a "merely trivial"
variation. Moreover, not only was the requirement minimal, but the judges
also considered "independent creation" the most important concept in
originality, without building any objective standard for defining the
characteristics that make a work "original." Therefore, the minimal standard
for originality and the importance given to the "independent development"
of the program is established as an important structural rule in copyright
cases regarding computer software. The judges' view on the originality
explains why they made infringement decisions based on the degree of the
defendant's developing activity "on his own," rather than on the functional
similarity or possible market effect of the defendant's program.
The arguments that used the frame of work made more frequently in
earlier cases. 24 (48%) of the 50 arguments were made in the first time period,
17 (34) in the second period, and 9 (18%) in the third period. There were no
arguments that used the frame of work in the fourth period. This seems to be
because the copyrightability of computer programs as a subject matter was a
. critical question when the first cases regarding software copyright began to be
decided. After many cases, it had become established as a structural rule that
the computer software is copyrightable as a subject matter.
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Among the arguments that used a frame of work, most of them (44 out
of 50) were responding to the defendant's challenge against the
copyrightability of the plaintiff's program. 41 of them rejected the defendant's
arguments and only 3 of them accepted the defendant's arguments. There
was only one argument that rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
program is copyrightable.
Most of the arguments that used a frame of work were about whether
the computer software is copyrightable. In most of the cases (45 arguments,
90%), it was established that it is a copyrightable subject matter. The first case
Synercom v. University Computing Company employed the theory of
communication and expression to determine the copyrightability of the input
formats of the Synercom's statistical analysis program. The defendants
argued that the input formats are not subject to copyright because they are not
intended to convey information. The judge rejected this argument saying
that forms which communicate information can be the subject of copyright,
and the critical question is whether the material undertakes to "express." The
computer program's input formats, therefore, were decided to be
copyrightable as it communicates the selection arrangements and the
sequences, which is expression. Citing this argument in Synercom, the judge
in Digital v. Softklone argued that screen is a form that clearly expresses and
conveys information and therefore, is copyrightable.
The theory of communication was used in the other 4 arguments. In
Apple v. Franklin, the judge argued that the scope of copyright is limited to
the material with a communicative purpose, so that it can create human
interaction. This argument that tried to limit the scope of copyright helped
Franklin in the district court, but it was explicitly rejected in the court of
appeals which argued that the 1976 Copyright Act suggested that programs are
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considered copyrightable as literary works whether or not it is a medium of
communication to human being. The question of communication in the
issue of copyrightability was considered once again in Williams v. Artic in
1982, where the defendant argued that a "copy" must be intelligible to a
human being. The judge, however, held that the program can be fixed by any
method, including with the aid of a machine. In this way, a strict
communication requirement was generally rejected by the courts and the
courts begin to rely more on the fixation requirement.
The 1976 Copyright Act states that "copyright protection subsists ... in
original work of authorship "fixed in a tangible medium of expression" .. .
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 2 arguments that
focused on the fixation requirement were also responding to the defendants'
challenge against the copyrightability of computer programs. The defendants
in both Midway v. Artic and M. Kramer v. Andrews questioned whether the
changing images of the audiovisual screen of videogames can be
copyrightable because they are not "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression.
Judges held that audiovisual are fixed in the computer program, thus both
the images (Midway) and the underlying computer programs (M. Kramer)
may be copyrighted. Consequently, arguments regarding the communication
and fixation requirement have undoubtedly established that both literal and
non-literal elements of the computer program, including the status screen
and audiovisual display, are a copyrightable subject matter.
A related theory is that of idea versus expression, which states that
expression, but not ideas, are protected by a copyright in order to prohibit the
monopolization of an idea. 25 of the 28 arguments that used this theory were
responding to the defendants' arguments against the copyrightability of
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computer programs, and 3 of them did not explicitly mention who initiated
the arguments. Judges tended to disagree with the defendants' arguments
using this theory (22 out of 25) and held thatthe program is copyrightable
expression rather than ideas. For example, in Whelan v. Taslaw, which was
extensively cited although often criticized, the court of appeals held that
copyright protects "non-literal" aspects of the program, i.e., structure,
sequence, and organization because the "purpose or function of a utilitarian
work would be the work's idea and everything that is not a purpose or
function is expression." In Broderbund v. Unison. Unison argued that the
idea underlying the menu screens, input formats, and sequencing of screens
in the plaintiff's program is indistinguishable from its expression (merger
doctrine), and thus are not copyrightable. But the judge, following Whelan v.
Taslaw. rejected the argument saying that there are many ways of expression
in the case of the plaintiff's program, thus rules and instructions can be
protected by copyright.
In order to determine whether computer programs or any elements of

the programs are ideas or expression, courts usually examined the
characteristics of the computer program (functional or artistic). Some of these
arguments explicitly used metaphor of utilitarian work, artistic work or
literary work in relation to the idea versus expression doctrine. Due to the
significant influence of the use of metaphor on the ways in which the
decisions are made, the arguments and decisions explicitly using metaphor
will be separately analyzed later in this section.
The judges who made arguments using this theory of idea versus
expression usually held that the work is copyrightable. When they decided
that it is not copyrightable in 2 out of 20 cases (even though both of the cases
were reversed in the appeals courts), it was always related to the fact that they
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considered the program a functional work, or focused on the functional
aspect of the program. For example, in Atari v. Oman, when Atari tried to
register its videogame for copyright, the copyright register argued that
copyright protection does not extend to games because the game and the
expression is merged, and its arrangement of images are dictated by functional
requirements. The district court agreed with the defendant, but the court of
appeals reversed the holding because the judges considered the plaintiff's
arrangement of images not dictated by functional requirements or merged
with ideas. Another case is Apple v. Franklin, in which the judge accepted
the defendant's argument that ROM is an object that merges its utilitarian
function and expressive purpose so that they are inseparable. But the judges
in the court of appeals rejected the view that the ROMs are utilitarian objects
or machine parts, but considered computer programs as literary works, which
are protected by copyright law. This case was thus reversed.
There are other arguments in relation to the copyrightability of the
plaintiff's work focusing on the nature of the work, but without using any
identifiable theories. All of these arguments were made in favor of granting
copyrightability. In regards to whether ROM chips are a "copy," or regarding
the distinction between the game and the program, many of these arguments
used metaphor as a rationale for their arguments. Use of metaphor will be
analyzed in the next section.
In the arguments made in the copyrightability cases, judges always

decided to grant the copyright to the plaintiff (excluding the arguments and
decisions that were reversed). The party that initiated the arguments, the
particular frame or theory that was used, or the characteristics of the parties
(developers, copyright holders, neither) did not matter. In conclusion, the
copyrightability cases and arguments, which centered around the plaintiff's
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originality as authorship and the plaintiff's work as a copyrightable subject
matter, have clearly established structural rules that: 1) computer software is
copyrightable as a subject matter and the protection extends to videogames
and operating programs as well as application programs, to literal and nonliteral elements and to programs embodied in ROMs and diskettes; and 2)
only a minimal amount of the originality shown by the evidence of the
plaintiff's independent development (on his own) is required to grant
copyright.

Metaphor

In earlier cases, the focus of the arguments was often about which law
should be applied, between Copyright Act of 1909 and Copyright Act of 1976.
In almost all the cases it was decided that the parties should comply with the
1976 Act. After this issue was settled, the use of metaphor in cases regarding
software copyright became frequent. As the new technology of computer
software poses difficult problems to the copyright cases, many judges and legal
actors tried to find analogy between computer software and other traditional
works that had been protected by copyright law. Some of the arguments
relied on the 1976 Copyright Act that states that "works of authorship include
literary works, musical works, dramatic works, choreographic works,
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, audiovisual works, and sound
recordings. "
Although the arguments using a metaphor were made in the
copyrightability cases most frequently (15 out of 33 arguments), they are also
found in the ownership dispute cases and the infringement cases. But the
arguments that used metaphor in the other cases were also placed in the
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context of determining the copyrightability of certain elements of programs.
Therefore, the analysis of the metaphor arguments will include all the
arguments, regardless of the issue of the cases.
Among the 115 cases, judges in 27 cases mentioned some kind of
metaphor in making decisions. In some cases, the judges were responding to
the plaintiffs or defendants who used metaphor in their arguments. In other
cases, the judges used metaphor of their own. The metaphor most frequently
used by the judges was the literary work (9) and the audiovisual work (9),
followed by the utilitarian work (6) and the artistic or pictorial, graphic,
sculptural work (2).
The issue of whether software is characterized as a utilitarian work, a
literary work, an audiovisual work or an artistic work has beneath it
important implications about the scope of protection. The critical distinction
is whether computer programs were considered a utilitarian work or a
literary and artistic work. For example, when Microsoft succeeded in
persuading the judge to think of the Apple interface as a utilitarian work, it
practically won the case on that issue. Apple had argued that the interface
was artistic and fanciful, and hence should enjoy a broad scope of protection.
Apple analogized the interfaces to paintings and music, while Microsoft
analogized them to automobiles.
The metaphor arguments turned out to be powerful and decisive, in
that the use of different metaphors always resulted in different decisions in
the copyrightability and the infringement cases. In 6 cases when judges
considered the computer program as a utilitarian work, it was always held
that the defendant did not infringe the copyright of the plaintiff's program
because it was not a copyrightable work. For example, in Synercom v.
University Computing Company, the judge rejected Synercom's argument
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that the order and sequence of the data was the expression, not the idea. The
judge's rejection was based on its famous analogy of the "figure-H" pattern of
an automobile stick, which the court decided was not protected by copyright.
Also, in Sega v. Accolade. which involved the plaintiff's computer program
for a video entertainment system, the judges in the court of appeals argued
that copyright protection differs according. to the nature of the work, and that
functional and factual aspects receive less protection and computer programs
are in essence utilitarian articles.
All the other arguments that used a literary work, artistic work, and
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work as a metaphor for computer programs,
resulted in the decision that the work was copyrightable and/or the
defendants did infringe on the plaintiffs' copyright. In Midway v. Artic,
Midway argued that its 'PacMan' games are copyrightable as an audiovisual
work while Artic argued that the 'PacMan' on the ROM and the 'PacMan'
games themselves are utilitarian objects. The judge rejected Artic's argument
and decided that Artic infringed Midway's copyright. Also in Johnson v.
Uniden, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's computer code is not
copyrightable because a computer program is a "useful" as opposed to a
literary work. But the judge held that a computer program is a "literary"
work, thus the "useful work" doctrine is not applicable in the case.
In addition, the cases that considered videogames as an audiovisual
work held that the displays of videogames are copyrightable as an audiovisual
work, regardless of the requirement of the fixation, communication, or
originality (Atari v. Amusement: Midway v. Dirkschneider: Stern v.
Kaufman: Midway v. Artie: M. Kramer v. Andrews: Red-Baron v. Taito.
appeals). Regarding videogame programs and their audiovisual displays that
were a new subject for copyright, the arguments and decisions that employed
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the notion of an audiovisual work firmly established the structural rule that
videogames are copyrightable as a subject matter and that the other
requirements for copyright do not have to be strictly applied for videogames.
Consequently, the scope of copyright protection for videogames became even
broader than that for other computer programs.
The judges' use of metaphor was found to be a decisive factor in
decision making. However, it is not clear how the judges determine which
metaphor to accept or reject when they face opposing metaphors argued by
different parties. When the judges accept or reject that parties' arguments,
they tended not to provide any basis or rationale for why they consider a
program in a different way. Further, it was found that the nature of the
plaintiffs or defendants (whether they were developers or non-developers) or
the topic of the case (copyrightability or infringement) does not have any
significant relationship to the metaphor used by the judges or to whether the
judge accepted or rejected the parties' arguments. In order to identify how the
metaphor arguments may operate, the frames regarding the authorship, the
work and the use that are implied in some cases are examined.
Although the metaphor arguments were made in 9 copyrightability
cases and 17 infringement cases, the basis for the decisions was on whether
the plaintiffs' computer programs were copyrightable or whether their
elements were a copyrightable expression in the first place, even in the
infringement cases. Thus, the metaphor arguments basically focused on the
nature of work, more likely on the plaintiff's work. But in some cases there
was a difference in the implicit notions of authorship, work, and use. The
interaction between the concepts of authorship, work, and use implied in the
metaphor arguments is apparent in some cases.
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When the judges considered the computer program a literary work or
artistic work, the metaphor arguments tended to imply a process of creation.
For example, in Broderbund v. Unison, Unison argued that the plaintiff's
program 'The Print Shop' does not fall within the definition of "pictorial" or
"graphic" works, since the program has mechanical or utilitarian features
rather than the artistic aspects which are protected. The judge argued that the
structure, sequence, and layout of the audiovisual displays of the plaintiff's
work are dictated primarily by "artistic considerations" and not by utilitarian
ones, so it is protected by copyright. Also in Digital v. Softklon, the judge
argued that the status screen, as a literary work, meets the requirement of an
original work. The defendant in M. Kramer v. Andrews argued that the
plaintiff's work is invalid because the work lacks originality, but the judges
argued that the standard for originality is minimal, and artistic skill is not
required where the work is audiovisual work. The judge followed the
structural rule in copyright law that the originality standard is minimal.
Consequently, his arguments expanded the scope of copyright.
Therefore, when the computer program was considered a utilitarian
work, the argument focused on the nature of the work itself, isolated from
the process of development or creation. However, when the program was
viewed as a literary work, the arguments usually mentioned authorship,
originality, or the process of software creation. It seems that when the work is
considered an artistic or literary work, it becomes more persuasive and
convincing that the author of the work should be compensated. But when
the work is considered useful and mechanical, the focus of the argument
becomes detached from the consideration of authorship. Thus it becomes
easier to argue against providing copyright protection, of which primary
concern in the court seems to be rewarding the authors.
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On the other hand, some cases that involve an alleged infringement of
a videogame copyright, arguments that used the metaphor of an audiovisual
work included the ones that responded to the defendant's arguments
regarding the use of the program. In Atari v. North American, the defendant
and the district judge mentioned extensively the defendant's "effort to avoid
infringement" and decided that North American did not infringe on the
copyright of Atari's 'PacMan' video game programs. The judge in the court
of appeals, however, viewed North American's effort to avoid copying as an
attempt to disguise an intentional appropriation of Atari's game, and instead
argued that games can be copyrighted as pictorial or graphic works and the
repetitive sequence of a game is considered copyrightable as an audiovisual
work. The case was reversed and decided that North American infringed on
Atari's copyright. The shift of the focus from the defendant's use to the
nature of the plaintiff's work resulted in a decision that found an
infringement.
In conclusion, in many of the arguments that used metaphor, the
critical distinction lies in the distinction between work and authorship. The
arguments and decisions regarding the metaphor have firmly established the
copyrightability of computer programs and audiovisual displays of
videogames, by focusing on the frame of the plaintiff's work. The only cases
in which the copyrightability was denied, were when the judges viewed the
computer program as a utilitarian work. The metaphor of a utilitarian work
was presented as an alternative to considering the computer software as a
literary work or artistic work, which inevitably relates to the notion of
authorship and creativity. Metaphors in copyrightability arguments tend to
reflect the tension between the developers of the original program and the
defendants who may benefit by isolating the author from the work. The
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audiovisual work is presented as a work of authorship that is protected by
copyright, regardless of the degree of originality or fixation. Also the minimal
requirement of the originality test was applied and reinforced here.
Therefore, metaphors in some of the infringement arguments reflect the
tension between the defendants who try to use the plaintiffs' programs and
the plaintiffs who are often not developers themselves and try to focus the
argument on the notion of work that is isolated from the notion of use.

Ownership!Authorship Disputes

17 of the judges' arguments in 13 cases were made in the context of
deciding the rightful author of the computer program when it was not clear
who developed (or co-developed) the program, or in the context of deciding
who owns the copyright of the program. Naturally, all the arguments in the
authorship/ownership cases used the frame of authorship. None of the
arguments used the frame of work or use. The analysis of the frame of
authorship in copyrightability cases demonstrated that the individual
creation is emphasized while the originality requirement in general is
minimized. The analysis of the arguments in the authorship/ownership
dispute which consist of the work-for-hire doctrine and the joint authorship
issue illustrates another dimension regarding how the authorship construct
transforms itself in copyright law.
In most of the cases (10), both the plaintiffs and the defendants were
somehow engaged in the development of a computer program, and the
judges used the work-for-hire doctrine in deciding who was the rightful
author. In one case, the defendant was not engaged in any kind of developing
activity but questioned the plaintiff's authorship of the program. 2 cases
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decided whether the plaintiff and the defendant were joint authors of the
program. These authorship/ownership dispute cases began to appear
relatively recently. 9 of the 13 cases were held in the 1990's.
The 2 cases regarding joint authorship are actually the same case held
in the district court and the court of appeals. Although the primary frame in
the arguments was that of authorship, the frame of work was combined as the
theory of idea versus expression was used. In Ashton-Tate v. Ross, AshtonTate received a list of user commands for the program 'MacCa1c' that Ross
was developing, and created a similar program 'Full Impact.' Ross claimed a
joint authorship in 'Full Impact' but the judges shifted the focus of the
arguments to the nature of the work by asking whether Ross' contribution in
terms of the list of commands was an idea or an expression. The judges
argued that the defendant's contribution is considered only ideas, because it's
nothing "innovative" or "noveL" Consequently, the judges applied a
different level of the authorship requirement to the defendants, as compared
to the very minimal requirement for the plaintiff's authorship, by shifting
the focus of arguments from the defendant's authorship to the nature of the
plaintiff's work.
In Nintendo v. Elcon, the defendant who did not participate in the
development of the plaintiff's video game questioned the validity of the
plaintiff's authorship, arguing that the plaintiff itself did not develop the
program but hired someone else. The judge responded that according to the
work-for-hire doctrine, the plaintiff's copyright is valid because Nintendo was
an employer of the person who developed this program while the person
who developed the program was merely a "technical assistant."
In all the other work-for-hire cases, both parties were involved with
the development process of the program in some way.
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A critical question

posed in all of the work-for-hire cases is whether one party was an employee
of the other party or not, because most judges follow the rule in 17 US.c.
§101(1), which was again established in Community v. Reid. Reid discussed
the presumption that the one who creates the work is the owner for copyright
purposes, and argued that this presumption may be overcome if the work is
made for hire. In order to decide if the work is made for hire, Reid applied a 2
step analysis to determine: 1) if the creator is a true employee of the employer
or merely an independent contractor; and 2) if the product was prepared
within the scope of the employment. And the product is within the scope of
the employment if: 1) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; 2) it occurs
substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and 3) it is actuated
by a purpose to serve the master.
Therefore, on the one hand, the work-for-hire doctrine alienates the
work from the author by taking rights from the author and granting them to
the employer, and it can be considered an indication that the authors' rights
began to be deprived of, as some scholars argued. On the other hand, the
authorship construct which was developed in the earlier copyrightability
cases seems to remain in the work-for-hire doctrine. The importance given
to the "independent creation" in the authorship construct of copyrightability
arguments is also found in this work-for-hire doctrine, in that the important
premise to be an author of the work one creates is to be an "independent
contractor" rather than an employee. Among the multi-dimensional factors
to take into account, the judges weigh different factors and questions in a
different way in the work-for-hire cases. The analysis of these arguments
reveals how the individual Romantic vision of authorship still remains
central, but in a somewhat distorted way, in work-for-hire cases.
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The question regarding whether the developer was an employee
appeared in every case. In some cases, especially in earlier cases, the only
question was whether the developer was an employee. Once the judge
decided on that matter, the question of who the author is was automatically
decided. In BPI v. Leith, judgment was made for the developer of the
program when the judge held that he was not an employee of BPI. Graham
v. Tames was decided against the developer of the program when the judge
held that James was an employee of Graham. Also, Aymes v. Bonelli was
decided for the developer of the program in the district court and then
decided against the developer of the program in the court of appeals, purely
on the basis of the judges' different interpretation and application of the
Reid's test of the "hire" and "employment" concept.
Later cases tend to introduce other factors with the discussion of the
matter of employment. There are some cases where, despite a finding that
the developer was an employee, the other factors played a larger role and the
decision was made differently. For example, in Avtec v. Peiffer, the court
admitted that Peiffer was an employee, but it still decided that he was the
rightful owner of the program because he did not prepare the product within
the authorized time and space limits but developed the program during his
non-working hours and did not create it for Avtec. In addition, in KelstallWhitney v. Mahar, the court found that Mahar was an employee. But when
Mahar argued that he developed the program on his own time
"independently," the court accepted the argument and held that it was Mahar
who had the "initial idea," wrote the source code, after working hours, and
with no wage compensation.
In other cases, the other factors work complementary to the notion of

employment. For example, in Mercer v. MacLean, when the court of appeals
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considered the factors in Reid and decided that Mercer-MacLean was not in a
master-servant relationship to constitute employment because he wrote the
program after he left Mercer, the court reversed the district court's holding
and decided MacLean may be the author of the program. At the same time,
the court of appeals also pointed out that MacLean had the required "skill and
creativity" to develop the program. Another clear example suggesting that
"independent creativity" was considered important is Whelan v. Iaslaw.
When Jaslaw sought co-authorship with Whelan who developed a dental lab
program forJaslaw, the court held that the work-for-hire doctrine was not
applicable because Whelan was an "independent contractor." At the same
time, the judge noted that Whelan alone was the author because her
"expertise" and "creativeness" designed the methods, while Jaslaw explained
to Whelan only the "functions" to be performed by computer.
The analysis of the arguments in authorship/ownership dispute cases
keenly reveals how the notion of authorship interacts with the notion of the
work in copyright arguments. The work-for-hire doctrine provides a place in
which the alienation of the author from the work occurs, and the ownership
rights are transferred from developers to employers, in that the "author" of
the "work" is the person on whose behalf the "work" was made, not the
individual who created it. The work-for-hire thus provides a rare
opportunity for the parties who are not developers to possibly prevail in
authorship cases. At the same time, the notion of "employment" which is
critical in deciding the applicability of the "work-for-hire" doctrine is
contrasted with the notion of "independent contractorship," suggesting that
the activity of "independent" creation is considered important. In addition,
the values that are constantly emphasized in conjunction with the
employment arguments are "skill and creativity," "expertise," "creativeness,"
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and even "ideas," all of which are rooted in the Romantic vision of the
author-genius. Therefore, while the author is being alienated from the work
when a work is deemed to have been made "for-hire," the individualistic
Romantic notion of the authorship seems to be still central to the
conceptualization of the authorship-ownership disputes.
Moreover, even when the "employer" was considered the author of
the program, the values of creative "ideas" or "inspirations" as opposed to
"labor" were emphasized. For example, in Armes v. BonnelL the judge
argued that because Aymes performed work under "supervision and
direction" of Bonneli, the work belonged to Bonneli even if Aymes had not
been an employee. In this way, the employers' claims are ironically
ration~lized

in terms of the Romantic conception of "authorship" with its

concomitant values of "creativity" and "inspiration," as Jaszi (1991) pointed
out.

Infringement Cases (Ownership and Copying)

186 arguments were made in infringement cases, which comprise the

arguments made most frequently in the data, and these arguments tended to
increase over time. In the first time period, the infringement arguments
were 61% of the total arguments (42 arguments), 72% in the third period (49
arguments) and 89% in the fourth period (70 arguments). In the second
period, however, the infringement arguments slightly decreased to 56% (25
arguments) while the copyrightability arguments slightly increased from the
first period. This is because the second period was when the copyrightability
of new subject matters such as videogame programs and their audiovisual
displays were being decided. The arguments in the infringement cases were
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more likely to be made in favor of broadening the scope of copyright rather
than limiting (69% for broadening and 31 % for limiting), but the discrepancy
was smaller than in the copyrightability cases (90% for broadening and 10%
for limiting).
In infringement cases, the frame of "use" is introduced and interacts
with the frame of authorship and that of work. Except for one argument, all
the arguments that used the frame of use were made in infringement cases,
including the nature of the defendant's use of the plaintiff's program, public
use/benefit, and market consequences. The most frequently used frame in
infringement arguments was the frame of work that was used 60% of the
time, followed by the frame of use (30%) and the frame of authorship (10%).
In copyrightability cases, the frame of work was used 86% of the time, and the
frame of authorship was used for 12% of the time. Also, many of the
arguments in infringement cases began to focus on the defendant's work, the
defendant's authorship, and the defendant's use (44% of the arguments) in
infringement cases, while none of the copyrightability arguments focused on
the defendants.
The arguments in infringement cases can be categorized into 4 major
issues upon which infringement decisions are based: 1) ownership of a valid
copyright, 2) copying -- substantial similarity), 3) copying -- copyrightable
expression as a scope of copying, and 4) copying that constitutes infringement.
In order to find an infringement, courts usually require the plaintiff to show
ownership and copying: that the plaintiff has a valid copyright for the
program in dispute, and that the defendant copied the plaintiff's program.
Acknowledging the difficulty of showing direct copying, courts note that
copying can be inferred from access and substantial similarity: that the
defendant had access to the plaintiff's program, and the two programs are
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substantially similar. The access was in dispute in only one case in the
copyright cases regarding computer software. Once it is decided that copying
did occur, the court can also consider whether the material copied was the
copyrightable expression or the unprotected idea. In addition, the court can
consider whether the defendant's copying constitutes an infringement or a
legitimate use .
. Among the 186 arguments in infringement cases, the arguments made
most were made in the context of infringing use (72), followed by substantial
similarity (54), copyrightable expression (39), and ownership of a valid
copyright (21). The arguments regarding the copying as infringement were a
steady majority of the arguments most of the time (36%, 32%, 47%, and 43%
of the arguments in each time period), although arguments regarding the
substantial similarity were the majority in the second time period (52%). The
arguments regarding copyrightable expression also greatly increased in the
fourth period (6% to 33%), while the arguments in substantial similarity
decreased over time (33% and 19% in the third and fourth periods).
The judges were most likely to argue in favor of broadening the scope
of copyright (95% of the time) when the arguments were made in the context
of the validity of a copyright ownership), followed by the context of copying as
infringement (72%), copyrightable expression (67%), and substantial similarity
(54%). All the arguments that were made regarding the validity of copyright
ownership, except for one, were in favor of deciding that the copyright is
valid.
Also, some differences are found in the use of frames according to
these issues. The arguments regarding the copying of the substantial
similarity, copyrightable expression, and valid ownership of copyright used
the frame of work most frequently (91%, 87%, and 62% of the arguments

154

respectively), whereas the arguments regarding the copying as infringement
used the frame of use most frequently (75%). Except for 2 arguments, all the
57 arguments that used the frame of use were made in the context of copying
as infringement. The detailed analysis of the use of frames, legal theories,
and interpretations in legal arguments according to each issue is presented as
follows.

Valid Ownership

The detailed analysis begins with the 21 arguments in relation to
whether the plaintiff has a valid ownership of the program. Basically, these
arguments have similar characteristics with the arguments in copyrightability
cases, but they do not lead to a separate decision on copyrightability, but are
placed in the context of defining the validity of a copyright as a pre-requisite
to find an infringement. As in the copyrightability cases, the arguments on
the validity of ownership tend to use the frame of work most often (13 out of
21 arguments), and most of them (12 out of 13 arguments) were about the
plaintiff's work rather than the defendant's work. Only one of the judges'
arguments refuted the validity of the plaintiff's copyright, even in the 3 cases
where the defendants were not found to have infringed on the copyright.
Only 2 arguments used the frame of use. The defendants of the two
cases in the fourth period challenged the validity of the plaintiffs' ownership
using the frame of public interest/benefit (Gates Rubber v. Bando; PRe v.
National Association of Realtors). Both of these arguments relying on the
doctrine of publication were rejected by the judges.
The frame of authorship was used in 6 arguments, 4 of which were on
the plaintiff's authorship and 2 on the defendant's joint-authorship claim.
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As demonstrated in the analysis of the arguments in authorship/ownership
dispute cases, the notion of authorship was constructed differently when it
was applied to the defendants than to the plaintiffs.
In all of the 4 arguments that used the frame of the plaintiff's
authorship, the defendants challenged the validity of the plaintiffs' copyright
based on the lack of originality. The judges rejected all of them by shifting the
focus of arguments from the authorship to the nature of work, or applying
the minimal requirement of authorship that had been established. For
example, the defendants in Stern v. Kaufman made an argument in relation
to the issue of the distinction between the program and the audiovisual
display, arguing that Stern's videogame display is not an original work
because Stern registered the audiovisual material, but not the underlying
computer program. The judge, shifting the focus of the argument from the
issue of originality to the nature of the work, held that copyright protection
extends to an audiovisual work and the plaintiff's game is a copyrightable
subject matter as an audiovisual work. The judge in Tohnson Controls v.
Phoenix explicitly stated that the standard of originality required for a
copyright is minimal, rejecting the defendant's challenge against the validity
of copyright in the plaintiff's program. Dynamic Solutions v. Planning &
Control also held that the plaintiff's program is original, because the
plaintiff's "contribution" is substantial. The judge in Allen-Myland v. IBM
claimed that the plaintiff's work can be considered original if the work is
viewed as a whole.
The judges relied on Whelan v. Taslaw in rejecting 2 joint authorship
arguments made by the defendants, arguing that the defendant's
"contribution" was not sufficient, and that the defendant was only a supplier
of "ideas" who did not translate the work in a tangible medium of expression
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(Softel v. Dragon; S.O.5. v. Payday). As in the authorship/ownership dispute
cases, the defendant's joint authorship arguments never received the benefit
of the "minimal" requirement of originality that was usually applied to the
plaintiffs. In addition, in S.o.5. v. Payday, the judge again shifted the focus of
argument from the authorship to the work itself by introducing the idea
versus expression theory to determine the authorship. Contrary to the workfor-hire cases in which an employer as a supplier of ideas and supervision
was deemed an author, this case alienated the defendant's authorship from
the defendant's work by using the idea versus expression theory.
Similar to the copyrightability arguments, most of the arguments (12
out of 13) regarding the frame of work were made by the defendants who tried
to challenge the validity of the plaintiffs' copyright, usually using the idea
versus expression dichotomy (7 arguments) or the fixation/communication
requirement (3 arguments). The judges rejected all but one of the defendants'
arguments.
Therefore, the analysis of the arguments regarding the validity of the
ownership of copyright in infringement cases reveal that no matter what
kind of frame or theory was used in the defendants' arguments, judges
tended not to refute the plaintiff's copyright ownership as invalid. When the
frame of authorship was used, the requirement of the authorship changed
depending on the prospective author in terms of the defendant or the
plaintiff. And when the frame of work was used, the computer software was
simply considered a copyrightable subject matter. Even when the case did not
find an infringement eventually, it was on the ground of other issues such as
substantial similarity or copyrightable expression. It seems that through the
arguments and decisions of the copyrightability cases, the minimal standard
of originality required for the plaintiff and the copyrightability of computer
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software as a subject matter had been solidly established as important
structural rules of copyright cases regarding computer software. Furthermore,
these established structural rules seem to have constrained future arguments
as shown by the decrease of the copyrightability arguments in copyrightability
cases and in the issue of the validity of ownership.

Substantial Similarity

As discussed above, copying can be inferred by showing access and
substantial similarity in the infringement cases. Since the access was in
dispute only once, the substantial similarity becomes a critical question to be
answered in finding an infringement.
The frame of work was constantly used in similarity arguments to
compare the characteristics of the two programs. 49 (91%) out of 54
arguments used the frame of work and 5 arguments used the frame of
authorship. The arguments using the frame of work in the cases focused on
the nature of the defendant's work rather than the plaintiff's work except for
one argument. All of the arguments that used the frame of authorship were
about the defendant's authorship rather than the plaintiff's authorship.
None of the arguments used the frame of use.
While most of the arguments using the frame of the defendant's
authorship (4 out of 5) were in favor of deciding that copying did not occur,
arguments using the frame of the work were evenly distributed. 20 (41%)
arguments found that there was copying, and 23 (57%) arguments did not
finding that there was copying.
When the defendants were not developers of any of the programs, they
never used the frame of authorship. But when the defendants were
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developers, they were able to use the frame of authorship as well as that of
work. Interestingly, when the party who was making any kind of argument
was a non-developer whether she was a plaintiff or a defendant, judges never
explicitly accepted her arguments. It seems that being a developer of any
computer programs rather than being only copyright holders or retailers
becomes an important resource in making copyright arguments.
In 4 of the 5 arguments that used the frame of authorship, judges
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant's work is substantially
similar to their program by shifting the focus from the work to the skills and
expertise of the defendants. Whenever the judge focused on the defendant's
developing activities, the judge decided that the defendant did not copy the
program. For example, in Plains Cotton v. Goodpasture where Plains Cotton
argued that they had an evidence of similarity between the two programs, the
judge changed the focus of argument toward the defendant's "experience and
knowledge" and held that the defendant did not copy. Therefore, when the
judges decided to use the frame of authorship instead of the frame of work in
order to find substantial similarity, it usually worked in favor of the
defendant whose creativeness was considered in the arguments. The judge's
arguments in NEC v. Intel also clearly illustrates how the defendant's
knowledge and skill was emphasized. When Intel argued that there was
copying, the judge stated that the developer of the NEC's program does have
the "expertise and talent," as opposed to Intel's argument that he was
inexperienced. The judge also mentioned that the program had been
"independently created," and thus it was not copying. Responding to the
similarity argument of the plaintiff, the judge in Micro Consulting v.
Zubeldia also emphasized that just being "created independently" by the
author meets the originality requirement. The judge in Integral v. Peoplesoft
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also decided in favor of the defendant when the defendant argued that its
employees had the necessary "skills, knowledge, and experience" to develop
the program "independently."
In the remaining one argument that used the frame of authorship,

while the defendant used the concept of the "laborious and expensive
process," the plaintiff used the concept of "independent creation," arguing
that the defendant could not have independently created its program without
consulting the plaintiff's program, which the plaintiff admitted was true
(Lasercomb v. Holiday). As expected, the court chose the plaintiff's view
which had been accepted by the courts.
Therefore, when the focus of argument in similarity cases was shifted
from work to authorship, and the authorship frame involved the defendant's
"expertise and knowledge" and "independent creation," the arguments were
made in favor of the defendants. But earlier, it was demonstrated that in the
case of other issues, the frame of authorship was applied differently to the
plaintiffs and to the defendants: the minimalistic view of the originality was
not applied to the defendants, but instead a higher standard was considered.
The critical difference between the authorship arguments in the similarity
issue and those in the other issues was that all of the defendants in
substantial similarity cases were developers themselves. It is suggested that
the concept of "independent creation" and "expertise" have become
important structural rules in the copyright cases that constrain the legal
actors' arguments but also enable some parties who have traditionally been in
a disadvantaged position, when they have and employ their resources
effectively in making arguments, i.e., by being developers themselves and
being perceived as independent creators by the judges. In the process of these
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actors' interactions through the use of the structural rules and resources, the
possibility of a structural change was found.
The majority of the arguments in similarity cases used the frame of
work. Various tests were conducted to determine similarities and differences
between the characteristics of the two programs. In earlier cases, courts
tended to ask if the similarity in the specific and overall appearances can be
determined by a "reasonable lay observer" (Midway v. Dirkschineider: Atari
v. North American: Nintendo v. Bay Coin: and later Soft Computer v.
Lalehzarzadeh; NEC v. Intel: Accolade v. Distinctive). In the first 4 cases
employing this "reasonable observer test" or "intrinsic test," the courts found
that there were substantial similarities.
However, this lay observer test began to be criticized by other courts in
that it captures the "total concept and feel" that was not supposed to be
protected in copyright law. In Micro Consulting v. Zubeldia as well as in
Autoskill v. National Education. the plaintiff claimed that "total concept and
feel" is similar between the programs, so an intrinsic test should be applied.
But the judge argued that the test of total concept and feel had been widely
criticized as it was geared toward simplistic works, thus served no purpose in
the realm of computers, where expert testimony was needed. The judge used
instead a "laundry list" of specific differences suggested by the defendants as
an extrinsic test. Also, the judges in the court of appeals in Computer
Associates v. Altai argued that due to the nature of computer programs which
are impenetrable by lay observers, the "reasonable person" doctrine employed
in other areas of copyright law should not be so much observed in software
copyright cases, and that the use of expert evidence was warranted. There
were some courts that still used the lay observer test, but the last 3 cases that
used this test found that the two programs were not substantially similar.
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Therefore, the courts constantly emphasized the importance of the
expert testimony over the lay observer test in software copyright cases
(Midway v. Bandai; Computer v. Altai). More courts began to use the
"extrinsic" test, that involves expert testimony, analytic dissection and
detailed analysis of the two programs (Pearl v. Competition; Midway v.
Strohon; Telemarketing v. Symantec; Micro v. Zubeldia). Although some
courts used both extrinsic and intrinsic tests as a 2-step test (Brodurbund v.
Pixelliite; Digital v. Softklone; Manufacturers v. CAMS; Integral v. Duffield),
even the courts that considered both tests tended to rely on the expert
testimony in deciding the issue, explicitly giving a greater weight to the
extrinsic prong of the 2-step test (Gates Rubber v. Bando). Moreover, some
judges transformed the concept of a reasonable person into someone who has
expertise in computer programs (Integral v. Duffield; Atari v. Nintendo). In
Integral v. Duffield, the judge stated that a "reasonable person" is defined as a
reasonable person in the intended audience, and in this case the person
would be with some knowledge of human resource management systems
(the software system of dispute in the case). The judges in Atari v. Nintendo
also stated that in the context of computer software, the "ordinary reasonable
person" is a computer programmer. Consequently, more and more of the
plaintiffs and defendants tried to use expert testimony. Moreover, when the
experts of the two parties presented different views, the judges often decided
whose testimony was more credible on the basis of the background and
expertise of each expert, rather than creating an objective way to evaluate the
testimony (NEC v. Intel; Plains Cotton v. Goodpasture; Integral v. Duffield;
Autoskill v. National Education; Yamate v. Sugerman).
In this process, the importance given to the expertise and skills in the
authorship arguments was found even in the arguments that used the frame
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of work in the area of similarity tests. The analysis of the similarity tests
shows that computer programs were differentiated from other works of
authorship, unlike in copyrightability arguments where computer programs
were constantly analogized to other works of authorship such as literary
work, artistic work, or audiovisual work. By pointing out that these are
copyright cases relating to the realm of computer programs, not to other
traditional works of authorship, judges tried to use a different test (extrinsic
test rather than intrinsic test) and/or to use the same test but placed a totally
different meaning on it (computer expert as an ordinary lay observer).
The values of scientific expertise and skills were constantly emphasized
and reinforced by the copyright cases regarding the protection of computer
software, which at first rejected the relevance of a lay observer test but
adopted analytic dissection and expert testimony, and then decided the
credibility of the testimonies based on the scientific background of the testifier
rather than the testimony itself. The use of expert testimony and analytic
analysis became an important structural rule in the copyright arguments and
decisions regarding computer programs. The value of artistic creativity that
has been emphasized and reinforced in other areas of copyright law was
transformed into that of "scientific expertise and knowledge" in software
copyright cases.
The similarity tests themselves did not determine whether the judges
would find a similarity when the tests were applied without having any
relation to other legal theories, even though the judges were slightly more
likely to find a similarity than not (found a similarity in 13 out of 19
arguments). In general, the chances of finding a similarity were quite evenly
distributed: 54% of the arguments found a similarity and 46 % did not.
However, when the theory of idea versus expression was introduced in
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analytic dissection to determine similarities, the arguments tended to limit
the scope of copyright. More often than not (13 out of 19 arguments),
arguments that used the theory of idea versus expression did not find that the
two programs were similar.
One of the most important rules in copyright law is that only the
expression, but not ideas, is protected against copying. The idea versus
expression doctrine has some corollaries such as merger doctrine, limited
ways, scenes a faire. Merger means that there is practically only one way to
express an idea, thus if the idea is indistinguishable or inseparable from, or
limited by its expression, copying the expression will not be barred. Scenes
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faire is a doctrine that allows the use of the expression when using that
expression is inevitable as an ordinary, stereotyped, industrial standard.
It was found that if the relevance of this doctrine was admitted, it

became one of the most important exceptions of deciding whether there was
copying. Except for the 3 arguments in which the relevance of the idea versus
expression theory was rejected, all of the remaining 16 arguments that used
the idea versus expression doctrine in the context of the similarity issue were
made against deciding that the defendant copied the plaintiff's work. For
example, in Frybarger v. IBM, the court decided that similarities between the
two programs are confined to ideas and concepts, so they are non-infringing.
Also in Micro v. Zubildia, no substantial similarity was found between the
programs at the level of protected expression. A few examples of arguments
using the merger doctrine or scenes a faire are presented here. Atari v.
Amusement decided that Amusement did not infringe on Atari's copyright
because, given the requirements of the idea of a game, most of the similarities
between Atari's videogame 'Asteroids' and Amusement's videogame
'Meteors' are inevitable. This case influenced Frybarger v. IBM, where the
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judge held that IBM did not infringe on Frybarger because when idea and
expression are inseparable, only virtually identical copying is barred. Data
East v. Epyx also held that the elements of similarities between the two
videogames necessarily follow from the idea of a karate game, or inseparable
from, indispensable to, or standard treatment of, the idea of the karate, so they
are not protectable. NEC v. Intel held that if the underlying ideas of the
similar routines found are capable of only a limited range of expression, they
may be protected only against virtually identical copying, which the
defendant's program does not have. Finally, Integral y. Peoplesoft found that
the similarity of system modules compares functions, not expressions, thus
cannot be the evidence of copying.
The analysis of the arguments that used the frame of work shows that
when the arguments centered around the comparison between a work and a
work, when the Romantic notion of authorship was severed from the notion
of work, the defendants were able to use the structural rule in a more equal
footing. Using the idea versus expression theory in the context of comparing
the similarities of the two works, as opposed to in the context of determining
the copyrightability of the plaintiff's work, the defendants gained a more solid
ground to compete with the plaintiffs.
This result suggests that the same frame of work that invariably
favored the plaintiffs in copyrightability or valid ownership arguments was
somehow used in a different way in similarity arguments. That is, the frame
of work in similarity arguments encompassed both the defendant's work and
the plaintiff's work, thus changed the focus of the argument from the
plaintiff to the defendant. As a result, when the defendants who are
themselves developers of programs and videogames could effectively use the
frame of work on their behalf, they have transformed the meaning of the
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"work of authorship" protected in copyright to the one that includes the work
created by the defendants.
In conclusion, differing from the arguments regarding copyrightability

or the validity of the ownership of copyright, which invariably favored the
plaintiffs, arguments regarding the similarity issue gave the plaintiffs merely
a slightly greater chance to prevail on the merits. Many of the defendants
could employ their resources of being developers in their use of frames (of
authorship and of work), and transformed the frame of authorship to
emphasize scientific expertise and knowledge and the frame of work as
encompassing the work created by defendants as well. This is a process by
which structural rules were transformed by the legal actors' use of rules and
resources.

Copyrightable Expression

When arguments using the idea versus expression dichotomy were
placed in the context of similarity arguments, the question was whether the
"similarities" were the expression or the idea. The idea versus expression
theory can also be applied to arguments in the context of copyrightable
expression in infringement cases. In that case, the question becomes whether
the "plaintiff's work" was copyrightable expression. Thus, the issue of
copyrightability of the plaintiff's computer program was considered in
conjunction with the similarity test in many courts, especially in later cases.
Among the 39 arguments that dealt with the issue of copyrightability of the
plaintiff's programs in relation to similarity arguments in infringement cases,
26 (67%) arguments were made in the fourth time period.
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Various tests were used to determine the copyrightable expression in
infringement cases. The most frequently used tests were the "Whelan test"
and the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test used by Judge Learned Hand
in Nichols v. Universal. The Whelan test comes from a holding of Whelan
v. Jaslaw that the purpose and function of the utilitarian work is a part of
ideas and everything else is the expression. Judge Hand's 3 step test involves
conducting an analytic dissection (as in the extrinsic test), removing elements
of ideas from those of expression, and then comparing the plaintiff's
expression and the defendant's expression. The first 2 steps involve the
nature of the plaintiff's work while the last step involves the similarity
between the two works. Some courts used only a portion of the test. Courts
have used different combinations of different tests, but they can be divided
into the test of the similarity that involves the nature of the two works and
the test of the copyrightable expression that involves the nature of the
plaintiff's work. It depends on the court whether it will consider the
copyrightable expression requirement, and if it does, whether the
copyrightability test is conducted before or after the similarity test.
34 (87%) of the 39 arguments used the frame of work and 5 used the
frame of authorship. Most (32 out of 34) of the arguments that used the frame
of work focused on the plaintiff's work. Arguments that used the frame of
work in the copyrightable expression issue were more likely to decide that the
plaintiff's program was copyrightable expression than it was not copyrightable
expression (13 cases versus 6 cases).
By considering the issue of copyrightable expression in infringement
cases, the arguments regarding the issue of copying were turned into the
arguments regarding copyrightablility. Consequently, the arguments related
to the issue of copyrightable expression in the infringement cases show a
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striking similarity with the arguments made in the copyrightability cases in
terms of the use of the frame, theories, and structural rules derived from the
arguments and decisions. For example, in Atari v. North American (appeals),
the judges argued that the repetitive sequence of a game is considered
copyrightable as an audiovisual work and held that the plaintiff's work was
copyrightable expression by applying the abstraction test. Other cases also
employed the traditional copyrightability arguments such as that ROMs are
copyrightable (Midway v. Strohon), that the program is a "literary" work that
is copyrightable (Iohnson v. Uniden), that the program can be copyrighted as
an audiovisual work or a literary work (Whelan v. Iaslaw), etc.
In some cases where the courts decide that the plaintiff's work is not
copyrightable expression, it was usually when the defendants used the merger
doctrine or functionality theory that is related to the idea versus expression
dichotomy (Computer v. Altai). For example, the judge in Williams v. Bally
held that many elements of the plaintiff's game are not protected because they
are utilitarian, and once these elements are put to aside, relatively little
remains to be determined for substantial similarity.
Another similarity between the copyrightable expression arguments
and the copyrightability arguments lies in that the nature of the actors does
not seem to make any difference in whether the judge will decide that the
work is copyrightable or not. Regardless of whether the plaintiffs were
developers or not, the judges were more likely to decide that the work was
copyrightable. The nature of the defendants did not make a difference, either.
Whether the defendants were developers or non-developers, the judges were
always more likely to decide that the plaintiff's work was copyrightable
expression.
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The ways in which the frame of work was used in the arguments
regarding the copyrightable expression were substantially different from the
ways in which that was used in the arguments regarding substantial
similarity. In similarity arguments, the focus of the arguments was on the
defendant's work and on how similar or different the defendant's work is
from the plaintiff's work. On the contrary, in copyrightable expression
arguments, the arguments centered around the copyrightability of the
plaintiff's work or even the copyrightability of computer programs in general
as a subject matter, which had already been decided in copyrightability cases.
In this way, the infringement arguments were transformed into the

traditional copyrightability arguments and decisions, and copyrightability
arguments which generally favored the plaintiffs are being repeated in
infringement cases. As a result, arguments that used the frame of work in
copyrightable expression issue were twice more likely to be made in favor of
the plaintiffs than of the defendants. In this process, the structural changes
that occurred in similarity arguments were diminished, and the structural
rules regarding the computer software as a subject matter were reinforced.
4 of the 5 arguments that used the frame of authorship found that the
plaintiff's work was copyrightable and 1 argument found it was not
copyrightable. These arguments were often complementary to arguments
using the frame of work by being made in conjunction with them without
any further discussion (Stern v. Kaufman; Apple v. Microsoft). 2 of the
arguments were about originality of the plaintiff's work. For example, the
defendant in Iohnson v. Uniden argued that the plaintiff's program is not
copyrightable because it was derived in large part from a preexisting material
in the public domain, thus Uniden cannot have infringed the Johnson's
copyright. But the judge responded that as long as the work contains
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originality, the mere fact that it is a derivative work does not bar
copyrightability, and stated that the originality test is a modest one, requiring
only a "faint trace" of originality. The judge in Lotus v. Borland also stated
that the originality requirement is minimal. Even when the focus of the
argument was shifted from work to authorship, the focus remained as the
"plaintiff's" authorship rather than the defendant's, and the arguments still
relied on the established rule that the originality requirement for the
developer of the underlying program is minimal.
The analysis of the arguments in the copyrightable expression issue
reveals that many of the later infringement arguments were turned into the
traditional copyrightability arguments which benefited the plaintiffs even
when the plaintiff was not a developer of computer programs, by introducing
the requirement of showing copyrightable expression of the plaintiff's work.
This result is ironical given that the requirement of the copyrightable
expression was at first introduced as a means to prohibit the monopoly of
ideas by the plaintiffs. Even though most (87%) of the defendants in these
cases were developers, due to the nature of the issue that focused on the
copyrightability of the plaintiff's program, their use of the frame was limited.
This is an example when the structural environment constrains the actors
from fully employing their resources, the actors fail to have the opportunity
to make an effective argument and probably change the structural rule in
their favor. In this process in which the frame of work and the frame of
authorship operated in the same way as they did in copyrightability cases, the
structural rules related to the concept of the minimal requirement of
originality and to computer software as copyrightable subject matter, were
reproduced and reinforced.
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Infringing Use

There are 72 arguments regarding the question of whether the
plaintiff's copying is legitimate or infringing. As in the copyrightable
expression arguments, these arguments imply that the copying did occur or
that the question of copying does not matter once it is decided that copying is
legitimate. The arguments regarding the infringing copying of the plaintiff's
program constitute the majority (72 arguments, 39%) of the infringement
arguments, and tended to increase proportionately over time.
The arguments regarding the issue of copying as infringement are the
only arguments that employ a variety of frames related to the "use" of the
plaintiff's work, including the use by the defendants and by any potential
users. The judges used the frame of use most frequently (54 arguments, 75%
of the time), followed by the frame of work (16 arguments, 22%) and the
frame of authorship (2 arguments, 3%). Among the arguments that used the
frame of use, most arguments (36) focused on the defendant's use, followed
by the public use and benefit (12). The arguments focused on the consequence
on the market or innovation least frequently (6).
When the frame of work was used, judges tended to argue that the
copying constitutes infringement (10 of 16 arguments). Among the 16
arguments, 11 focused on the defendant's work and 5 focused on the
plaintiff's work. When the focus was on the plaintiff's work, arguments were
made in favor of the plaintiffs, but when the focus was on the defendant's
work, the arguments were split. Among the 5 arguments that focused on the
plaintiff's work, one case was reversed in the court of appeals, one argument
was rejected because the defendant simply misunderstood the law, and one
case was placed in the context of the fair use, which will be analyzed later. In
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the remaining 2 cases, judges held that the copying constitutes infringement.
In Data Cash v. IS&A the plaintiff argued that ROM is a copy, but the judge

used the analogy of a piano and argued that ROM is not a copy so there is no
infringement. The court of appeals reversed the case and held that there is
infringement because ROM is a copy. Since the district case was decided
before the rule regarding the copyrightability of ROM was clearly established,
the plaintiff in Data Case v. JS&A could not employ the rule on their benefit.
But in the court of appeals of Data Case v. IS&A and a later case, Midway v.
Artie, the plaintiff and the judge were able to use this rule that ROM is a copy.
Also when the defendants in Sega v. Accolade argued that the disassembly of
the object code does not constitute infringement because it is necessary in
order to gain an understanding of the code, the judges changed the focus of
argument and asked instead whether the object code is eligible for the full
range of copyright protection. As in most of the copyrightability arguments,
the judges held that the object code is copyrightable, thus the defendant
infringed the plaintiff's copyright.
When the arguments focused on the defendant's work, the judges
were split, but they were still more likely to decide in favor of the plaintiffs: in
7 out of 11 arguments the judges held that the copying was an infringement
and in 4 arguments they decided that the copying was not an infringement.
Some of the defendants used theories used in the copyrightability arguments
such as the idea versus expression, and the judges rejected the arguments
(Johnson v. Uniden; Johnson Controls v. Phoenix). In some of the earlier
cases judges held that the defendant's work is a derivative work, thus
constituting an infringement of the copyright (Midway v. Artie; SAS v. S&H;
Forry v. Neundorfer). But in other cases the judges decided that the
defendant's work is not a derivative work because they are not substantially
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similar (Yault v. Quaid, appeals) or because they are not fixed in a separate
form (Galoob v. Nintendo).
It was found that the nature of the parties did not make a significant

difference in the ways in which the arguments that focused on the
defendant's work were made. The arguments that used the frame of work
tended to be made in favor of the plaintiffs, although when the focus was on
the defendant's work instead of the plaintiff's work, the defendants were
sometimes able to prevail. All the cases that were decided in favor of the
defendants involved the issue of derivative works, in which the separation of
the notion of work from the notion of the plaintiff's authorship provides
room for the defendants to shift the concern toward their own authorship
and their work as a product of independent developing activity.
The frame of the use was employed in 55 arguments in the issue of
copying as infringement. Usually the defendant's argument was that their
copying of the plaintiff's program was no infringement because the program
was used for legitimate reasons. The basis for most of their arguments relate
to the theories of fair use and adaptation, which were a product of the recent
amendment to the copyright law.
Before the theories of fair use and adaptation became prevalent in
software copyright arguments, some parties and judges made arguments in
terms of "legal use" or "legitimate purposes," without specific supporting
doctrines. All of these arguments were made in favor of the plaintiffs. The
first argument regarding the defendant's use was introduced by the judge in
Midway v. Artic, when the defendant argued that copies of the plaintiff's
circuit boards are not infringement because they are useful devices. The
judge pointed out that because the printed circuit boards were not used for
"innocent purposes," they constitute infringement. Some of the defendants
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in other cases argued that their use was legitimate because its purpose was to
achieve compatibility or standardization (Lotus v. Paperback), that their
copying should be permissible as "repair" of the patented machines (AllenMyland v. IBM), and that the reverse engineering and disassembly of the
object code is intermediate copying, which is not infringement (Sega v.
Accolade). All of these arguments were rejected. Even though Sega v.
Accolade was reversed in the court of appeals, the reversal was on the ground
of fair use.
The defendant in Atari v. IS&A first made an argument based on the
issue of "adaptation" as an exception of infringing use, pursuant to 17 U.s.c.
§117, which stated that copying is not an infringement when a new copy is an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program and when such a
copy is for archival purpose only. The judge was reluctant to accept this
argument saying that no other court had interpreted §117, and the legislative
history was scant. Interpreting §117 according to a report made by a National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (hereafter
CONTU Reports), the judge held that the archival exception is not applicable
because it is to protect the use of a copy specifically against the risk of being
destroyed by mechanical or electrical failure. The judge in Micro-Sparc v.
Amtype followed this interpretation when the defendant relied on the
adaptation doctrine to argue that their service to type the published written
programs in magazines and to sell the disks was legal. The defendant used
the theory of utilization of the program as well as that of archival copying.
The judge responded that Nimmer on Copyright (hereafter Nimmer) and the
CONTU Reports strictly limit the exception to "inputting" of the program and
its use by the purchase of the program, thus creating and selling disks does
not fall into the concept of "utilization." The interpretations of §117 which
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resulted in the narrow scope of possible exceptions in these two cases became
an established rule in copyright law regarding computer software, which
influenced almost all the cases that later relied on this theory (Allen-Myland
v. IBM: ISC v. Altech: Cmax v. VCR).
Although the doctrine of adaptation may have been designed to
provide exceptions in infringement decisions defending the defendant's use
of the program, the relative focus of the above arguments regarding the
adaptation was on the nature of the program that need to be loaded into a
diskette and are subject to the risk of being destroyed, rather than on the
nature of the defendant's use. This may have had a significant influence on
the ways in which the arguments were made, because a particular nature of
the defendant's use of the program can be argued to have a relationship with
the defendant's independent production. In other words, the defendants
could have argued that their use of the plaintiff's program did not influence
the process of "independent" creation of their own programs. But when the
inherent focus of the arguments that used the adaptation theory was placed
more in the frame of work than in the frame of the defendant's authorship,
the arguments' almost always found an infringement, even when the
defendant was a developer. In this situation, even the defendants who had
the resource of having developed his own program could not benefit from
this doctrine.
On the other hand, there were 2 cases that used the doctrine of
adaptation and were made in favor of the defendants. One of such cases is
surprisingly Vault v. Ouaid in which the defendant's program allowed a user
to make copies of programs contained in floppy diskettes which had a serious
potential of creating a large number of infringing copies. The judges in Vault
simply refused to follow the interpretation of the previous cases that adopted
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the view of the CONTU Report and Nimmer. They argued that the statutory
reading itself does not suggest the narrow conception of the exception, and
focused on the fact that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's program did
include "non-infringing" use. Thus the judges focused their arguments on
the nature of use rather than on the nature of work. The judge in Foresight
v. Pfortmiller also refused to follow the narrow interpretation of the previous
cases, by arguing that Pfortmiller enhanced the plaintiff's program and used it
only in its business and did not sell. Therefore, distinguishing the use of the
Pfortmiller from the nature of the defendant's use in other cases, the
argument in this case remained focused on the frame of use.

n was found that most of the arguments that used the doctrine of
adaptation focused on the nature of the work in the process of interpreting
the statute, thus the judges decided that the defendant's copying of the
plaintiff's work could not be an exception to finding an infringement.
However, when the arguments remained focused on the nature of the use
and the defendants were also developers themselves, the judges sometimes
decided that the copying did not constitute infringement. It seems that the
arguments can be made in favor of the defendants when the defendants
effectively employ their resources (being and being perceived as a developer)
and the structural rules (valuing the independent creativity of developing
computer software), i.e., employ the frame of use in relation to the fame of
authorship by arguing how the defendants' program still involves a process
of independent creation despite their use of the plaintiff's software.
Scholars have noted that in early cases regarding the adaptations of the
works of authorship in other areas of law, the new creator of an unauthorized
adaptation was not deemed to be an infringer but regarded as a new author.
For example, Kaplan (1967) noted that the infringement problem was being
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answered by looking not so much at what the defendant had taken as to what
he had added or contributed. But as in other contemporary cases, showing
how much of his work he did not pirate does not seem to mean that he did
not infringe the copyright in software copyright cases.
The defendants involved in the arguments regarding the issue of
copying as infringement invariably focused on the frame of use, and when
the frame of use was used, judges tended to argue that the copying constituted
infringement (41 of 54 arguments). The defendants including those who
were developers themselves were not able to shift the focus of the argument
toward the nature of their developing activity. There were only 2 arguments
that used the frame of authorship, and these arguments failed to employ the
structural rules established in the authorship arguments in copyright law.
Arguments using the frame of authorship were made by a plaintiff once and a
defendant once. Both of them were rejected because they used the "sweat of
the brow" arguments that had been widely criticized in other areas of
copyright law. Responding to their arguments that considerable "time, effort,
and money" went into developing the program, judges stated that the "sweat
of the brow" evidence is not to be considered in a copyright case (Autoskill v.
National Education: Sega v. Accolade, appeals). Thus, the actors in these cases
failed to use the structural rules on their behalf, even when one of them had
the resource to effectively use the rule because the defendant was a firm that
developed a program. By explicitly rejecting the value of "labor" and "effort,"
as opposed to "expertise" and "independent creation," these arguments and
decisions seem to have refined and reinforced the existing structural rule
regarding authorship.
Fair use is a doctrine that recently began to be used in copyright cases
regarding computer software. The first argument was made by a defendant in
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a case decided in 1990, and the theory was frequently used each year from then
on. Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act states that "the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords of by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright." Four factors are suggested to be considered to determine whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use: the purpose and
character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyright work as a whole,
and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. Courts differ in terms of which factors they consider and
which factors they weigh heavily. Since these 4 factors involve different
frames, the ways in which the courts responded to the arguments that used
this theory provide an understanding of the values created, maintained, and
reinforced in the copyright arguments and decisions regarding computer
software.
There are 9 cases in which the theory of fair use was applied and
discussed, one of which was reversed in the court of appeals. Only 2 cases
decided that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's program was a fair use.
Most of the cases considered all the 4 factors and weighed each factor as the
same. For example, in Cable/Home v. Network, the judges held that the
defendant's device to de-scramble the plaintiff's program was made for
commercial use, that the plaintiff's program was copyrighted, that a
qualitative evaluation indicated the two programs were substantially similar,
and that the defendant's device had a negative effect on the plaintiff's market.
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The fair use arguments in Allen-Myland v. IBM and Kepner-Tregoe v.
Leadership were also similar.
The court of appeals in Atari .v. Nintendo was the only court that did
not explicitly mention the 4 factors. But the court implicitly focused on the
first factor by saying that the reverse engineering is not a fair use because its
use was beyond understanding and distinguishing unprotected ideas but the
use included commercially appropriating the program. In the cases that did
not find a fair use, while the issue of commercial use was present in every
case, the factor of the market effect was often considered the least important.
For example, in Lotus v. Borland, all the other 3 factors were considered and
decided in favor of the plaintiff. But the effect on the market was argued that
it can be presumed by a commercial use, thus a likelihood of negative effect
on the market is enough to decide that it was not a fair use. In Sottel v.
Dragon, 2 factors were found to work in favor of the plaintiff and 2 factors
were found to work in favor of the defendant. The judge argued that the
purpose was solely for profit and the portion used by the defendant was
qualitatively substantial, which worked against finding a fair use. But it was
found that the work is a utilitarian,functional, and factual work and that
there was no evidence that the defendant's use would affect the potential
market, both of which worked in favor of finding a fair use. Then the judge
decided against finding a fair use based on a "good faith" concern.
On the other hand, courts that found a fair use emphasized the
importance of the effect on the market while considering the purpose of use
and the amount of copying less importantly. For example, Galoob v.
Nintendo held that the effect on the market is the single most important
factor while the court held that the defendant's videogame accessory was
made for a family's non-commercial home use (focusing on the end user's
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use rather than the defendant's use of the program), that the plaintiff's games
were published work which gains less protection, and that the portion copied
is not an important factor. The judge provided a detailed analysis of market
analysis in arguing that most of the defendant's works are no longer in the
market, so the plaintiff's program cannot affect the sale of products and future
harm is not likely to occur, and that the defendant's product would encourage
rather than discourage enthusiasm over video games in general. The court of
appeals in Sega v. Accolade also argued that the issue of commercial use is
insignificant and can be rebutted by the fact that the defendant's work
involved intermediate use only and that the public benefits from the
compatibility gained in the defendant's work. The judges also argued that
even a wholesale copying should be allowed if it increases the public use, and
the minor economic loss of the plaintiff caused by the defendant as a
legitimate competitor should not bar a finding of fair use.
The arguments that used the theory of fair use resemble various
arguments that are considered in copyrightability and infringement cases.
The judges who considered the theory of fair use were more likely to decide
that the defendant's work infringed the plaintiff's program. When the
arguments used the issues of the defendant's use, substantial similarity, or
the nature of the plaintiff's work, the judges tended to decide against the
defendants. However, the market consequences were seriously considered
and extensively discussed, the judge found in favor of the defendants, the
market consequences were rarely considered and usually speculated when
considered, as similar to the finding in the preliminary injunction
arguments. The same was true with the issue of public benefit and public use.
Although when the judge acknowledged the issue raised by the defendants in
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Sega v. Accolade. it worked in favor of the defendant, public interest was the
least frequently considered concept in the fair use arguments.
Beside the arguments regarding the theory of fair use, there were 6
arguments that used the frame of consequence on the market and
innovation, most of which were initiated by the defendants and the plaintiffs
rather than the judges. The judges rejected all of them. In these cases the
judges simply rejected the defendants' arguments that finding an
infringement would discourage innovation (Pearl v. Competition), and
would drive competitors out of the market (Data General v. Grumman; ~
v. Accolade). In one case the judge ignored the plaintiff's argument that used
the theory of market consequence by shifting the focus to other issues. In
Vault v. Ouaid. the plaintiff used the argument regarding the impact of the
defendant's software that allows a user to make copies of programs.
Responding to the plaintiff's argument that they lost customers, the judges
argued that even if the plaintiff did lose customers, the purchasers of the
program, not the defendant who made the program, were responsible. Thus
the concern of market consequence that the plaintiff raised was ignored and
the focus of argument was shifted to the issue of deciding the responsible
party. On the contrary, in another case the judge responded to the
defendant's argument which was not directly related to the market
consequence by introducing a marketplace concern. The judge in Midway v.
Artic responded to the defendant's analogy of a speeding-up kit used on the
plaintiff's videogame to speeding-up of a phonograph record, by pointing out
the difference between phonograph record and videogame in terms of the
demand in the market. The judge argued that since there is enormous
demand for speeded-up videogames but little if any demand for speeded-up
records, the defendant's kit infringed the plaintiff's copyright.
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Whenever the judges considered the market consequences in their
arguments regardless of whether they were initiated by the defendants, the
plaintiffs or the judges themselves, they decided that the copying does
constitute infringement. Only when the argument regarding the market
consequence was placed in the context of fair use, was it decided that copying
does not constitute an infringement. Otherwise, arguments that used the
frame of market consequence were always rejected whether the argument was
made by the plaintiff or the defendant.
The arguments that used the frame of the public interest were analyzed
in the previous section on the framework of the public interest versus the
private property right. It was found that the arguments regarding the public
access and benefit were infrequently made and these arguments were usually
rejected by the judges. Especially, when the parties involved non-developers
of any computer programs, the argument using the frame of public interest
(especially the doctrines of publication and first sale) were never accepted.
Only when both parties were developers of different programs the party that
used the argument based on these theories had a chance to convince the
judges, but they were not always successful. The most important
consideration seemed to be whether the program had a direct linkage with
the plaintiff's program or was independent created. Therefore, it is suggested
that the value of the independent creation is still emphasized in the
arguments using the frame of public interest, thus the structural rule
regarding the authorship that works in the copyrightability cases still prevails
in the arguments regarding the public interest.
In conclusion, when the arguments used the frame of the defendant's

use, judges generally decided against the defendants. At first the judges did
not have clear structural rules to rely on when the arguments regarding the
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nature of the defendant's use of the program were introduced. Drawing on
the available rules relating to the nature of work, judges began to focus the
arguments on the issue of copying as infringement on the plaintiff's work
rather than on the defendant's development activities. As the decisions were
being made against the defendants as a result of these arguments, the
defendants failed to establish a structural rule regarding their use of the
program in their favor.
It was found that the nature of the actors influenced the ways in which

they make arguments. For example, when the plaintiffs were nondevelopers, all of their arguments used the frame of use, while when they
were developers their arguments included all the frames of work, authorship,
and use. In the same vein, when the defendants were non-developers, they
used the frame of use almost exclusively, while the defendants who
developed their own programs used the frame of use more frequently, but
also used the frame of work. Even though the nature of the actors
constrained and enabled the plaintiffs and the defendants in a similar
fashion, the result of this influence was different to the plaintiffs and to the
defendants due to the mechanism by which the established structural rules
operated. When the non-developing plaintiffs used the frame of the use, it
did not work against them if the judges shifted the concern toward the nature
of the plaintiff's work. This is because the structural rule regarding the
nature of the plaintiff's work usually granted the copyright protection to
computer programs. However, the use of the frame of use clearly worked
against the defendants including the ones who developed their own
programs, because the focus on the nature of work deprived them of the
opportunities to shift the concern toward their independent developing
activities.
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The implication of these interactions between the structural rules and
the actors' resources is clearly reflected in the ways in which the decisions
were made according to the nature of the actors, in the arguments regarding
the issue of copying as infringement. Differing from any of the issues from
the copyright cases, in the issue of copying as infringement, it was found that
if the defendants were developers, it was more likely to be decided in favor of
the plaintiffs when the plaintiffs were non-developers (100% in favor of the
plaintiffs) than when the plaintiffs were developers (56%). The apparent
paradox is solved by examining how the plaintiff's tendency to employ the
frame of use when they were non-developers, which was a constraint of the
structural rule and their resources, actually helped them to render the
decisions in their favor, whereas the tendency of the defendants to rely on the
frame of use became a real constraint to them. This may be unintended but
real consequences of the interaction between the structural rules and
resources, where the apparent structural constraints turn out to be
enablements for certain actors.
Also, parties had been reluctant to use arguments related to the concept
of the public interest or the concept of market consequences. Although those
arguments began to appear recently, introducing the frame of the public
interest or the market consequence generally did not help the parties who
made the arguments. Whether the reluctance of making arguments that
used the frame of public interest and market consequences comes from the
judges' tendency to reject the arguments or their tendency to ignore them is
not clear. But it is suggested that those concerns regarding the public interest
and the marketplace have yet to be established as identifiable structural rules
in the copyright cases of c~mputer software.
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Structural Rules Identified in Software Copyright Arguments

The analysis of legal arguments employing the framework of
authorship, work, and use reveals the ways in which structural rules are
identified, reproduced, and transformed through the actors' communicative
interactions. Earlier cases mainly considered the questions as to whether
computer programs are copyrightable, and whether the copyright of the
plaintiff's program is valid. First of all, the concept of originality was
considered the most important factor among the various requirements for
copyrightability. In the early cases in which the issue of originality was in
dispute, judges adopted the minimalistic view on the standard of originality,
that originality means only that the work "owes its origin" to the author, that
the work was "independent created." By constructing the originality standard
as minimal, courts broadened the scope of copyright protection. At the same
time, the importance given to the value of independent creativity was
established as one of the most important structural rules in copyright cases
regarding computer software.
The arguments regarding the copyrightability of computer programs
also employed the frame of work, especially various metaphors, in order to
determine the scope of copyright protection of this new technology by making
an analogy to other traditionally protected works of authorship. As many
courts regarded computer programs and their screen displays as a literary
work, artistic work, or audiovisual work, it was firmly established that the
computer software is a copyrightable subject matter. As a result, even when
the validity of a program's copyright was challenged in the validity of
ownership disputes or in other infringement issues, some argument makers
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made successful arguments simply by shifting the focus to the established rule
that a computer program is copyrightable.
Through the copyrightability arguments, it was solidly established that
computer programs are copyright as a subject matter, that the protection
extends to videogames, operating system programs as well as application
programs, to both literal and non-literal elements of programs, and to
programs embodied in both ROMs and diskettes. The only leeway that was
available to the defendants was related to the concept of the utilitarian work.
As some judges accepted the arguments that the computer program is a
utilitarian work rather than a literary work, or that some functional elements
of computer programs should not be protected by copyright, the notion of the
utilitarian work and functionality became an important structural rule that
provides a potential to benefit the defendants.
The copyrightability arguments that focused on the concept of work
instead of authorship had a dual implication for future arguments and
decisions. On the one hand, it established that a computer program is
copyrightable. Therefore, many of the copyrightability tests did not have to be
conducted once it is decided that this is a computer program and a program is
copyrightable. In this way, arguments focused on the work had a consequence
of broadening the scope of protection. On the other hand, these arguments
alienated the work from its author, providing non-developers an opportunity
to claim rights in the program that were taken from the developers. As in the
arguments that used the utilitarian work rationale, once the work is
objectified and detached from its author, it was easier to decide not to
compensate the author. Jaszi (1994) argued that ideologically, the new
emphasis on the "work" minimized the threat to free exchange posed by the
notion of an intimate link between the "author" and her productions.
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Although this alienation of the work from the author could provide
an opportunity for copyright holders to take rights from developers, as shown
in the work-for-hire cases and some other cases, the concept of the work did
not "replace" or "substitute" the concept of the authorship, but worked in
conjunction with the authorship construct. Even in the rule establishing the
copyrightability of computer software, the authorship and the creativity is
implied in the concept of the literary work or the artistic work, because it was
the reason they were protected in the first place although now the originality
question does not have to be asked again.
The recent work-for-hire doctrine provides that the author of the work
is the person on whose behalf the work was made, not the individual who
created it. Thus the works of authorship is legally objectified and propertized.
However, since the requirement for application of this doctrine is that the
creator was an employee, and that to be an employee means that one is not an
independent contractor, the person who "independently created the
program" is still beyond the reach of this process of objectification and
alienation from one's work. In addition, the employers' claims of authorship
are rationalized in terms of "creative ideas" and "inspirations," as opposed to
labor, which are concomitant with its concomitant values of originality and
creativity. In this way, the authorship construct is not only alive in work-forhire doctrine, but also its values are extended and reinforced.
The concept of authorship and work that was established and typified
as structural rules in copyrightability cases also influences the ways in which
the infringement cases are argued and decided. First of all, some of the issues
in infringement cases such as the validity of ownership and the copyrightable
expression render the infringement cases strikingly similar to copyrightability
arguments and decisions. By never refuting the validity of the plaintiff's
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copyright and by transforming the substantial similarity arguments into
copyrightability arguments regarding the plaintiff's work, courts not only
broadened the scope of copyright, but also reproduced and justified the
authorship construct with its minimalistic standard.
It was only in the context of the substantial similarity issue where some

changes in the structural environment occurred through the actors'
interactions employing their resources and structural rules. The defendants
who developed their own programs used the structural rule that requires a
minimal standard of independent creation and the resources of being a
developer themselves, of which consequence was more arguments made in
favor of them than made in any other issues. At the same time, their
arguments that used the frame of work centered around the nature of the
defendant's work rather than the plaintiff's work, and they gained a more
equal footing to compete with the plaintiffs between a work and a work
which was severed from the notion of the plaintiff's authorship. In this
process, the structural rule was not any longer applied differently for the
plaintiffs and the defendants, and the structural rules began to encompass the
defendant's work and the defendant's authorship as well.
Moreover, the concept of authorship interacted with the notion of
work in the similarity cases as well. Among the various substantial similarity
tests, the lay observer test was criticized and diminished while the extrinsic
test and expert testimony were encouraged. Not only was the lay observer test
criticized, the concept of a lay observer, "a reasonable person," was equalized
to a computer programmer, a computer expert. Also, in the extrinsic test, the
only device that was used by the courts to evaluate opposing testimonies was
the background and expertise of each expert, rather than any objective test. In
this process, the value of the authorship construct, i.e., creativity enough for
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independent production, is again emphasized. However, this concept became
explicitly adapted to the realm of computer programs by being transformed
into the value of scientific expertise, knowledge, and skills. Therefore, in the
similarity issue, not only were the defendants who were always
disadvantaged in copyrightability arguments sometimes able to prevail, but
the structural rules were slightly transformed to reflect the different aspect of
computer programs from other works of authorship. In this way, applying
the existing form of copyright law to a new technology that is considered to
have a different functional aspect was rationalized.
As the copyrightability of computer programs becomes established, and
as there are many new cases in which both the plaintiffs and the defendants
are developers or both are non-developers, the question regarding the nature
of the use of a program became important. The only issue in the
infringement cases that extensively employed the frame of use is that of
copying as infringement. Since it was not clear to the judges and other legal
actors what kind of rules they had to draw to decide on the issue of use, the
judges turned into the typified rule of providing copyright to computer
programs. In this process, the defendants failed to shift the arguments on the
concept of authorship in relation to the concept of use, even when they had a
resource of being developers. Consequently, how much the defendant
contributed was not considered a concern but the focus of the arguments was
whether the plaintiff's copyright was a valid one. Thus the decisions tended
to be made against the defendants even when they were developers. In this
process, the defendants were not able to use their resources to take a full
advantage of the structural environment which was not clearly determined at
the time, and the structural rules regarding the plaintiff's work and the
plaintiff's authorship began to control in the issues related to the use as well.
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Consequently, rules that specifically and exclusively concern the nature of the
use is scarce and often replaced by the already established rules regarding the
authorship and work.
Finally, it was found that the public interest or market consequence is a
theme that hardly becomes a basis of copyright decisions regarding computer
software. Some of the actors have used the theory, and the judges tended to
argue in favor of the plaintiffs when these frames were used. Rather than
being outright rejected, the concept of the public interest seems to be usually
ignored, or trivialized to be equal to providing monetary reward to
individual authors. Also the market consequence was rarely considered, and
an extensive analysis of the market situation was hardly provided. In
general, arguments that use policy considerations as a rationale tended to be
placed in the context of, and be influenced by, other frames or typified
traditional legal rules of authorship such as the concept of independent
production, rather than to operate as a decisive factor themselves. Therefore,
concerns related to the public interest and the marketplace remain to be
established as structural rules in future copyright cases regarding computer
software.
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VIII. CONCLUSION: PROCESS OF STRUCTURAnON IN THE

COPYRIGHT CASES REGARDING COMPUTER PROGRAMS

This study on legal arguments and decisions regarding the copyright
protection of computer programs in the United States demonstrates the
importance of communicative activities in structuration process. As will be
discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs, the actors' use of their
resource of being a developer in making legal arguments was found to be the
most influential on the judges' decision-making process than any other
factors. The framework ot' authorship, work, and use helps us understand the
legal actors' relationships and struggles that are manifested in their legal
arguments, because the construct of authorship, which is transformed and
reproduced through the decision-making process, reflects and generates the
underlying values of the legal system and the society.
In general, it was found that in copyright cases regarding computer

programs, the plaintiffs were more likely to prevail than the defendants, and
there was more consensus in granting copyright to the plaintiffs than in
holding that the defendant infringed the plaintiff's copyright. The study
examined various factors that may have influenced the ways in which the
copyright decisions were made. Some of the factors that have traditionally
been acknowledged as having an influence in other areas of law, such as the
judges' political or educational characteristics and the human and financial
resources of the parties, were not found to be related to the copyright
decisions regarding computer programs. The most important variable that
relates to the decision making was the nature of the actors, whether they were
developers of computer programs or not. Although the judges tended to
grant copyright to the plaintiff's program regardless of the nature of the
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plaintiffs and the defendants, infringement decisions were clearly related to
the nature of the defendants, i.e., whether the defendant developed his own
program or not.
The importance of being a developer was manifested in another
dimension of the decision making, regarding the nature of the computer
program. Although the nature of the plaintiff's program did not relate to the
ways in which copyrightability and infringement decisions were made, the
nature of the defendant's program turned out to be related to decisions in an
interesting way. Judges tended to grant copyright to the plaintiff's program
regardless of whether it is an application program or a videogame, and
whether the aspects in dispute are literal or nonliteral elements of the
program. However, in making infringement decisions that usually involve
two programs developed by the plaintiff and the defendant, the judges found
an infringement even more likely when the defendants developed products
that have characteristic that are not clearly harmful to the plaintiff or other
users such as accessories to the plaintiff's program or a device to enhance the
plaintiff's program, than when they developed competing products which are
functionally so identical that the plaintiff is very likely to suffer from it. This
finding clearly illustrates that the central question that the courts considered
was the independent developing activity of the defendant rather than any
other related concerns such as the function of programs or market
consequence of the defendant's program.
Examining the relationship between the decisions and the various
other factors revealed the importance of being a developer of computer
programs to prevail in copyright cases. This finding posed an interesting
question when it is compared to some critics' argument that the authors'
rights are taken to be given to the copyright holders in the U.s. copyright law,

192

which has been shaped through the struggle between authors and publishers.
This seeming paradox will be reconciled by analyses of legal arguments that
unveil the communicative interactions between plaintiffs and defendants,
including authors and copyright holders.
In order to understand the mechanisms by which copyright decisions
are made, this study conceptualized legal arguments made by the plaintiffs,
defendants, and judges as a critical nexus that helps us explain the
relationship between the decisions and other factors. In analyzing legal
arguments, this study employed various approaches that were suggested by
scholars and critics. Critical scholars and historians have suggested to focus
on examining the ways in which the copyright system is shaped by struggles
among the stakeholders. Thus the notions of developers versus copyright
holders, developers versus non-developers, and plaintiffs versus defendants
were employed as a main framework to examine the copyright arguments
and decisions. Also, the frames of authorship, work, and use were found to
be particularly useful in understanding the stakeholders' relationships and
struggles that are manifested in their legal arguments, and in exploring the
underlying values that are reflected and generated through the decision
making processes regarding copyright protection of computer programs.
In the contemporary copyright discourse regarding computer programs,
the idea of individual creation is constantly praised in numerous aspects.
The obsession with "originality" in conceptions of copyright that Kaplan and
other scholars have noted seems to be apparent in the copyright cases
regarding computer programs as well. In earlier cases in which the question
of the copyrightability of computer programs was addressed, originality was
presented as the most important requirement for copyrightability. At the
same time, the judges adopted the minimalistic view on the standard of
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originality, which only requires a potential author to make something "of his
own" or "independently." The authorship concept is thus dissociated from
the Romantic notion of "genius" and then reassociated with the meanest
levels of creative activity. The construct of authorship has been mobilized yet
remained central through the legal actors' constant efforts to legitimize their
interests in computer programs. Since most of the plaintiffs were developers
and copyright holders at the same time in earlier copyrightability cases, the
concept of authorship praising the minimal amount of independent
production was not so much a product of the struggle between the developers
and the copyright holders as a product of the common interests of both
parties. The rule that makes it easier to become an author thus rationalized
extending copyright protection to a new kind of subject matter, computer
programs.
Another important aspect of discourse in the early copyrightability
cases was raised by the question as to what is the copyrightable subject matter
and whether computer programs can fall into that category. In order to make
a decision regarding this new technology, judges analogized computer
programs to a literary work or an artistic work, and videogames to an
audiovisual work, both of which had been traditionally protected by
copyright. As more and more judges and other legal actors followed this
view, the computer program as a copyrightable subject matter (regardless of
its form, function, and embodiment) was solidly established and typified as an
important structural rule in copyright law, thus legitimately becoming a
vehicle for a significant expansion of copyright protections to non-developers
as well. On the other hand, when the judges focused their arguments on the
nature of the work sometimes, they tended to limit copyright protection if
they perceived computer programs as a utilitarian work, probably because it
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was perceived easier not to compensate the author when the work was
objectified and detached from its author.
While arguments focusing on the concept of work could be used for
both broadening and limiting the scope of copyright, the concept of work
alienated the work from its author and objectified the work, thus the leverage
of publishers and other purchasers of authors' rights was increased. Critical
scholars have suggested that it was through this use of the concept of work
the copyright law of the printing press gave entrepreneurs a monopoly over
the products with little regard to, or concern for, the authors who produce the
product (see Patterson and lindberg, 1991). Copyright arguments and
decisions regarding computer software were continuously shaped by the
interactions between these two seemingly contradictory concepts: the concept
of authorship that was supported by common interests of developers and
copyright holders, and the concept of work that seem to embrace the interests
of non-developers rather than those of developers. These two concepts,
however, did not replace or substitute each other. Nor did they remain the
same constructs over time. The analysis of interactions between legal rules
and actors' resources illustrates how these two concepts are mobilized in
relation to each other through communicative activities of legal actors, and
become constraints and enablements for future interactions of the legal actors.
The tension between the concept of work and that of authorship was
keenly manifested in the cases that employed the work-for-hire doctrine,
which renders the person, on whose behalf the work was made, the author of
the work, when a work is deemed to have been made "for-hire." Under this
doctrine, the alienation of creative workers from the products of their labor is
formally and legally complete. But surprisingly, the notion of authorship
with its concomitant value of originality is employed to support this doctrine.
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Because the prerequisite for the applicability of this doctrine is that the creator
was an "employee" which is considered as an opposite concept of
"independent contractor," the creator who "independently developed" the
program is out of the reach of this alienation and objectification her work.
Moreover, the employers' claims of authorship are rationalized in terms of
"creative ideas," "supervision," and "inspirations," all of which are
concurrent value of authorship. In this way, the emphasis given to the value
of individual creativity is reinforced, and the authorship construct is
extended to encompass the employer's creative ideas and inspirations.
The construct of authorship and that of work also comprised a critical
part of the structural environment in which infringement decisions were
made. The most simple and direct influence of these structural rules was
found in the ways in which the legal actors relied on them in dealing with
the issue of the validity of ownership of copyright and the question as to
whether the copied portion was a copyrightable expression. These two issues
comprised almost half of the arguments in infringement cases, and the
plaintiffs, whether they were developers or non-developers, received a great
amount of benefit by applying these traditional copyrightability rules. It was
because these rules were typified and objectified in cases where the plaintiffs
were usually developers and copyright holders at the same time, thus tended
to grant copyright to the plaintiffs .. As a result, the structural rules relating to
independent production and to the computer program as a copyrightable
subject matter were reproduced and reinforced in infringement cases.
It was only in the context of substantial similarity issue where changes

in structural rules occurred. As most of the arguments in the similarity issue
compare the plaintiff's work and the defendant's work, thus centered around
the nature of work, the concept of the authorship was severed from the
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plaintiff's work. The structural rule regarding authorship that usually gave
plaintiffs more advantage was thus not operating here. At the same time, as
the arguments focused more on the defendant's work than the plaintiff's
work, the structural rule regarding the computer programs as a copyrightable
subject matter provided a similar application to the defendant's program. As
a result, the defendants in the similarity issue gained more equal footing to
compete with the plaintiffs with their works, and the structural rule focusing
on the concept of work was transformed in a way that it encompasses the
defendant's work as well as the plaintiff's work. In addition, as most of the
defendants in the similarity issue developed their own programs, many of
them were able to use their resources of being developers in shifting the focus
of arguments from work to authorship by arguing that they have the "skills,"
"experience," "knowledge," and "talent" to develop their programs
"independently." The concept of independent creation and expertise that had
become objectified structural rules constrained legal actors' arguments but
also enabled some actors who had traditionally been disadvantaged by the
rules, when they employed their resources effectively, i.e., by being
developers and being perceived as independent creators by the judges. This is
a striking evidence that a structural change is possible due to the duality of
structure that becomes both the medium and the outcome of the interactions.
Another way in which the concept of authorship interacted with the
concept of work was found in the judges' application of similarity tests. In
determining similarities and differences between the two "works," judges
criticized and diminished the lay observer test and encouraged the extrinsic
test. Some judges even argued that a computer expert and programmer was
considered a lay observer (a reasonable person) in copyright cases.
Consequently, most of the similarity cases were thus decided by expert
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testimony. When the different parties' testimonies contradicted each other,
which was usually the case, the only device to evaluate the testimonies used
in the courts was the expertise' background and knowledge. Therefore, even
in the arguments that focused on the concept of work, the importance was
given to the "expertise" and "skills" that are concurrent yet a slightly distorted
value of authorship. Artistic creativity that had been emphasized in other
areas of copyright, and independent creativity that had been emphasized in
earlier cases of software copyright, was now transformed to "scientific
expertise, knowledge, and skills." This transformation seems to reflect the
tension between the acknowledgment of the unique aspect of computer
programs and the need to apply the existing form of copyright law to the new
subject matter. Through this transformation of the rule, the value of
authorship remains to be emphasized, and extending the copyright law to
computer programs is rationalized.
As the copyrightability of computer programs became objectified, and
as many new cases began to involve developers as both plaintiffs and
defendants and involve non-developers as both plaintiffs and defendants, the
question regarding the nature of the use of a program became significant. The
issue of use was mostly considered regarding the question as to whether the
defendant's copying of the plaintiff's program constituted infringement.
Because no clear rules regarding the use of computer programs had been
established yet, judges tended to turn into the existing structural rules
regarding the authorship and the work.
The consequence of this process was again an advantage given to the
plaintiffs, because the focus of the arguments tended to be on the plaintiff's
work, even when the defendants were developers themselves. Some
defendants were able to prevail in few cases in which the arguments

198

remained focused on the nature of the defendant's use which implicitly
suggested that the use did not make the defendant's work a product of "less
independent" creation. In this way, the arguments regarding the use of a
program were greatly influenced by the concept of authorship and that of
work. Despite the fact that a new kind of issue was introduced, which can
create a structural environment where the possibility of structural change is
great, and despite the fact that most of the defendants in these cases had the
resource of being developers themselves, they were not able to make legal
arguments in their favor. The reason for this was that the new rules that they
mostly relied on were contextualized by the existing structural rules,
especially the ones that traditionally disadvantaged the defendants. In other
words, had they focused the arguments on the defendant's authorship or the
defendant's work, relating to which more favorable structural rules had been
created in the similarity issue, it may have been more effective than using
new rules that had not been tested (such as adaptation and fair use) or the
existing rules that were unfavorable to them (such as focus on the plaintiff's
work or the plaintiff's authorship).
However, the processes regarding the use of the program seems not so
much to be a result of strategic activities as unintended consequences of
interactions between structural rules and resources. Both the plaintiffs and
the defendants who were non-developers were constrained to focus their
arguments on the issue of use rather than work or authorship according to
the existing structural environment. But the focus on the concept of use did
not work against the plaintiffs who were non-developers because the rules
were in favor of them. On the contrary, the focus on the use became a real
constraint to the defendants who were non-developers. As a result, different
from in any other issues of copyright cases, in the issue regarding the nature
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of use, defendants were even more likely to lose the case when the plaintiffs
were non-developers than when the plaintiffs were developers. This is thus
an unintended yet real consequence of the interaction between the structural
rules and the resources, where the apparent structural constraints turned out
to be enablements for certain actors.
The implication of the arguments and decisions made regarding the
use of a program is significant. Structural rules that specifically concern the
nature of the use are still scarce, and they tend not to be developed because
they are often replaced by the rules regarding the authorship and work. In
this process, the structural rules regarding the authorship and work are again
reproduced and typified.
As Jaszi (1991) argued that the public/private contradiction may not
capture the true essence of the fundamental conflict of interests that underlie
copyright, concerns regarding the public interest and marketplace turned out
to be hardly a basis of copyright decisions regarding computer programs.
When it did become a basis, the concepts and meanings of the public interest
and market effect were distorted and the decisions tended to be made in favor
of the plaintiffs rather than the defendants. For example, the public interest
was often trivialized to mean the providing of a monetary reward to the
individual authors, and an extensive analysis of market consequence was
rarely provided. Arguments that used these policy considerations tended to
be placed in the context of, and be influenced by, other rules of authorship or
work. As these considerations rarely operate as a decisive factor themselves,
parties seem to have been reluctant to use these concerns as a rationale for
their arguments. Therefore, workable rules related to policy considerations
are yet to be created in future copyright arguments and decisions regarding
computer programs.
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IX.

DISCUSSION

This study examined how legal actors who have different interests and
resources interact through their communicative activities and how these
interactions using structural rules and resources shape the copyright law
regarding computer programs. The structural rules mainly concerning the
concept of authorship and work at first enabled the developers and copyright
holders to make effective arguments to extend copyright protection on their
behalf. When the cases began to involve more actors who are developers but
not copyright holders and the actors who are not developers but claim their
rights in the programs, the struggle between the developers and nondevelopers were manifested in their arguments focusing on the concept of
work and that of authorship. The constructs of authorship and the work
have been mobilized through the actors' interactions and in the process of
constraining and enabling the actors, the structural rules concerning the
concept of authorship and work have been also transformed and sometimes
reproduced.
The implication of these dynamics can be described in two dimensions.
The first is the structural rules that have extended copyright protection to
almost all the aspects of computer programs that can be shown to be
independently produced. These rules can work as enablements when the
actors use their resources of being developers effectively. At the same time,
the authorship construct has been mobilized and transformed throughout the
copyright cases. The overall incoherence of the law's account of "authorship"
may be best understood as reflecting a continuing struggle between the
economic forces that would be best served by the further objectification of
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creative endeavor and the ideological persistence of creativity and
individualism that Jaszi noted.
The second dimension regards the stakeholders of the copyright system
of computer programs. Actors who develop their own programs, thus who
can claim themselves as "authors" have the most important resource in
making legal arguments. This is a consequence of the struggle (or
cooperation) between authors and publishers in early copyright cases. On the
other hand, non-developers who are usually copyright holders tried to
alienate the work from its author in order to prevail in later cases. As the
notion of author tends to contextualize many arguments focusing on the
work, this was not always successful. However, as demonstrated in the
arguments regarding the concept of use, non-developers who are plaintiffs
may benefit from the structural rule that tends to favor the plaintiffs, which
was a result of earlier cases that usually had developers-copyright holders as
plaintiffs.
Therefore, the findings of this study demonstrate the importance of the
role of communication in structuration, because the only way that the legal
actors were able to legitimize their interests and possibly transform the
existing structural rules was through their communicative activities. The
nature of the actor, i.e., whether she was a developing entity, was found to be
a single most important factor that influences the decisions made by the
judges. However, only when the legal actor could successfully present herself
as a party that involved with developing computer programs, the judges were
more likely to accept her arguments. When the actor was a developer but she
focused her arguments on the nature of the work rather than her developing
activity, the actor tended not to have any advantage over the other party.
Therefore, it was the legitimacy gained by communicating the nature of the
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actor, rather than the nature of the actor itself, that made the difference in the
ways the judges made decisions. This result has particular significance for the
study of communication, in that the importance of the strategic use of
structural rules and resources exercised in communication activities can be
applied to any other areas of communication that involve efforts to influence
the authority, let alone to other conflicted areas of law.
The result of this study is somewhat contradictory to previous
conclusions made by some scholars that the American copyright law is
protecting publisher's property rights while disregarding author's moral
rights. It was found that the author's and developer's rights were even more
likely to be protected than those of publishers as copyright holders, and the
authors' rights in computer programs included both moral rights in terms of
rewarding their effort and expertise and property rights that can also be
transferred to others. This is not a comparative study that tries to suggest that
U.S. copyright is more author-oriented or society-oriented in any way. What
it does show is how the value of the author's independent creativity and
expertise became emphasized through the interaction between the copyright
holders and developers. Although the concept of creativity and expertise
tended to provide advantage to the developers in making their arguments, it
was not always the case, and more importantly, it was an intended and
unintended result of the interactions between the actors using their resources
and rules. This was a process of structuration in which the copyright system
is shaped and reproduced through the continuity and transformation of
structural rules that function as the product and antecedent of the actors'
practices.
Some scholars' argument was that legal rules used in the copyright law
reflect how they overlook the users' concerns as opposed to developers'
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concerns, which is consistent with the implication of this study. First of all,
the nature of the legal cases usually involved authors and publishers rather
than users. This is in part attributed to the fact that litigation usually costs
large sums of money and effort. Although it was found that allocative
resources in terms of revenues, the number of employees, and the age of the
firms were not significantly related to the decisions, one of the indirect ways
in which the allocative resources playa role in this copyright system of
computer software may have been beyond the scope of the data of this study.
The adequate level of financial ability must have been critical in allowing the
firms or individuals to file a suit against others or respond to others. It is
possible to speculate that many individuals and firms did not have an
opportunity to initiate litigation, and as a result, the legal cases in the
copyright protection of computer software tended to involve developers and
copyright holders rather than users, and bigger firms among the developers.
The fact that the actors in the legal decisions mainly consist of copyright
holders and developers may result in a limitation in providing policy
guidelines that can be applied to all the actors involved in the creation,
distribution, and the use of computer programs.
In addition, the legal discussion surrounding the copyright protection
of computer programs does not include many issues on possible
consequences or implications on the users or on the market, or on the public
interest. The minimal discussion of the public interest ironically focuses on
rewarding the authors' creativity and efforts. It is suggested again that the
U.s. copyright law reflects and reproduces the norms and values embedded
implicitly and explicitly in a society, which value and reward scientific
expertise and specialized knowledge. It is also suggested that the power in
terms of knowledge and expertise is reproduced not only by the process of
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acknowledging and protecting knowledge and expertise, but also in the
process of decision making that influences the access to computer programs,
which become important sources of skills and expertise.
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3.

CODING SCHEMES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS

File Name: Short name-court level-year
Name of the case (X v. X)
Name:
Citation:
Date: YYMMDD
Court: District/ appellate division
State
Judge:Name (underline the writer of the opinion in appellate cases
Characteristics:
appointing President (party)
school graduated
age
Legal Topics: Authorship / Copyrightability /Infringement
Procedural Status: Summary judgment/Preliminary injunction/Final
judgment
Name of the plaintiff
Nature of the plaintiff (developer/ copyright owner/both
developer and copyright owner at the same time/retailer, etc.)
D:
Name of the defendant
Nature of the defendant (developer/copyright
owner/both developer and copyright owner at the same time/retailer, etc.)
Parties:

P:

The kind of computer programs in issue:
Subject:
1. system programs / operating system programs / application programs
2. literal elements (source code / object code) / non-literal elements (structure,
sequence, and/or organization, screen display and user interfaces, function or
purpose)
Facts: Brief facts of the case and procedures
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Focusing on : Who is the author, developer, copyright owner of the
original program in issue?
If the program in issue is not one, what other programs, how they are
developed?
Who sought what relief claiming what?
Arguments per each Q (issues and theories):
1. Questions:The specific questions asked and tried to be answered "in" the
arguments (answers)
2. Issues (small questions): underline disputed issue(s)
Copyrightability - Validity Certificate
Scope -Originality
Authorship
Fixed in tangible medium
Literary work
Infringement -

Ownership of copyright --

Copying -

copyright certificate
- Copyrightability (validity and
scope)
- Work made for hire
Access + Substantial similarity
Copyrightable expression (idea/expression)
- extrinsic (expert) and intrinsic (lay)
tests
Krafft
- structure, sequence v. purpose
Whelan
- abstraction test (filtering, and
comparison)
Nichols v. Universal
- utilitarian work
- adaptation (essential step/ archival)
- total concept and feel
Roth v. United
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- iterative test
E.F. Johnson v. Uniden
If preliminary injunction case,
Probability of success on the merits
Irreparable harm
Balance of harm
The public interest
Or,
Irreparable harm + Probability of success on the merits
Irreparable harm + serious issues and Balance of harm

3. Judge's argument style (own argument only / own order but including
parties' arguments as well / primarily following the party(s)'s argument
order)
4. Code of Arguments:
Summarize the arguments in the court opinions in the order made by
the judges. When the judges' arguments were responding to the other actors'
arguments, include the other actors' arguments as well after P: and D:.
Define one argument unit when the judge was dealing with one issue using a
legal theory, a test, or supporting evidence. A sample of coding arguments is
provided in the end of this coding sheet. The possible legal theories are
presented below.
*Theories that are used to discuss each issues
Idea v. expression -- 17 U.s.c. §102 (b)
(merger /inseparability, scenes a faire, limited
ways of expression)
Utilitarian (functional) work
Archive
Public domain (Publication)
Derivative work
Work made for hire
The purpose and character of use
Fair use: 4 factors The nature of the copyrighted work
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The amount and substantiality of the portion used
Effect on the market
(17 U.s.c. §107)
Personal use
First sale
Also define the main frame used by the each actor (authorship/nature
of the work/nature of use of the program). An argument is coded as having a
frame of the work when the argument is focused on the nature of the
computer program, i.e., whether the program was a utilitarian work or an
artistic work, whether the part of the program considered is an expression or
idea, whether the two programs considered are similar or not. An argument
is coded as having a frame of authorship when the argument is focused on
the process of developing the program, i.e., which actor provided more input
in developing the program, whether an actor has a background and skill to
possibly develop the program, etc. An argument is coded as having a frame
of use when the argument is focused on the ways in which the program was
used by another actor or the third party, i.e., whether an actor's use of the
program developed by the other actor was legitimate. See page 87 of the text
for examples of defining the frame of the arguments.
Also provide headings before the summary of the arguments in order
to indicate the issue under which the argument is made.
P:
D:

J:
5. Define the Metaphors used by each actor:
Utilitarian work
Literary work
Audiovisual work
Artistic work
6. Did the arguments include alleged infringer's effort to avoid copying?
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Decisions: In summary judgment and preliminary injunction cases,
Motion granted or denied
In appeals case,
Affirmed or reversed
For or against deciding Infringement
Plaintiff or defendant wins
For or against copyright holder (if applicable)
For or against developer (if applicable)

* A sample coding
In Data Products v. William Rappart (Copyright Law Decisions 126,723), the
opinion stated on page 24,225:
Finally, the defendants argue that any modifications made to the TAS or cable TV
program packages were valid under 17 U.S.c. §117. The argument is limited in scope: it would
serve to protect the defendants only from infringement claims which are based on the
modification of the programs for the use of Sunflower or its subsidiaries (Jetmore or
Cablevision, Ltd.). It would not provide protection from the claims of infringement arising from
the use of the programs by S T Enterprises or its subsidiaries. 17 U.S.c. §117 (1990 Supp.)
provides in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of
a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy of adaptation of
that computer program provided ... (provision of 117 is presented here)
DPI argues that §117 is inapplicable, since the modifications were not performed in the
process of inputting the programs into the Sunflower computer, but were performed later. See,
e.g., Micro-Spare, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F.Supp.33 (D.Mass. 1984). However, as Judge
O'Conner recognized in Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F.Supp. 1006,1009-10
(D.Kan. 1989), cases such as Micro-Spare which apply 117 in a narrow manner are against the
weight of recent authority and contrary to the intent of Congress. The better view is that §117
is designed to protect software purchasers who make modifications or enhancements to the
software for their own use only. ld., at 1010.
But again, §117 has only a limited application in the present case. Under the statute,
any modifications or enhancements to the DP] software would not constitute an infringement to
the extent that they were used solely by Sunflower and its subsidiaries, Jetmore and
Cablevision, Ltd. Any use of the software by S T Enterprises or its subsidiaries would not
receive any protection from §117.

The above arguments are coded as:
1) infringement
D:
Any modifications made were valid under 17 U.S.c. §117 (adaptation
for utilitarian purpose and archival purpose).

227

--- Frame: use
--- Theory: adaptation
J:
§117 has only limited application here because modification in this case
is allowed to the software for their own use only, and D's other companies
and subsidiaries (not only the ones who purchased the software at first) used
the modification (Foresight v. Pjortmiller, Micro-spare v. ).
--- Frame: use
--- Theory: adaptation
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4.

TABLES

Table 1: Cases in Different Circuits
Circuit Courts

Frequency of Cases

1

5
16
13
9
11
3
13
2

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
D.C.

Federal
Total

30
6
4

o

2
1
115

Table 2: Cases by Legal Topics
Topic of the Case

Frequency of Cases
6

Copyrightability
Infringement
Copyrightability+Infringement
Ownership

22
75
12

Total

115
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Table 3: Cases in Different Time Periods
Time Periods

Frequency of Cases
4

1978-80
1981-83
1984-87
1988-90
1991-93

28
19
31
33

Total

115

Table 4: Cases by Subject Matters
Subject Matter of the Case

Frequency of Cases
17

Operating system programs
Application programs
Video game programs

33

Total

115

65

Table 5: Cases by the Nature of the Plaintiffs
Nature of the Plaintiffs

Frequency of Cases

7

Developers
Copyright holders
Developers / copyright holders
Unclear

30

77
1

115

Total
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Table 6: Cases by the Nature of the Defendants
Nature of the Defendants

Frequency of Cases

Developers
Copyright holders
Retailers, etc.
Copyright Registrar
Unclear

68

Total

115

18

21
2
6

Table 7: Cases by the Nature of the Case
Nature of the Case

Frequency of Cases

Developer against developer
Developer against non-developer
Non-developer against any

59
24

Total

115

32

Table 8: Cases by Decisions on the Scope of Copyright Protection
Frequency of Cases

Decisions (Scope)
Limiting copyright protection
Expanding copyright protection
Only the ownership issue

43

Total

115

69
3

Table 9: Cases by Decisions on the Copyrightability of the Subject Matter
Frequency of cases

Decisions (Copyrightability)
Copyrightable
Not copyrightable

26

Total

29

3
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Table 10: Cases by Decisions on Infringement
Decisions (Infringement)

Frequency of Cases

Infringement occurred
Infringement did not occur

65
42

Total

107

Table 11: Frames used in the Judges' Arguments
Frequency of Cases

Frames
Work

Plaintiff
Defendant

100
62

Authorship

Plaintiff
Defendant

27
17

Use

by Defendant
Public
Market consequence

36
14
7

Total

261

Table 12: Frames Used in Different Time Periods
Frames
Time Periods

Work

Authorship

Use

1978-83
1984-87
1988-90
1991-93

55 (80%)
34 (76%)
31 (46%)
42 (53%)

5 (7%)
7 (16%)
14 (21%)
16 (20%)

9 (13%)
4 (9%)
23 (34%)
21 (27%)

Total

162 (62%)

42 (16%)

57 (22%)
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Table 13: Contexts of the Arguments in Different Time Periods
Contexts

Time Periods

Copyright* Owner Valid Similar Express Infringe

1978-83
1984-87
1988-90
1991-93

25 (36%)
18 (40%)
14 (21%)
1 (1%)

Total

58 (22%)

2
2
5
8

(3%)
(4%)
(7%)
(10%)

9 (13%)
1 (2%)
7 (10%)
4 (5%)

11 (16%)
14 (31%)
16 (24%)
13 (17%)

8 (12%)
3 (7%)
2 (3%)
26 (33%)

14 (20%)
7 (16%)
24 (35%)
27 (34%)

17 (7%) 21 (8%) 54 (21%) 39 (15%)

72 (28%)

• Copyright: Copyrightability
Owner: Ownership disputes
Valid: Validity of copyright in infringement cases
Similar: Substantial similarity in infringement cases
Express: Idea versus expression in infringement cases
Infringe: Copying as infringing use in infringement cases

Table 14: The Use of Frames according to the Context of the Arguments

Frames
Work
Contexts

P*

Authorship
D

P

D

Use
D

Public

Market

------------------------------------------------------

Copyright
Owner
Valid
Similar
Express
Infringe

50 (86%)

7 (12%)
8 (47%) 9 (53%)
12 (58%)
1 (5%) 4 (19%) 2 (10%)
1 (2%) 48 (89%)
5 (9%)
32 (82%) 2 (5%) 4 (10%) 1 (3%)
5 (7%) 11 (15%) 2 (3%)

Total

100 (38%) 62 (24%)

1 (2%)

2 (10%)

36 (50%) 12 (17%) 6 (8%)

25 (10%) 17 (7%) 36 (14%)

• P: Plaintiffs work or authorship
D: Defendant's work or authorship or use
Public: Public interest
Market: Market consequences or innovation
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14 (5%)

7 (3%)
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